

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—AND FOR ENGLAND.

BY

WILLIAM DIGBY, C.I.E.,

HONORARY SECRETARY, INDIAN FAMINE RELIEF FUND, 1877-78; AUTHOR OF 'THE FAMINE CAMPAIGN IN SOUTHERN INDIA;' 'FORTY YEARS OF CITIZEN AND OFFICIAL LIFE IN A CROWN COLONY;' 'INDIAN PROBLEMS FOR ENGLISH CONSIDERATION;' 'HISTORY OF THE NEWSPAPER PRESS IN INDIA AND THE FAR EAST;' ETC.

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'*On the most selfish view, it would be far better for us that the people of India were well-governed and independent of us, than ill-governed and subject to us; that they were ruled by their own kings, but wearing our broad cloth, and working with our cutlery, than that they were performing their salaams to English Collectors and English Magistrates, but were too ignorant to value,* OR TOO POOR TO BUY, *English manufactures. To trade with civilized men is infinitely more profitable than to govern savages.* THAT WOULD INDEED BE A DOTING WISDOM WHICH WOULD KEEP A HUNDRED MILLIONS OF MEN FROM BEING OUR CUSTOMERS, IN ORDER THAT THEY MIGHT CONTINUE TO BE OUR SLAVES.'—Lord Macaulay.

'*I believe that nothing but the fact that the present system is almost secure from all independent and intelligent criticism has enabled it so long to survive.*'—Sir Louis Mallet, late under Secretary for India, on Indian Land Revenue.

11.9.95

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ROOT-PRINCIPLES OF BRITISH-INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.

THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY,

Sometime Secretary of State for India.

'As *India* MUST *be bled*,'

'The lancet should be directed to the parts where the blood is congested, or at least sufficient, not to those which are already feeble for the want of it.'

'*Much of the revenue* [of India] *is exported without a direct equivalent.*'

'So far as it is possible to change the Indian fiscal system, it is desirable that the cultivator should pay a smaller proportion of the whole national charge. It is not in itself a thrifty policy to draw the mass of revenue from the rural districts.'

'I SEE NO TERROR *in the prospect of* "DRIFTING."'

'We have not the power to give permanent force to a new policy.'

'. . . a long series of inconsistencies in the course of the Indian Government. . . . . They are a warning of the fashion after which our Indian Government is made.'

'By the law of its existence it [the Indian Government] must be a government of incessant change. It is the despotism of a line of kings whose reigns are limited by climatic causes to five years.'

'Whatever power exists in England is divided between a council of which the elements are necessarily fluctuating, and a political officer whose average existence amounts to about thirty months. *It would be absurd to expect* from this arrangement *a persistent and systematic policy, if the policy is to depend upon the will of the government.*'

'Our expenses grow annually, and almost the only part of the revenue which we can expect to grow is that which comes from the land.'

'The recuperative force which plays so large a part in the calculations of Western financiers seems to be wholly wanting in the East.'

(Continued.)

SIR LOUIS MALLET,

Late Under Secretary of State for India.

'Even now, is it not nearer the truth to say that the Government of India takes, *not what it chooses, but what it dares*?'

'The day must come, and ought not to be distant, even with a people so helpless and so silent, when there must be some recognition of the duty of redistributing the fiscal burdens of the people in the several provinces with a greater regard to equality.'

'Assessments have been raised 70 or 80 per cent. in one stroke, in conformity with certain artificial and arbitrary rules often at variance with actual facts.'

'In many cases lands have been assessed which barely pay the cost of cultivation, and yield no rent at all.'

'The remarks of Sir G. Campbell and Sir H. Maine, equally appear to me to ignore that the source from which the Government of India derives its power has changed and is changing daily, and that, *if India is to be maintained and rendered a portion of the British Empire*, THIS MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED IN SOME OTHER WAY THAN BY PLACING OUR FUTURE RELIANCE ON THE EMPIRICAL ACTS OF DESPOTISM.'

'It may be said that it is idle to apply an abstract law . . . . to a society so vast and complex as that of India, but *I contend that it is a far sounder course to start from a general principle, and qualify it as you go along by the thousand considerations which its application requires in the practical conduct of government, than to discard it altogether, and deal separately with every set of facts which presents itself.* This is to embark in a boundless sea of inquiry without chart or compass.'

'I cannot but think that the quiescent attitude of Indian financiers in the face of so much that is unsound, is greatly due to their reliance on the rent of the land as a great fiscal reserve on which they can always draw in case of future difficulties.'

'By a perpetual interference with the operation of laws which our own rule in India has set in motion, and which, I venture to think, are essential to success—by a constant habit of palliating symptoms, instead of grappling with disease—may we not be leaving to those who come after a task so aggravated by our neglect or timidity, that what is difficult for us may be impossible for them?'

'We see *a system which sweeps into the coffers of the State 50 per cent. or more of the net produce of the soil*, thus diverting a fund which, in countries where private property is absolute, would, to a great extent, find its way back again into channels of agricultural improvement.'

TO

THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND

THIS LITTLE BOOK

CONTAINING SOME GENERALLY OVERLOOKED FACTS RESPECTING

THE PEOPLE OF INDIA

IS

DEDICATED

With the humble yet strong hope and earnest expectation and belief that the more completely the former know the latter the more thoroughly will they desire that their fellow-subjects in the East shall, to the full, share in the liberties, rights, and privileges which they themselves enjoy.

PREFACE.

I MAKE no apology for laying the statements contained in the following pages before the English public. I seek, —in a manner the shortcomings of which are more painfully evident to me than they can possibly be to my most severe critic,—to draw attention to some marked defects in our rule of India, and to suggest certain changes, which, if carried out, I believe (for reasons fully stated) would ensure the good of England and India alike. Having had the good fortune to know intimately and to be honoured with the friendship of many Indians in their own country; having also, both in the past and at present, special opportunities of becoming acquainted with the state of affairs in many parts of India; and, moreover, appreciating the earnestness, and pathos even, of many English men and English women to know something of their fellow subjects in the East over and above what appears in official documents and official speeches, I have had little choice but to write what I knew and felt, with the humble hope that the effort may not altogether be fruitless. I have spoken because I have felt I could no longer keep silent without doing violence to my own sense of justice towards our fellow-subjects in India.

I was emboldened to put my statements forth at the present time and in the popular—(some Anglo-Indians very familiar with many of the facts I narrate may say elementary)—form adopted for a very definite reason. I have great faith in the strong sense of justice of the English people as a whole, and in their passionate desire to right the wrongs with which they may be made acquainted. It is to them and for them this narrative of facts is written; to them this appeal for justice and consideration is made. 'Deep calleth unto Deep.' The great need experienced, the unfortunate position of political subjection suffered, by the Indian people at the hands of England, cannot fail, if once rightly apprehended, to touch the heart and to deeply move the emotions of the enfranchised millions of the United Kingdom. If two or three only of the Political Apostles of the day, whose power to educate and influence the mass of their countrymen is beyond question, would but master the Indian problem, themselves become transfused with a sense of the magnitude of the issues at stake and the possibility of a remedy being found, and would let their imagination be fired and their reason stirred, —then, the time would be short between the recognition of the work to be done and a hearty attempt made to do it. The English people, rightly approached, are peculiarly susceptible to appeals to their higher nature; abundant instances in recent history testify to this. In matters concerning India this fact is especially true. When the fashionable Conservatism of Brighton deprived the late Mr. Fawcett, the popularly-known

Member for India, of a seat in the House of Commons, a democratic constituency welcomed him and gave him a secure place in the great Council of the Nation. A similar constituency, that of Greenwich, has had the courage and high-mindedness to choose an Indian gentleman, Mr. Lal Mohun Ghose, as a candidate for Parliamentary honours. Indian Reformers have only to adapt their information to the language of the people, to translate the important facts now made obscure in official jargon and unapprehended by any but a few experts into plain English speech, to secure for the dumb and downtrodden Princes and Peoples of India a free nation's appreciative sympathy and warm succour. Therefore, it is that I make the humble attempt to enlighten my countrymen which the following pages betoken.

I believe, and I think I prove, that our government of India has been very largely a failure, inasmuch as it has nowhere, in its own Provinces, secured the greatest good of the greatest number. Instead of British-Indian administration being perfect in its performance, and its administrators having reason to cast their eyes to Heaven thankful that no evil has proceeded from anything that they have done, that same administration and those same administrators, trying to achieve the impossible, are responsible for a most serious failure. Nevertheless the attitude which the majority of Anglo-Indians always assume is that of ecstatic admiration of themselves and their doings; an attitude of admiration, very naturally, is also adopted by English statesmen who obtain their evidence at second-hand.

In their government of India the British authorities are not content that they should be judged by an ordinary standard, by the standard which is allowed to be sufficient in respect to the government of other nations. They go above and beyond the canons of criticism which serve for testing the accomplishments of Parties in English political life. Philanthropy, they declare, is the key-note of all they do in India; the light by which they (officially) walk streams straight from Heaven, is always with them, and prevents them ever taking a false step. They had, when an Order for the recognition in India of personal merit and public services was created, to find a motto. This was the motto chosen: '*Heaven's Light our Guide.*' Surely it is seemly, considering the feebleness and limitations of human nature, for an ordinary citizen to shrink abashed from approval of such presumption. The more especially ought one to shrink abashed from a test of so high a character, seeing the results indicate that if a lower standard had been adopted greater success might have been achieved. If it be true that the man who throws a stone at the moon hits a higher object than he would have done if a hay rick had been his target it does not follow that the Indian administrator, who scorns the light of Earth and declares that for him the illumination of Heaven only will suffice, acts more justly and achieves higher ends than does he who thinks of what is fair between man and man, irrespective of race and colour, and who is content with the light of earthly facts and earthly experience.

Many Englishmen will be loth to believe that justice is not being fully done in all departments of political life under British control in India. They will ask, Are, then, the honourable Englishmen we know worse than Turks in Macedonia that they are blind to the evils of their own rule, that they are oblivious of the consequences of foreign domination even though they themselves are the foreigners? I nowhere charge my countrymen in India with conscious injustice. I nowhere assert,—I should be the first to condemn the assertion in others,—that our countrymen, chosen for their high character and great ability, for service in the India Office, deliberately refuse to see things Indian from an Indian point of view. A little consideration will show that no surprise need be felt at such a condition of things as now exists. That things are as (in common with others who are jealous for our nation's good name and anxious for the recognition of Indian merit) I describe them to be, is perfectly natural,—only too natural. Men are not good enough for such unchecked rule as Englishmen possess in India.* Angels from Heaven *might* not degenerate were they as irresponsible rulers allowed free course over what they might be pleased to consider a degenerate and conquered race. It is certain that no body of Englishmen,—and Englishmen are as good, taking them all round, as men are constituted nowadays, — can enjoy such power and

* Nor in England. Else, why are the acts of Administrations periodically referred to the judgment of the nation, with consequences often disastrous to the administrators as in 1874 and 1880

position, without degeneracy in themselves and injustice towards others. This is why our rule in India is seamed with so much that will not bear the fierce scrutiny of public investigation, that fears investigation as night-birds fear the light. I do not blame or censure my countrymen who are in office in India for the ill they do there so much as I blame and censure the blindness and incapacity, born of the system and inseparable from it, which will not recognise the checks and balances and play of indigenous talent which so great a task as we have undertaken in India demands.

The India Office is largely to blame for the want, in Great Britain, of knowledge, or for the dissemination of incomplete and, therefore, incorrect, knowledge, respecting Indian affairs. It does some things; it leaves undone more than it does. It is too prone to regard itself as the Executive of Anglo-Indian officials. It seldom or never appears to consider that it has duties towards India as a whole, and that it ought to exhibit as much solicitude for the interests of the native Indian as it does for the Anglo-Indian. Here, for example, is an instance of deliberate refusal to see facts in their true light. In 1875, Sir Louis Mallet, then permanent Under Secretary at the India Office, was the first writer in a 'symposium' on Indian Land Revenue.* In the course of his argument, he said:—'If there is any one thing which is wanting in any investigation of Indian problems, it is an approach to trustworthy and generally

* East India (Report of Famine Commission). App. I., page 135.

accepted facts. There is hardly a subject upon which the best authorities do not absolutely disagree as to the fundamental facts. I could mention the most startling instances, but they must be present to the minds of all of us. *Now I am compelled to say that, since I have been connected with the India Office, I have found just as strong a repugnance to the adoption of any adequate measures for the collection of a comprehensive and well digested set of facts as to the recognition of general principles.* The only occasion upon which I had the misfortune of encountering the vehement opposition of some Members of Council, for whose opinions and experience I have the most unfeigned respect, was in my advocacy of Dr. Forbes Watson's proposals for an Industrial Survey.' No outside critic has ever said anything more damaging of the India Office than this. In presence of the passage italicised and the reference to the 'vehement opposition' of the Council, I have serious misgivings as to whether, in what I have written, I ought, as I have been glad to do, to assume the good faith of the Anglo-Indian officials in all they have done or have left undone.

An attitude in favour of the Indian and free from preconceived ideas such as I ask for, ought not merely to be possible; it ought to be in course of daily practice. But here, again, to expect such conduct from the India Office, constituted as it is in England and joined to a pure despotism in India, is to expect too much. Official nature is worse than individual nature; it sinks to a low level more rapidly, and is incurable by ordinary means. As a rule, only revolutions which are bloody and are not of

a rose-water character, are able to break through the concreted routine of a Permanent Department and to make it fully alive to all its duties. Lord Melbourne's piteous appeal, 'Can't you let it alone?' is the Old and New Testament of every permanent official. The India Office suffers from the melancholy disadvantage of being, at no time, brought to the judgment seat, either in England or in India, and compelled to account either for performance or for non-performance of duty. No greater evil can befal either man or institution than that his or its responsibility shall remain unchecked and criticism be dumb, or if voiceful be so feeble as to prove ineffectual. Unlike the great Departments affecting England principally, such as the Local Government Board or the Home Office, the India Office is above and beyond effective criticism or control. The Departments named find every detail of the work they undertake subjected to angry challenge in many cases it may be and to critical examination in all, in the localities and by the persons interested, while searching review in Parliament is not wanting. The India Office, on the other hand, although responsible for the righteous government of a population nearly seven times as large as that of the United Kingdom, is entirely uncontrolled, is subject to no check worth a snap of the fingers, is practically irresponsible, and is largely influenced by that hideous anomaly in the free life of England, a Secret Council. This is bad for everybody interested; for the men in office most of all. They move in a groove out of which, even if they could,

they do not want to get; they come, in very speedy manner, to regard things in a mechanical fashion, and wholly from The Office standpoint. In this way, so far as Indian matters are concerned, all affairs affecting British Provinces are hued with rose-colour never mind what their character; all matters concerning Indian States are limned in blackest tints, are seen with a jaundiced eye, let them be never so lightsome and healthy. The India Office, in its statements respecting India, is not to be implicitly trusted. It is not, as I am anxious never to avoid remarking, consciously insincere, or desirous to be unjust. But,

'Where self the trembling balance holds,
'Tis seldom right adjusted.'

If I may direct the attention of my readers to any portions of the following pages more than others, it will be to Parts II. and III. Part II. tells the story of thirty years' administration of a Native-Indian State. It furnishes, in the irresistible force of the facts recorded and the comparisons instituted, the most convincing proofs of the aptness of Indians for administrative work. The present Under-Secretary of State for India, in a speech delivered by him at St. Bees, Cumberland, on December 29, 1884, said that *the* principle of our rule in India was this, 'So far as the people of India could be entrusted with the government of their own country it should be extended to them.' So far as a very humble individual, who speaks simply as a non-official British citizen, may do so, on behalf of the thousands of capable Indian administrators, I call upon Mr. Cross to examine

the facts of Native-Indian administration for himself. And if,—not satisfied with examining only such facts as may be placed before him by Anglo-Indian officials, he proceeds to investigate the circumstances for himself, and should then find that the people of India *can* be entrusted with the 'government of their own country,' will he see that that government is 'extended to them?' Or, if the powers-that-be in St. James' Park are too strong for him as they were too strong for Sir Louis Mallet, will he retire from the important position he occupies and join those who are endeavouring to ensure the fulfilment of the promises so frequently made to the Indian people? I claim that the facts I have gathered together amply prove that the Indians, as administrators in India, cannot merely do as well as British Officials, but that they actually do far better. To be consistent, Mr. Cross's next great speech in the House of Commons on Indian affairs, should contain an announcement that the policy of restoring India to the Indians will be at once commenced and that not a single further examination of Englishmen for the Civil Service will take place.

The *Spectator* in one of its thoughtful articles on India,* recognising the 'New India' which has sprung into existence under the fostering care of Lord Ripon, remarks:—'We do not believe in the juxtaposition of Indians and Europeans in the same work, which is only impeded by their ineradicable differences of thought and method; but we would, as the time grew ripe, try fairly and fully the experiment of purely Native Administra-

* *Spectator*, Jan. 10, 1885, Art. 'A New India.'

tion in certain districts, would utilise the great native capacity for public works—they devised the tank system of irrigation, not we; they built the Taj and the Temple of Sheringham, not we; and they, and not we, founded Benares, Jeypore, and Umritsur,—and we would, in any possible way, for instance by leaving cavalry service to them, open to Indians a path to military distinction.' I venture to hope that the pages of this little book show that the 'experiment' desired has already been made. It was not made 'fairly and fully'; nevertheless it has succeeded completely, and its success is the more notable from the circumstance that it was achieved in the face of the most serious obstacles. There is no need for farther experiments, no need to wait until the time grows ripe; time never does, in the opinion of men situated as Anglo-Indian officials are situated, grow ripe for such experiments. If Englishmen will not, with the evidence available, believe in Indian capacity for administration, neither would they if one rose from the dead.

In Part III. an attempt is made to show how the reorganisation of India could be carried out, without harm to any individual interest, and with great financial relief to the Indian taxpayer. When in August, 1884, laying the Indian Budget before the House of Commons, Mr. Cross, referring to the Salt Tax, remarked:—'I am bound to say that the financier who shall be able to abolish this tax, or to carry further the reductions of it commenced three years ago, will confer on the people of India almost as great a boon as the repeal of the Corn Laws gave to the people of England.'* Did he choose

* Hansard, ccxcii, 302.

to give the whole weight of his individual and official position to the task Mr. Cross might become the Cobden of India. Should, however, he bend his energies in that direction he will receive no countenance or support from the Office in which he occupies a most important position. The India Office takes too narrow and too contracted a view of its position and of its duties towards the people of India, while it makes no independent investigation of its own on any subject.

Under such circumstances the most frightful injustice becomes possible, the most painful suffering may become chronic, at the hands and through the instrumentality of men who, personally, and in matters affecting their own countrymen, are the embodiments of justice and highly sensitive to even the appearance of agony. They lead two lives,—one personal and full of the richest flavour of intelligent, cultured, and religious emotions, a stay and stimulus to their own character and to their friends; the other, official, in which all the nerves are numbed: the auditory nerve is slackened so that it cannot hear, the optic nerve is semi-paralyzed so that the eye can see only one set of facts. In a word, they are controlled by the system they administer, and become its bond-slaves. Not the least melancholy feature in the situation is that they are unaware that a large part of their nature is atrophied. Without, as I have said, meaning so to be, they are the authors (more or less indirect) of suffering and pain, mental, social, and physical, at which if they heard so much as the faintest moan thereof in any people but the Indian people they

would shudder and cease not to cry aloud and labour for reform. Now and then, the dense atmosphere which they breathe and which exercises so maleficent an influence upon them, is agitated by an admission coming, almost against his will, from one of their number. They have ears, they hear for a moment, and then turn to Pay and Pension Rules unheedingly. One asserts that under their governance forty millions of people are, year in and year out, in a state of chronic starvation, not knowing from January to December what it is to eat and be satisfied: *—their worm (of hunger) dieth not. Our officials hear, they busy themselves with the machine as it grinds out routine reports and statements, taking no effectual steps to alter this sad condition of things; or if enquiring, contriving, as if by malice aforethought, (though, of course, there is no malice either aforethought or afterthought), to miss the essential point of the enquiry. Had a new evangel rung in their ears from lips of angels in a beatific vision, seen by a wondering and admiring world, telling to all that Heaven's light *was* indeed their guide, and wisely did they walk in that light, they could not be more self-satisfied than they are, or less solicitous to see things Indian from any but the accustomed standpoint.

Wherefore, I plead with my countrymen that they should endeavour to see things Indian for themselves

* 'The remaining fifth, or forty millions, go through life on insufficient food.' Dr. W. W. HUNTER, C.I.E. 'I do not hesitate to say that half our agricultural population never know from year's end to year's end what it is to have their hunger fully satisfied.' C. A. ELLIOTT, C.S.I., Chief Commissioner of Assam, in Settlement Report quoted by *Hindoo Patriot*.

and not through the medium of the India Office. Wherefore, I invite all who desire well to their Indian fellow-subjects to note carefully the 'sample' of facts—all or nearly all obtained from official sources—I lay before them, and to so prosecute their studies as, 'without haste, without rest,' to determine to pause not until the rights, liberties, and privileges of the Queen's English subjects are shared by the Queen-Empress's Indian subjects. The Indian people want but these things, only they want them as realities not as shams, to ultimately and not distantly raise India into a position second to none in the glittering array of British States scattered through the world.

The English people have, now and again, been favoured with opportunities to render service to humanity. They never had so great an opportunity or one yielding such rich results as they possess in coming to a determination to restore India to the Indians while, at the same time, retaining it by a silken cord of mutual esteem, affection, and profit with the British Empire.

WM. DIGBY.

COROMANDEL, WOODVILLE ROAD,
EALING, W.;
February, 1885.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

Misconception as to character and capabilities of Indians—How these misconceptions arise and are continued—Testimony in favour of Indians—India conquered for England chiefly by means of Indian forces—Geographical comparison between India and Europe—Nationalities of India—Disastrous effect on English political life of the absorption of Anglo-Indian Despots—Exceptional ability of Indians in various departments—Indian achievements in the past: capability as great now as at any time .. .. 1 to 12

CHAPTER II.

Comparison between English and Indian Rule in India—Sir Lepel Griffin's unfair statements — Anglo-Indian opinions of Anglo-Indian performances — A definition of English and Indian Rule—Sir H. Sumner Mayne and Professor Max Muller on Indian contributions to the higher realms of thought—Indian skill in the minor arts—Things in India in the pre-British era as compared with Things at Present—Condition of the average Indian worse now than before—The one great feat which the British have accomplished—Failure in details of Administration .. .. 13 to 21

CHAPTER III.

Why British Rule in India cannot ever be a complete success—English Rigidity *versus* Indian Adaptability—Two Pictures

drawn during a Famine Period—Anglo-Indian 'Benevolence' and Native-Indian Ideas and Practices in Famine Times—Reasons only too abundant why Indians should prefer Native-Indian State to British Province — How the Distressed were treated (1) in a British Province, (2) in the Nizam's Dominions, (3) in Holkar's State — A Contrast: What Indian rule has done for Travancore, What British rule has done for Mysore; Prosperity in the one instance, Ruin and Distress in the other—The Jhansi Districts brought to overwhelming 'indebtedness and ruin'—Practical aptitude of Indians for self-government—Rules of a Village Council in Ceylon .. .. 22 to 45

CHAPTER IV.

The 'personal' element, in Indian and in English Rule—Native-Indian Remissions, English 'Rack-renting'—Sir James Caird's Opinion: Discouragement to increased Cropping—Revelations of the Deccan Riots' Commission—Mr. H. P. Malet's Testimony—What a Debt of Rs. 6,000 ended in—The very different condition of Things in an Indian State—Mrs. Burton's comparison between British and Indian Territories—Harshness in Collection of Land Revenue when Crops have failed—Remissions in a Famine Year in Madras—Mr. Seshiah Sastri's bold experiment in Pudukotta—Village and Communal Life largely destroyed by the British—Ruined or Ill-repaired Tanks—An Incident near Madras in 1877—'Experience' of less value in India than anywhere—Retrenchment at the Expense of Tank Repairs .. .. 46 to 61

CHAPTER V.

An Official Statement of Comparative Taxation—Native-Indian Taxation probably slightly higher than British, yet prosperity of Indian people greater than British—Mr. J. B. Peile's Statement of Relative Prosperity in British Provinces and Indian States—Wherein British supremacy in India has been of great value—Limitations of beneficial British control—

Our treatment of Famine, one of the most serious blots on our administration—Map showing great Indian Famines of this Century—The Famine Commissioners' Report—Greater frequency of Famines in British Provinces than in Native-Indian States—Would there not have been fewer famines in India during this century if we had busied ourselves less with Administration?—An Answer in the Affirmative—Famine Mortality in British Provinces and in Indian States—A Standard for testing Famine Mortality—Uncomforting Facts—A Comparison with the Bengal Famine of 1770—Why our Influence in India is a Blighting Influence—Circumstances peculiar to our rule proving that rule disastrous—What might and ought to have been done in Southern India in 1876—Famines may, as they should be, be taken by the forelock—Remissions wisely conceived and carried out—What might be expected to happen if England were governed by Chinese Mandarins after the British-Indian fashion. 62 to 83

CHAPTER VI.

Costliness of British as compared with Native-Indian Administration—Cruel methods of taxation necessitated by British Costliness—'Artificial and arbitrary rules at variance with actual facts,' and the woe they work—Two meals a day instead of three, so as to pay Government Rent—The Five Millions paid from the British Treasury on account of the Afghan War contrasted with the harm done to the Indian Exchequer by the abolition of Customs' Duties on Cotton goods—Free Trade in India, Protective Duties in the Colonies, and Customs' Charges in England—A Comparison of English and Indian Finance—A Year's Official and Non-official Expenditure in England on Account of India—Improvements in India of too costly a character—Poverty of the British Indian People: Effect of English Administration to Increase the Price of Food—Comparative Prices of Food .. .. 84 to 101

CHAPTER VII.

British 'Benefits' not sufficient to quench love for Self-Rule—An Enquiry into the Relative Merits of British-Indian and Indian Government seventeen years ago—Bias of the Government Circular of Enquiry—Lord Salisbury the occasion of the Enquiry—Summary of his lordship's Contention—Letters, Observations, Memoranda, and Notes from Thirty Officers—Remarkable Testimony from Sir Richard Temple as to the Excellence of Native-Indian Rule—Sikh Villages 'among the finest and happiest' Sir Richard ever saw—The whole of India embraced in Sir Richard's Review—Lord Northbrook on Indian capacity of all kinds—Recent Testimony of like character from the latest 'Material and Moral Progress' Report—Early Testimony (1808) to same effect—Native-Indian Rule of the best kind a combination of Oriental Flexibility with British Inflexibility—Catena of Objections to British Rule .. .. 102 to 121

CHAPTER VIII.

Native-Indian Grievances Formulated in 1867—The Grievances as great now as Ever—The Orders of the Star of India, Indian Empire, and Crown of India—How they are Divided—The Few Britishers carrying off the larger Portion—True Patriotism in Indians and How it may be Secured .. 122 to 126

PART II.

THIRTY YEARS' ADMINISTRATION IN AN INDIAN STATE.

CHAPTER I.

Fragmentary Character of Previous References to Superiority of Native Indian over British Rule—Reasons why the State of Hyderabad is chosen for Illustration — What has been accomplished there, may be accomplished anywhere 129 to 130

(1) THE NIZAM'S DOMINIONS IN 1853.

Depressed Condition of the State—Mr. Edwin Arnold's Description of Lord Dalhousie's Treatment of the Nizam —The Story of the Berars Not to be Told in this Narrative —The strain on an ordinary Englishman's belief—Low Revenue, Considerable Deficit—Sir Lepel Griffin's statements tested—Abolition of Slavery .. .. .. 131 to 135

(2) REFORMS NEEDED; REFORMS UNDERTAKEN; REFORMS ACCOMPLISHED.

Sir Salar Jung's Assumption of Office—His Recognition of the Position—Reforms Projected—Confidence in Sir Salar Jung—Sir Salar's Description of his Land Reforms—Comparative Increase of Land Revenue as Compared with British India—The Increase of Land Revenue not expected to continue — Net increase in extent of Cultivation — Growth of Population—Aids to Trade—Abolition of Vexatious Imposts —Taxes Remitted—Raising Taxes in Bombay: abolishing Taxes in Hyderabad—Fostering Large Sources of Income— Improvement of Trade with England .. .. 135 to 151

(3) Efficiency and Economy in Administration.

Cost of Collecting Revenue—Improved Jail Accommodation —Expenditure upon Police—Reduction by Sir Salar Jung of his own Honorarium by one half: Further reduction— Relative Increase of Revenue in British India and in Hyderabad—Debts in British India and in Hyderabad— Comparison between Annual Military Expenditure in British India and in Hyderabad — The 'Contingent:' its cost—Lesson to be learnt from the experience acquired in the Nizam's Dominions — Mr. Gorst's Charges respecting Employment of 'Foreigners' — An Example for English Imitation .. .. 151 to 163

(4) A Native Indian Statesman.

Sir Salar Jung in Great Things and in Small Things—His Position in Indian History—What he did for the Empire during the Mutiny—His Conduct other than we, from our dealings with his State, had any right to hope for—Lord Dalhousie's acts—The conduct of Indian Princes tested —Their Traducers wholly confounded—Sir Salar Jung's Recognition of English over-lordship—Mr. Gorst's painful inability to understand Sir Salar Jung's character—Honesty towards India and Indians should lead us as Administrators to give place to Indian Statesmen .. .. ..163 to 169

CHAPTER II.

The Crooked Eyes with which Englishmen and Englishwomen look at Indian Affairs—A Typical Englishwoman; a Typical Englishman—Mr. Gorst, M.P., the reputed Friend of Oppressed Races proving himself their Enemy—Indian Details of Mr. Gorst's Visit to Hyderabad—Mr. Gorst's Client, the Peshkar —The New Minister at Hyderabad — Salar Jung's specia

fitness for his office—Mr. Gorst's Personalities and inaccurate Charges—An Examination of these Charges — (1) General Glasfurd's Incident, (2) Bribery by Govind Rao, (3) Humnunt Rao, (4) The alleged Abduction by a High Revenue Officer, (5) Mr. Gorst's 'Honest Talukdar,' (6) Administration of Justice in Rural Districts, (7) Alleged Revenue Decline, (8) Expenditure in Hyderabad City—Mr. Gorst condemned out of his own mouth .. .. 170 to 186

APPENDIX.

I.

Mr. Gorst and His Client .. .. 187 to 189

II.

Mr. Gorst's Charges .. .. 189 to 191

III.

Sir Salar Jung's Reforms .. .. 191 to 194

IV.

The Debts of the Nizam's Kingdom .. .. .. 194 to 196

V.

Reforms in the Hyderabad State .. .. 196 to 198

PART III.

AN ENQUIRY AS TO THE POSSIBLE REMEDY.

CHAPTER I.

The Directions in which to look—Complete Severance between England and India impossible — Reasons why Connection must be maintained—The Issues involved in the Situation—The Situation not a *cul de sac*—Beneficial Change possible without imperiling a single British investment—Lord Canning, in 1860, indicated the first step—The First Step—The Second Step—Native-Indian State Loyalty during the Mutiny Delirium—Lord Canning's Remarks proved in 1878-79 .. 199 to 206

CHAPTER II.

Contributions to *The Times* on the Armies of the Native States—Lord Dufferin exhorted to imitate Lord Dalhousie: His Excellency's Response—One-sided and Exaggerated Characteristic of the Contributions—A Survey from the Himalayas to Adam's Bridge — The Indians all Bad, the British Immaculate—The articles a *balloon d'essai*—Conclusions arrived at—Inaccurate Bases for Calculation—An Instance from Mysore Number of Native-Indian State Soldiers and Guns—Three important Things to be borne in mind 207 to 212

CHAPTER III.

Need for change of Attitude towards the Indian Princes—The Creation of the Council of the Empire on January 1, 1877—The Council the One Good Thing of the Delhi Assemblage—The Council to be made the germ of a Re-constituted and Representatively-governed India—Duties which might be undertaken by such a Council—Who should be Members Thereof?—Provincial Parliaments for the Presidencies and Provinces—Revenue and Expenditure of the Provinces in 1883—Ten Years' Totals—Finances for the Imperial Council—A Native-Indian Financier Needed in the Viceroy's Council—Probable Effect upon Native-Indian Life and Character of Provincial Parliaments—English Models adapted to Indian Requirements—Effect upon Indian Commercial Life and Prosperity—Large and Generous Reforms: The Fruit they would bear—Indian Princes and Peoples now between the Devil and the Deep Sea .. .. 213 to 223

CHAPTER IV.

A Properly Constituted Council of the Empire removing the double danger of (1) Over-Taxation and (2) the State Armies—How the Princes' Loyalty could be deepened—Neither British Raj nor Native Prince suffering, but both gaining—Details of Strength of European Army, British-Indian Army, and Police—Alleged Strength of Native States' Armies—Cost of Military Expenditure in British India and (estimated) in Feudatory India—Expenditure Excessive—Loyal Conduct of Independent Troops—Our Position in India now compared with the beginning of the Century—Lay opinion on Military Matters and the Defence of the Empire—Number of British Troops sufficient for India—Reorganized Imperial Military Forces and Expenditure—An Annual Saving in the Indian Budget of Nine Millions—Benefit to both British and Feudatory India—Consequences certain to flow from the adoption of the Policy suggested .. .. 224 to 236

CHAPTER V.

Summary of Reforms advocated—Who could Protest against them? Not Princes or Peoples of India; not the Queen, the Parliament, or the People of England; not the Cotton Manufacturers of Lancashire; not Indian Investors: only the small class interested in Indian appointments could object—The Reforms all gain and no loss—Consideration of Reasons why Reform of a thorough character is urgent —237 to 247

APPENDIX.

PART IV.

THE OUTLOOK.

Effect of the Evangelical Creed on the British People—In India the Characteristic Exaggerated—'Without shedding of blood no Remission'—Maleficent Beneficence—Famine Insurance Expenditure more of a Benefit to England than to India—Hopelessness the only feeling possible regarding India—Mr. Fawcett's Opinion—Recent Events in India deepen gloom and intensify despair—A glance at the Governors of the Presidencies and the Lieutenant-Governors of the Provinces—Anglo-Indianism and the opinion Anglo-Indians have of it—The English People Responsible for Indian Administration—The 'Shedding of Blood' now

going on in India—The Re-creation of Indian Nations by the English Nation possible, and, being possible, an Imperative Duty .. .. 253 to 261

MAP.

The Great Famines of the 19th Century .. .. *To face* page 66

PART I.

OME FRUITS OF BRITISH RULE.

INDIA FOR THE INDIANS

—AND FOR ENGLAND.

PART I.

SOME FRUITS OF BRITISH RULE.

CHAPTER I.

It is not, perhaps, surprising, but it is far from creditable that, after such a long-existing connection between England and India so much misconception should prevail among the English people respecting their Indian fellow-subjects. While misconceptions of a serious character could be cherished for many centuries, and even now prevail, of each other by two nations separated only by a narrow streak of sea, as France and England, surprise may not be great that Indians are almost entirely misunderstood and misappreciated by Englishmen. The intimacy which has

so long continued between the two peoples should nevertheless have removed this reproach. Unfortunately, that intimacy has, in no small measure, been the occasion of the misconceptions,—misconceptions unjust and discreditable to the misconceivers. There are Englishmen and Englishwomen residing in India who make it their boast that, for all they know of the thousands of people living around them, they might as well be in England itself. They go to India with their minds already made up that there is naught of good in the Indian character, that there is no capacity for administration or aptitude for general ability in the individual Indian, and they take no steps, while in India, to test the accuracy or otherwise of their opinion. Several instances, in connection with Englishmen of high ability and attainments, crowd on the memory while the sentence is being written.

Such persons, on their return to this country, do not scruple to intimate, in a thousand ways, their scorn and contempt for so miserable and ignorant a people as those, not with whom, but in whose land, they have sojourned for a while. And yet these same defamers of a race they have never troubled themselves to understand, are sure to have, in their *repertoire* of experiences among unfamiliar folk, some interesting, maybe pathetic, story of the devotion shown in time of sickness and trouble by an Indian servant. Surely, it might occur to these scornful critics that if, by accident as it were, they found certain

Indians, not of the higher and cultured classes, with whom they had perforce to do, 'faithful in a few things,' the capacity would not be wanting for faithfulness in many things, given the opportunity for the display of such capacity, and the education and experience required.

The prejudice against the Indian people, with which, unfortunately, most English folk are saturated when they proceed to India, remains with them throughout. The man who is a 'nigger' (with or without the expletive) before he is seen remains a 'nigger' after he has been seen—seen not nigh at hand but afar off. Such Britons view most, if not all, the actions of Indians through a distorted medium and declare there is no straightforwardness anywhere. Yet the testimony to Indian worth and character, of the wisest and best Englishmen who have ever lived in India and who have not been content to take their information at second or third hand, is of a highly flattering nature. Bishop Heber, who, under the influence of 'poetical necessity,' undeservedly libelled an oriental people by declaring of Ceylon that, while every prospect pleases, 'man is vile,' has fully redeemed his character by his acute observations of a people he knew more intimately. He wrote: — 'Of the people [of India] so far as their natural character is concerned, I have been led to form, on the whole, a very favorable opinion. They are men of high and gallant courage, courteous, intelligent and most eager after knowledge and improve-

ment . . . . They are sober, industrious, dutiful to their parents, and affectionate to their children; of tempers almost uniformly gentle and patient, and more easily affected by kindness and attention to their wants and feelings than almost any men whom I have met with.' * It is matter of notoriety that the Englishmen who know the Indian people intimately, who have lived with them for many years, find they cannot speak too highly of their oriental fellow-subjects, A book, fresh from the press while this page is being corrected, written by Colonel Hastings Fraser, and containing a memoir and the correspondence of General James Stuart Fraser, is the latest and not the least striking instance in proof of the assertion.

The unflattering and depreciatory estimate of Indians to which reference has been made, applies to all departments of Indian life, but is most common in regard to their fitness for public affairs. Because, under specially favouring circumstances† which take

* Professor Max Muller's two Essays, 'What can India Teach Us?' and 'The Truthful Character of the Hindus,' (Longmans, Green & Co.) are full of evidence of a like kind, and will well repay perusal. I only stay to add my stone of testimony to the cairn Max Muller raises to the truthful character and commercial honour of the Indian people generally and of the merchants in particular. Even in regard to enlightened philanthropy England cannot put India to shame. I am proud to count among my personal friends in Madras an Indian merchant whose wise charity and prescient goodness is not second to that of any English merchant's; his acts, indeed, may be placed by the side of Mr. Samuel Morley's—if I may be pardoned taking this liberty with a name known and honoured for good works throughout Great Britain.

† 'The nations of India have been conquered by an army of which, on the average, about a fifth part was English. In the early battles of the Company, by which its power was decisively established, at the siege of Arcot, at Plassey, at Buxar, there seems always to have been more Sepoys than Europeans on the side of the Company. And, let us observe further that we do not hear of the Sepoys fighting ill or of the

away much even of the merely combative merit of our conquest, we conquered India, we assume there can be nothing of any value in the character of those we have conquered. The consequences flowing from this course of action, while flattering to our self-pride and pecuniarily very profitable to us, have, to our Indian fellow-subjects, been most disastrous. The events of the past few years show this to be the case so far as their capacity for self-government is concerned. The present writer cannot adequately describe the feeling of shame he has experienced, again and again, during the discussions arising out of Lord Ripon's legislation, when good English Liberals have, with fear and trembling, asked him whether, after all, they ought to support the Viceroy; whether, indeed, the people of India were not too ignorant, too unversed in the ways of Home-Rule, to be trusted even with the modicum of self-government which Lord Ripon proposed should be given to them.

Such a feeling ought no longer to hold sway over English minds, nor ought any general misconception regarding India as a whole to continue. It speaks badly for those who are responsible for the geography taught in our schools that every boy and girl is not made to appreciate that India is a continent as large

English as bearing the whole brunt of the conflict. . . . . But, if once it is admitted that the Sepoys always outnumbered the English, and that they kept pace with the English in efficiency as soldiers, the whole theory which attributes our successes to an immeasurable natural superiority in valour falls to the ground. . . . . Though no doubt there was a difference, it was not so much a difference of race as a difference of discipline, of military science, and also no doubt in many cases a difference of leadership.'—*Seeley's 'Expansion of England,' pp.* 200 201 *and* 202.

as Europe without Russia. A comparison of India with Europe in maps drawn to the same scale,—happily conceived and carried out by Dr. George Smith, C.I.E., in 'Student's Manual of the Geography of British India' (published by Mr. Murray),—exhibits some interesting features. Thus, for example, as regards area Bengal may be paired off with France, but Bengal has twice the population of our Gallic neighbour. Madras is as large as Spain, and has thirty-three millions of population against the Spanish sixteen millions. The State of Hyderabad, of which the reader will note a great deal in this work, with the Berar Districts, is of the same area as Great Britain: our own country, however, has the advantage in population, viz., 29,702,656 against 11,840,462. Bombay is as large as Spain and Portugal combined and has a larger population. Like details will be found in the table given below;* permission to copy it has been obligingly given.

Further, it should not be forgotten that the peoples

* INDIA.	Square Miles.	Population.	Population.	Square Miles.	EUROPE.
Bengal	203,437	69,133,619	37,072,000	204,177	France.
Assam	55,384	4,908,276	25,968,286	58,320	England & Wales
British Burmah	87,220	3,736,771	29,702,656	89,005	Great Britain.
Andaman Islands	3,285	30,000	150,000	4,200	Cyprus.
N.W Province, with Oudh	111,086	44,851,542	28,437,091	114,296	Italy.
Panjab	221,749	22,712,120	37,839,427	240,942	Austria-Hungary.
Bombay	191,847	23,396,045	20,974,411	219,260	Spain & Portugal.
Ajmer	2,710	460,722	936,340	2,866	Hesse.
Baroda	4,399	2,154,469	1,506,531	5,851	Baden.
Rajpootana	130,994	11,005,512	27,278,911	137,006	Prussia.
Central India	89,098	9,200,881	29,702,656	89,005	Great Britain.
Central Provinces	113,042	11,505,149	28,437,091	114,296	Italy.
Berar	17,728	2,972,673	2,846,102	15,992	Switzerland.
Haidarabad	80,000	9,845,594	29,702,656	89,005	Great Britain.
Madras	150,248	33,840,617	16,625,860	182,750	Spain.
Coorg	1,583	178,302	349,367	1,526	Brunswick.
Mysore	30,500	4,186,399	3,734,370	30,685	Scotland.

of India differ from each other as widely as Spaniard differs from Swede, as the Frenchman differs from the Dane, as the German from the Italian, as the Irishman from the Russian. All the richness and variety of racial character which mark Europe mark India also. It is to the last degree unfair to those oriental races that they should be regarded as on a dead level,—a dead level, too, of incapacity,— and consequently that they should all be governed in one way and by one system. We are carrying out in India what Napoleon I. strove to accomplish in Europe over three generations ago. He wished to govern all Europe from Paris by French methods. He was frustrated in his designs by despotism-hating Englishmen; the whole world has been the gainer. We, in India, are carrying out the Napoleonic principle, we, who fought stoutly against its application in this part of the world! And, alas! alike for England and for India, no interposition has taken place or seems likely to take place, which would free India from this *mis*-rule. Alas! again it may be said, for England. The fact that, for centuries, India has been ruled from a single centre is not over-looked, but it does not follow that the centralization has been for the best interests of the people, and that the European plan would not be an excellent one for India. At the same time, it must be recognized, that, while on the one hand, the rule of The Mogul was not so thorough and so searching in its character as our rule, on the other hand, what the Emperors of Delhi raised by taxation in India they spent in that country.

It is not, and cannot be, for the moral and political good of Britons, that their body politic in the home-land should be recruited, year after year, by the absorption of a comparatively large host of petty despots,* or that British statesmen should administer, without any check from those they rule, the affairs of two hundred millions of people. The slowness of political and social reform in Great Britain is, one may be inclined to think, not a little owing to the enervating authority in our counsels, and the influence 'unseen but felt' of what is being done in the British name in India. The time has fully arrived for us to understand that the capacity for self-rule of the average Indian, be he from the Punjab or from Travancore, is as great as is the capacity of the average Englishman,—with this addition, that the inhabitant of a Native-Indian State is a better man, since he is in more prosperous circumstances, than his brother in a British-ruled Indian district.

It is matter of notoriety to the most casual observer in England, and to all who are even slightly acquainted with what is going on in India, that the Indians of whom they read or with whom they associate, at frequent or infrequent intervals, are at least the equal, in many cases the superior, of the average Englishman. In the examinations for the Civil Service of India, for the Bar, or for medicine, Indian students in England, though resident in a foreign land and working with a

To give a concrete instance: It cannot, according to the view stated, be good for the politics of Newbury, Berks., that an Anglo-Indian of the views on English politics and English statesmen held by Sir Alexander Arbuthnot, K.C.S.I., should have so great an influence in imperial politics as that gentleman has, or at least had two years ago.

foreign tongue, more than hold their own, indeed, frequently distance all competitors. If man, as a talking animal, takes rank among created beings, then are Indians our equals. In theology, this century has probably not produced an orator who possessed a finer mingling of oriental fervour and spiritual insight with occidental practicalness than did the late Keshub Chunder Sen. To descend a step lower, and to stay for a moment in the realm of politics, it is but fair to remark that there is not in England, at the present day, a better political orator, one possessing in greater degree all the finer essentials of oratory than the second Liberal Candidate for Greenwich, Mr. Lal Mohun Ghose. He has appeared on the platform with John Bright, has followed that great master of the English tongue, and has not suffered in comparison. It was the same when he spoke at one of the House Dinners of the National Liberal Club in London, in April, 1884, the Secretary of State for India in the chair: Mr. Ghose's speech was the most happily-conceived of those delivered during the evening, while it was penetrated with deep fibres of sympathy which touched to admiration all who heard. Mr. Lal Mohun Ghose belongs to a class most persistently decried by a certain section of English publicists. He is a Bengali, and therefore to be despised. One who knew the Bengalis well, the late Rev. M. A. Sherring, has said, with not more acumen than truth :—'The Bengali has a glorious future before him, a future in which, if we mistake not, he will shine conspicuously as the

leader of public opinion, and of intellectual and social progress among all the varied nationalities of the Indian Empire.'

As for the weightier matters of political administration, later pages of this little book will be devoted to showing that living and recently-deceased Indian statesmen have, under exceptional difficulties, accomplished feats which no European Ministers of this century have excelled. To some this may seem a hard saying and difficult to believe; the facts to be furnished will, it is contended, fully justify it, and, what is more, command acquiescence from all candid minds.

The evidence in support of these statements is abundant. Nowhere is it so abundant as in the archives of the India Office. But it is not readily available.* The India Office possesses it, and fails to produce it, that is to produce it in a form useful for instruction. The English people are not instructed as they ought to be regarding the true characteristics and actual experiences of the Indian people. Such statements as do appear are largely misleading, while much which ought to appear is not published. This is not from malice; we are content to believe it is from inadvertence rather than by intention, though this is no excuse—the evil wrought by want of thought is evil all the same. The reader will judge for himself, by the evidence which is supplied, how far the assertions made in commendation of our Indian fellow-subjects are deserved. Sir Thomas

* Mr. Lionel Ashburner says:—'The published records of the Indian Government . . . are not available to the general reader who requires the very dry subject of Indian taxation to be made easy of comprehension.'—*National Review*, Sept., 1884.

Munro, incomparably the best Governor Madras ever had, remarked: — 'I do not exactly know what is meant by civilizing the people of India. In the theory and practice of good government they may be deficient; but if a good system of agriculture, if unrivalled manufactures, if a capacity to produce what convenience and luxury demand, if the establishment of schools for reading and writing, if the general practice of kindness and hospitality, and, above all, if a scrupulous respect and delicacy towards the female sex are amongst the points that denote a civilized people, then the Hindus are not inferior in civilisation to the people of Europe.' It will be found that these high encomiums are, every one of them, richly deserved. We, with all our boasted administrative skill and capacity, have not surpassed what the Emperors Baber and Akbar accomplished before us. It is doubtful if, with greater advantages, we have done as much. Of Akbar it is stated, by Elphinstone in his *History of India* (pp. 11 and 12), that he forbad trials by ordeal and marriages before the age of puberty. He permitted widows to marry a second time, while he prohibited *suttee* against the will of the widow. He perfected financial reforms and made a complete survey of the land. In his collection of the land revenue he was as considerate and as kind as we are the reverse. What is more, all the gain was India's; not, as in our case, the gain of a foreign country and of foreigners. Akbar is but one of a host of great kings,— worthy to rank with our Alfred and our Cromwell,— with which India has been blessed. Through all the depart-

ments of mechanical life the high character obtained for India in matters pertaining to administration and highest statesmanship was maintained.* Indeed, during the last century, and for a part of the present century, Indian manufactures could, if fairly dealt with, compete with Manchester and Paisley in the English market.†

* 'The correct forms of ships—only elaborated within the past ten years by the science of Europe—have been familiar to India for ten centuries: and the vessels which carried peacocks to Ophir for king Solomon, were probably the same as the fishing craft of the present day, which furnish the models the American and English clipper and yacht builders are aspiring after. The carving of its woodwork, the patterns, colours, and texture of its carpets, shawls and scarfs, admired for centuries, have, since the Great Fair of the world, been set forth as patterns for the most skilled artificers of Europe to imitate. From the looms of Dacca went forth those wonderful tissues that adorned the noblest beauties of the Court of Augustus Cæsar, bearing in the Eternal City the same designation sixteen centuries ago as that by which cotton is still known in India; and the abundance of Roman coins and relics up to our time occasionally exhumed, yet preserve traces of the early commercial connection between the two most wonderful nations in the world—those of the Cæsars and the Moguls. The rarest gifts Bengal could offer its native princes or its foreign conquerors, were the muslins known as "the running water," or "the nightly dew,"—being when wet scarcely distinguishable from either; and since the advent of the English, a single piece, twenty yards in length, and one and a quarter in breadth, weighing no more than fourteen ounces, has been sold for twenty-five pounds,—a sum equal to the requital of three Dacca spinners and weavers for a twelvemonth.'—*Notes on India*, by Dr. Buist, of Bombay, 1854 (or thereabouts).

† Mr. A. J. K. Connell, whose writings on Indian Economics deserve to be widely known in England, in a paper read before the East Indian Association in March, 1884, quotes the following passage from Mill's History of India, vol. vii.:—'It was stated in evidence that the cotton and silk goods of India up to this period (1813) could be sold for a profit in the English market at a price from 50 to 60 per cent. lower than those fabricated in England. It consequently became necessary to protect the latter by duties of 70 and 80 per cent. on their value, or by positive prohibition. Had this not been the case, the mills of Manchester and Paisley would have been stopped at the onset, and could scarcely have been set in motion even by the power of steam. They were created by the sacrifice of the Indian manufacturers. Had India been independent, she would have retaliated. This act of self-defence was not permitted her. British goods were forced on her without paying any duty, and the foreign manufacturer employed the arm of political injustice to keep down and ultimately strangle a competitor with whom he could not have contended on equal terms.'

CHAPTER II.

To fully carry out the purpose of these pages it is intended to institute a comparison between English and Indian* rule, that is, a comparison between States ruled by foreigners and States administered by their own inhabitants or by men born in India and of an Indian race. In so doing the claim that is made for the Indian people is put forward on the ground which perhaps, opponents would desire as the one they, too, would prefer.

Sir Lepel Griffin may be taken as the most outspoken, and least careful in his choice of language, among the large array of admirers of our practices; he is first among those who deprecate all that is done by Indian statesmen. According to Sir Lepel we are an Earthly Providence to India. 'The administration of British India,' says this modest administrator, 'is probably as perfect a system of Government as the world has ever

* The reader will probably have observed that, so far, I have not used the word 'Native' in reference to the people of India. I do not intend to use it. It came into vogue as the expression of a 'superior' race when brought into contact with those who were entirely innocent of all knowledge of the arts and sciences; it is out of place when employed of Indians. The Englishman would object to be designated by all foreigners as a 'Native' when referred to in connection with his own country. What is sauce for the Britisher is sauce for the Indian,—be he Hindu or Mussulman, Rajpoot or Madrassee.

seen.' Without us and our system of administration, apparently the sun would hardly venture to shine on the Indian continent, the winds would blow wrongly if they blew at all, and the rains either would not fall or would come down at the wrong time and in the wrong place; while, as for the people, if they did not sink to the level of the brute beasts it would be because they were already as near the earth as though they actually walked on all fours. The evidence of this witness, however, cannot be accepted in a hearing conducted in the Temple of Truth. He is a party to the controversy. His success in life depends upon the general acceptance of the views he enunciates with more ability than fairness. His emoluments would cease, or rather the emoluments of his successor,—in these days we are very tender respecting vested interests,—were the facts of the case more widely known and appreciated. Independent, unvitiated testimony and the testimony of the writers of whom Sir Lepel Griffin is an example, are at variance. It should not require more than average acumen in discerning where the truth lies.

The effect of English rule in the ordinary Indian district may be illustrated by the definition given of gout as a pain in comparison with rheumatism. Put, it is said, your hand in a blacksmith's vice, and turn the screw till you can bear no more: that is rheumatism; give the screw an additional turn: that is gout. Likewise, consider a state of existence whereby a vast proportion of the people barely keep body and soul together and do not know what it is from one year's

end to another to have as much to eat as they want. That is the condition of the Indian people under the Collectors in our Provinces. Then, once every four years, in one part of India or another, a famine occurs, and those insufficiently-nourished subjects of ours die by hundreds, by thousands, and in exteme cases, say, once in ten years, by millions. This is an accurate statement of our rule in India. Such is the general effect of the picture seen through clear glasses and with eyes which look straight. Here and there in British districts the keen observer finds incidents of a pleasing character; a little closer investigation and the rosy gleam is lost in a dark ray of gloom quivering with suffering. Of the Indian-ruled States such experiences are not recorded. In those territories the people are uniformly prosperous and are wholly contented and loyal. And, herein lies the occasion for the writer of these lines to cry aloud in the ears of the careless or uninformed British elector who, in the last resort, be it borne in mind, is responsible for the continuance of such a lamentable state of things.

The idea prevails in the mind of ninety-nine Englishmen out of a hundred who have thought at all about the matter that, without the beneficent over-sight and control we provide, the Indian people would be as sheep without a shepherd, that they are savages wholly ignorant of everything until they are taught by us. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that it will be a surprise to some good English folk to learn that in many of the arts and sciences which go to the enrich-

ment of men's minds or which find practical exhibition in works of beauty or utility, it is Englishmen who have to sit at the feet of Indian Gamaliels. As to the higher sciences, listen to the record borne by Sir Henry Sumner Maine, to the graduates assembled at Cambridge to hear the Rede lecture. 'India,' said he, 'has given to the world comparative philology and comparative mythology, it may yet give us a science not less valuable than the sciences of language and folk-lore. I hesitate to call it comparative jurisprudence, because, if it ever exists, its area will be so much wider than the field of law. For India . . . . includes a whole world of Aryan institutions, Aryan customs, Aryan law, Aryan ideas, Aryan beliefs, in a far earlier stage of growth and development than any which survive beyond its borders. There are undoubtedly in it the materials for a new science, possibly including many branches.' Or, to Max Muller, in his lectures at Oxford, wherein he says:— 'If I were asked under what sky the human mind has most fully developed some of its choicest gifts, has most deeply pondered on the greatest problems of life, and has found solutions of them which well deserve the attention of those who have studied Plato and Kant, I should point to India. And if I were to ask myself from what literature we here in Europe, we who have been nurtured almost exclusively on the thoughts of Greeks and Romans, and of one Semitic race, the Jewish, may draw that corrective which is most wanted in order to make our inner life more perfect, more comprehensive, more

universal, in fact, more truly human, a life, not for this life only, but a transfigured and eternal life—again I should point to India.'

Thus, in the nobler things of the mind we are debtors to Indian thought and Indian wisdom. As for the more prosaic matters, things of the earth earthy, it is worthy of remark that while we, in this day, with all our inheritance of knowledge, build barracks in India which fall down overborne by their own weight, Indians of three hundred years ago, built the Taj Mahal, of which a writer, whose sympathy is not over-done, says:—'There are some subjects too sacred for analysis, or even for words, and I now know that there is a human structure so exquisitely fine or unearthly, as to lift it unto this holy domain. . . . The Taj is built of a light creamy marble, so that it does not chill one as pure cold white marble does. It is warm and sympathetic as a woman.' 'One great critic has freely called the Taj a feminine structure. There is nothing masculine about it, says he; its charms are all feminine. This creamy marble is inlaid with fine black marble lines, the entire Koran in Arabic letters, it is said, being thus interwoven.' 'Till the day I die, amid mountain streams or moonlight strolls in the forest, wherever and whenever the mood comes, when all that is most sacred, most elevated, and most pure, recur to shed their radiance upon the tranquil mind, there will be found among my treasures the memory of that lovely charm—the Taj.' * What the Indian races were in the times

* *Round the World*, by Andrew Carnegie, pp. 252, 253, 254.

of Akbar they are now. Their capacity is not lessened, their brain-power is as great, their skill in administration has not failed; this they show day by day, year in, year out,—all that they need is a fair field and liberty for the free play of their faculties, and that their merits, even when recorded, should not be suppressed, whether accidentally or deliberately. If we have constructed railways and made roads the Indians of days gone by dug canals and built irrigation works of a magnitude and of a solidity which are alike a marvel to us of to-day and a defiance almost of decay. These were 'imperial works and worthy kings.' There is nothing we have done in India which that country's sons could not do as well, or better, with perhaps one exception, and that a very important one, the magnitude of which the writer will not attempt to minimise. He desires to hold the balance fairly, naught extenuating, naught setting down in malice.

It is commonplace to all who know aught of the history of India, that our arrival on that continent coincided with a break-up of the central and controlling authority heretofore wielded by the Emperors of Delhi. We, through much warfare, in which (as Professor Seeley points out in passages already quoted, see p. 4 ante) only accomplished our ends by the aid of Indian bravery. By the exercise of skill of a character which, in any other calling than that of a diplomatist's, is stigmatized with shame, we obtained the supremacy. We became supreme in India more by good fortune and art, not to say artful-

ness, than by surpassing merit. Affairs generally, thanks to the break-up of the Mogul power, were bad when we fought or intrigued our way to pre-eminence; but it is a question whether they were one-half so bad as they are now. Not that Englishmen admit this; far from it. We, in our complacency and by the mouths of official apologists, claim eagerly—often with suspicious eagerness—a very different verdict. Verdicts, however, are not to be bought from or browbeaten out of an honest jury. In the main, and when fully informed, the English people are conspicuous for the honesty of their verdicts.

It is doubtful whether, save for the mischance of war—and after all, even in the days of anarchy, war was exceptional—the position of the average Indian toiler in what are now British Provinces was not better during the turmoil of the eighteenth century than it is in the peace of the nineteenth century: thanks to our good intentions and poor performances. Be that as it may, we have accomplished one great object, the value of which cannot be over-rated. That is, except when *we* elect to fight there is peace in the land. We have stopped wars between Princes of adjoining States; the Mahratta raids have ceased once and for ever. This done, we ought to have stayed our hand. More than this, and all it involves, we ought not to have attempted. We ought not to continue anything more than imperial rule in the true sense of the word. We should rule, not administer. Instead of stopping at imperial control we preferred to assume

that we could govern the Indian races better than they could govern themselves; that we, who knew nothing of oriental practices, could administer the affairs of an oriental people better than they could themselves. We have tried; we have failed egregiously.

The mischief of the situation is that we will not acknowledge our administration of India to be a failure. We assert it to have been wholly and entirely beneficent, and to be so still. We point, as we may truthfully point, to certain effects; regarding these alone, and shutting our eyes to the vast matters beyond, with as much complacency as it is recorded in the Book of Genesis the Creator exhibited in reviewing his creation of the universe—the English see the things that they have done, and, behold, they are very good! And, yet, if the story were told of all the misery we have caused, of all the misery we are still causing, and of all the misery it is to be feared we shall continue to cause for generations to come, the record of the woe and suffering for which we are responsible would appal even our conceit, the conceit of a conquering race firmly rooted in the seat of supremacy.

The British people do not mean to be unjust to races whom they hold in subordination; they do not think they are unjust. The fact, however, remains that injustice exists in India; that life is harder, less relieved by gleams of hope and happiness, in British-governed districts than in the States ruled by Indians and according to methods approved by long-continued experience as suited to the people. In a word, it is

to our interest to believe that our rule of India is only slightly removed from ideal beneficence, and where interest is powerful the eyes, however strong the optic nerve, always see awry.

CHAPTER III.

THE contention of this portion of the argument is that our duty in India should be a Police Duty, with all that is therein involved, and nothing more; that the British, as they alone can in India, should keep the peace. That done they should stand aside, allowing the people to rule themselves according to their own ideas and experience of what is best. It is admitted that, in the view now expressed, the matter is looked at from the point of view of the ruled, not from the standpoint of the rulers. To secure the greatest good of the greatest number is the sole inspiring desire of these pages. We cannot govern an Indian State with so much benefit to the governed as can the Indian people themselves. We cannot secure so much content and satisfaction. We cannot raise as much revenue without serious discontent. The reasons why are on the face of the assertions. English and Indian idiosyncracies of character, all the stored-up force and experience of respective ancestors and of the several national and individual histories, are separated by a wide and unbridgeable gulf. Sympathy and a higher kind of altruism alone could connect the two sides of the yawning chasm; of altruism of the best order, the

English as a race are singularly deficient. We, in India, are strangers in a strange land, mere birds of passage; we cannot suit ourselves to our unfamiliar environment; we are insensible to the thousand and one incidents of daily life and experience which, more than anything else, guide the wise statesman in a course which proves successful in the ends that serve humanity.

Among other things we as rulers do in India is to substitute the rigid forms of law and a scientific routine for adaptability and sympathy. We do not see things eye to eye with our subjects,—our point of view and theirs are different; ours is held to be right, theirs, without dispute or question, wrong. The weakest go to the wall: in other words, the millions suffer because Englishmen regard oriental affairs from a Western standpoint and act accordingly.

Ask an Indian living in an English district bordering an Indian State, whether he would prefer to stay under the rule of the English Collector, or cross the border and become amenable to oriental governance. He would, unhesitatingly, answer that he would prefer to live in the Indian State. Such an answer is humiliating to our pride and self-complacency. But, that such an answer, and such an answer only, should be given, need not be wondered at. Here are two pictures which, as well as anything else, will reveal at a glance why our Indian fellow subjects prefer the tender mercies of their own countrymen to our so-called and much vaunted beneficence.

BRITISH BENEVOLENCE TOWARDS A SUBJECT AND SUFFERING PEOPLE.

The year is 1877; the month January; the districts Cuddapah and Bellary in the Madras Presidency. The year is the dark second successive year of famine. The scene is any one of a score of famine relief camps. In long rows stand the poor famine-stricken creatures. Scattered about are the officials of the camp, some of them busy in preparing food, others 'dressing, the lines of 'objects' about to be inspected, and all in a state of general expectancy. At length the Famine Delegate arrives. He comes straight from the Camp at Delhi, where, at great expense and at the occasion of much inconvenience, the Viceroy gathered the Princes, the Maharajahs and Rajahs, the Governors, the Lieutenant-Governors, in imitation of the assemblage called by Darius the Assyrian; while the pageantry was preparing and the pomp was proceeding in Madras alone one thousand people were perishing for want of food between sunrise and sundown every day. The ink with which the instructions were written was scarcely dry. The Envoy was, in an informal fashion, given to understand that, no doubt, there was a great deal of exaggeration in the cry of famine from Madras, and he was to discourage belief in a serious crisis and the need for heroic measures in every way in his power. A more fitting instrument for the carrying out of such a policy could not have been desired. It was true that, four years earlier, he had conducted a famine campaign

on exactly opposite principles. This, however, was of no consequence to the Delegate; inconsistency has never sat easier on any man's soul than it habitually sits on his. He began his mission by putting the starving people employed on works and receiving relief on a diet not much more than half as good as that provided for felons,* and much less than what, in Bengal in 1874, he declared was the minimum quantity to maintain life. The Famine Delegate passes along the ranks and turns out every man or woman who was not in a wretched state of emaciation and in a condition of almost primitive nakedness.

Here are his words as reported by a Madras Civilian †

* A Ceylon Newspaper (the *Times*) made the following comparison, which, in its general features, may be taken as fair:—

Daily allowance to an able-bodied labourer on our Indian Relief Works:—	Daily allowance to Juan Appu recently convicted of knocking out the brains of a near relative:—	
	Bread	4 ounces
	Rice	20 ,,
	Meat or Fish	5 ,,
	Vegetables	4 ,,
	Plaintains	2 ,,
16 ounces of Rice,	Dholl	2 ,,
and	Sugar	1 ounce
	Coffee	1 ,,
One anna (1½d.) in cash.	Ghee	½ ,,
	Onions	½ ,,
	Salt and Pepper	½ ,,
	Curry stuff a sufficient quantity, comprising cummin seed, coriander seed, garlic, maldive fish, tamarind, saffron, cocoanut and lime.	

This is how the Temple ration worked. 'Some elder coolies,' reports a Native-Indian officer, 'saying they have no bellyful meals, have shown their bellies to me, which appeared like pits. They appear like persons who have had no food for several days.' . . . . . 'All coolies, men, women and children, represented to me that the rations were insufficient. One of the elder coolies asked me, "Have I not the virtues of a convict to get a bellyful of food?" Another answered him, "We also can get a bellyful of food if we commit theft."'

† A Pamphlet towards the History of the Madras Famine, by a Madras Civilian.

who, at this time, was administering a district. 'If,' said the Delegate, 'I were in England, and a man wearing a good black coat and silk necktie were to come up to me and tell me he was starving, I should not believe him, but should say, "My friend, were you really starving you would have sold your good coat and neck-tie, and bought food with the proceeds; come back to me when you have done so, and then I will give you relief." Such is the policy I would pursue in India. You have begun too soon. If you question this man you will find that he has at home a bullock, or perhaps two; yonder man has a couple of acres of land; if this man were really starving his blanket would be in rags, and yonder woman would have sold the glass beads she is wearing round her neck. Again, look at these six men I have picked out of your gang! They are fine tall men. Look at their broad shoulders and sinewy arms, and contrast them with these others who are thin and emaciated. Do you mean to tell me that in a gang of famine coolies there should be so wide a difference? These poor wretches have clearly nothing, but the others are probably men of some substance, who supplement their famine wages by the little property they still possess. In a famine so huge as this is the State cannot do more than keep alive. What you have to do is to muster each of your gangs as I have done this; you should, as it were, weigh each man on your finger, as a native cashier (shroff) does the coin which is paid into the treasury, and to those who seem to you to be not yet fit objects of relief, you should say, "Go home, my

friend, and come back to me in three weeks or a month, when you have eaten the proceeds of your hut, your plough, and your ploughing cattle."' During his tour the Delegate inspected in this manner upwards of a hundred thousand relief coolies in the presence of European and Native subordinate officials of all ranks, and it is therefore easily to be understood that his policy was soon widely known, and, alas! too frequently accepted with docility and carried into effect. The fallacy of the Famine Delegate's reasoning is apparent. In such a crisis as then existed in India there was no market for the woman's glass beads, while if the man allowed his blanket to become ragged before he applied for relief he would not be in need of relief long; the cold nights of the period would soon have ended his life. The Delegate 'shroffed' the ranks and hundreds were turned away to die of starvation, and did so die. This treatment became known only too well among the people: how many of them would be likely to regard the British as beneficent rulers? At the time he so acted, the Delegate was himself receiving, as salary (not counting travelling allowances) from the Indian treasury, as many rupees per day as would, on his own reckoning, have fed nearly five thousand people per day!

Does the reader quite grasp the details of the picture? Do those members of the English public whose sympathies on behalf of the brute creation have caused them to be very active in stopping vivisection, fully realise the experiment the Famine Commissioner, with the approval

of the Government of India, was making in the early Spring months of 1877? All through the Famine districts of Madras, for several months, a gigantic experiment, dictated solely by financial considerations, was going on;—human beings, whose crime was that they were poor, poorer than they need have been but for British administration, subjects of the recently proclaimed Empress, were the objects of the experiment: with the stupidity and wickedness of their race they spoiled the experiment; they had the temerity to die. Surely the game that was played was worthy of an imperial race! Men and women and little children were the counters, and their continued existence at the cost of a few rupees per day per hundred the point at issue. How did the experiment actually work? An instance will serve to indicate. At Madanapilli, in the Cuddapah District, on February 2nd, the Delegate recorded that he found the laborers 'looked to be in good physical condition, and it appeared that some proportion of them must have been able to support themselves, for a time at least, without Government aid. Hardly any of them appeared to be in a physically reduced condition.' For some reason not stated these gangs were not 'shroffed,' nor were their occupants put on the reduced ration. It will be easy to judge the serious havoc caused generally by that ration from the statement of what happened to these gangs. Seven weeks later they were examined by Dr. Cornish, Sanitary Commissioner of Madras, whose good work during the famine can never be over-praised. He says:—

'Out of the whole 800 and odd we found only three women who appeared in moderately good condition and fit for work. Of these, two had three or four young children each (the children being much reduced), and the remaining one had managed to slip in at the back of the enclosure without a ticket in the hope of getting a meal. I did not see a single man in a fit condition to work. What we did see was a large group of individuals in every stage and variety of starvation. We saw old men and old women bloated with dropsy, some with their legs covered with bad ulcers; we saw others again—and many of them men and women in the prime of life—literally moving skeletons. We saw children of all ages in such a condition of emaciation that nothing but a photographic picture could convey an adequate representation of their state. We noticed children hanging listlessly on their mothers' hips, slowly dying of diarrhœa, and others recently born, merely loose skin and bone, atrophied, in fact, by the mother's want of food before they came into the world.'

Verily, the tender mercies of British administrators in India are cruel.

Two further passages must be suffered by the reader, otherwise the true measure of our *humane* acts will not be fully appreciated. Referring to the coolies on Relief Road work, Surgeon Æ. M. Ross, of Nellore, wrote:—'One of the women, I regret to say, Gainga Ademal, aged 50, fourteenth on the list, died during the week of sheer inanition, while at work. She, with her daughter, Jetty Soobakkah, No. 15 on the list, aged 35, had been marked emaciated at several previous examinations. She had often stated that she and her daughter were starving, and that the amount of rice they were able to purchase with the wages they received

was insufficient to keep them in life. The Collector, who was present at several examinations, and I myself, frequently urged them to go into the relief house, where they would get better and more abundant food without labour, for which they were unfit, but they both declared they would rather die, and they have done so; for I hear that, since the examination under report was made, the daughter also has died. It appears that the elder woman, while at work carrying earth, complained of feeling very faint, but continued to work for a short time more, when she fell down and in a short time died.' Does the record of heroic endurance and plucky effort during the Lancashire cotton famine contain a more pathetic story than the foregoing? Pathetic on one side in the pride that kept the cooly-women at work; cruel on the other in refusing them pay enough to keep their courageous souls in their weakened bodies, Again: 'A few more weeks of their present diet will render even the strongest among the men unfit for any moderately hard or continuous labour, while the weakest must die ere long. They are dying slowly now, day by day, week by week.'

NATIVE-INDIAN IDEAS AND PRACTICES IN TIME OF FAMINE.

While such inhumanity was characterising our action in the Madras districts, what was happening across the border in certain districts of the Nizam's Dominions,

where the crop-loss and famine were little, if any, less severe? Immigrants * were treated with great beneficence. They and their cattle were passed toll-free, no charge was made for cattle-grazing, the police were instructed to give special protection to the immigrants, the village officials were directed 'to request the villagers, as far as practicable, to employ the immigrants as farm labourers, and to render them all the assistance in their power,' and waste lands for cultivation on most liberal terms were granted to them.

There was no want of careful ascertainment of the state of affairs. Nothing in the British Provinces marked more complete forethought and adequate grasp of the situation than the action taken by Sir Salar Jung at the first appearance of distress. Sir Richard Temple was compelled to state, in January, 1877, 'the arrangements made to meet distress, and the diagnosis of the coming trouble, were creditable to the prudence and foresight of H.H. the Nizam's Government.' And, as a consequence, when the munificent charity of Great Britain and the Colonies, to which the reader doubtless contributed his portion, placed nearly £800,000 for private relief at the service of the Relief Committee in Madras and (on Lord Northbrook's suggestion) an offer was made to Sir Salar Jung of a portion of the British

* 'No less than 47,400 people migrated into H.H. the Nizam's territories from the adjoining British districts up to the spring of 1877 only. In the course of about two hours on the forenoon of the 9th November, 1876, the correspondent of the *Times of India* encountered some 230 persons on the Begumpore road *alone*, who were all migrating to the Nizam's dominions, and had no knowledge whatever of the existence of relief works in their own territories.'—*Times of India*, Dec. 14, 1880.

gifts, he was able to reply that while highly sensible of the generosity of the English people the distress was so well in hand and so nearly at an end that he would not ask for a grant from the fund. At this very time distress was at its worst in the British Provinces and in the British-ruled State of Mysore. The reason is not far to seek; it is not creditable to our rule.

And, here may be placed the picture to set over against that of the British Famine Delegate's action in the various camps he visited. For this purpose extracts may be made from a report, prepared by Moulvie Mushtaq Hussen to Moulvie Syed Mahdi Ali, Secretary to the Central Famine Relief Committee, as follows:—

'Famine-stricken persons have been classified by the Committees under the four following heads, namely:—

1. Able-bodied men, capable of hard work.
2. Men of weak constitution, incapable of hard work, or light labourers.
3. Men not at all capable of work.
4. Purda women having no ostensible means of support.

From the commencement of the famine, a sufficient number of relief works, such as roads, tanks and canals, are in progress in each district, to afford ample employment to those who come under the first of these heads. Persons falling under head No. 2 were found, mostly, to participate in the above relief works, and work to the extent of their ability to earn the ordinary wages. But the relief committees have thought it proper to relieve this class of men from such work, and at their suggestion, together with men falling under the third of the above heads, they have now been consigned to the poor-houses, where cooked food is distributed to them.

'With respect to the description of people coming

under head No. 2, it was also resolved that, as far as possible, they should be assigned only to such work as fell under the scope of their own respective professions, and should be called upon to turn out as much work daily as they possibly could. The object of exacting work in this manner is not that the coffers of the poor-houses should be enriched from the proceeds of the amount of work turned out, but simply to impress the labourers with the idea that, even in poor-houses, nothing is obtainable without honest labour and assiduity, and to give them the choice of earning their livelihood elsewhere, if they should be unwilling to abide by the rules and regulations enforced in these asylums. In this manner it was hoped that those only who are actually unable to obtain employment would gain admission into the poor-houses, and people, who make poverty a pretence for not doing honest work, would be kept out. These have therefore been placed under the denomination of "light labourers," and are employed on works of a miscellaneous nature, such as spinning, twisting of ropes, and the manufacture of mats and baskets. The works are in daily progress, and the supervisors of poor-houses have made the necessary arrangements for providing sheds for the workmen, so that they should be sheltered from the effects of a scorching sun.

'Those under head No. 3, who are totally unable to work, are divided into three classes, namely: 1, Hindus; 2, Musalmans; 3, Pariahs and others who have no caste prejudice as regards their food and drink. In each poor-house regard is had to the above distinction, and separate seats are provided for each class of people, so that no confusion may ensue when they meet to partake of food, and people of one class may not, in the hurry of getting something to eat, offend the caste prejudices of those of another. Care is also taken to separate people peculiarly afflicted with disease, and they are provided for quite apart from the others.'

'Women nursing children receive an additional

quantity of one-eighth of a seer. Women in a state of dessication have their infants supplied with milk from the poor-house. Two tolas of the best quality of salt is used to every seer of food prepared. In the districts already named, jowari is the staple article of food; it is therefore the grain cooked and served out to them. Three-fourths of a seer of jowari properly boiled will produce a bulk equivalent to 2½ seers or more. Chutni is served out to make the food palatable, and the following is the proportion of ingredients supplied for the purpose, *viz.* :—

Salt	1 tola.
Chillies	2 do.
Tamarind	2 do.
Onions	1 do.

It has been ruled that the victuals should be frequently changed, and before doing so, the members of the Committee, in conjunction with the medical officer attached to the poor-house, should first ascertain the wish and the habits of the people of the district, and effect the necessary change to suit the times of the seasons.

'The cook-rooms have been carefully constructed, with the view that the victuals prepared for Hindus shall not be in any way interfered with by people of other castes and creeds. The cooks for these are selected by the Members of the Committee, which is composed of Hindus and Musalmans; the Hindus have their food served out by the Hindu cooks alone, whilst the Musalmans and lower castes of people get their food served by Hindu or Mahomedan cooks.

'Those not able to work at all repair to the poor-houses daily, receive their food and return home. The lightworking poor are leisurely employed during seven hours throughout the day, after which they retire to their houses. Another privilege allowed them is that they are generally consulted by the members of the District Committee in fixing their time of work. The

inmates of the poor-houses have their personal comforts carefully attended to.

'Friday being considered a general holiday, the light-working people of the poor-houses are exempted from work, but rations are continued as usual.

'Each poor-house is provided with a hospital and a medical officer attached to it, together with an adequate supply of medicines. It is incumbent on the medical officer to look to the cleanliness of the house, to scrutinise the quality of grain served out daily, and to attend to the diet of the sick, on whom some of the incumbents are daily told off to minister to their wants and comforts. He must also see that no expense is spared in providing for the sick, and that the internal management of the poor-houses is satisfactory.

'Before the admission of any incumbent, strict inquiries are generally made as to the eligibility of the applicant for admission, and should the result of the enquiry prove satisfactory, the applicant is in due course admitted and classified.

'With respect to the clothing, there is generally an ample supply available, and those in actual need are freely supplied.'

As for the orphans and children, it is stated :—

'The arrangements made for orphans and other little children were in every way satisfactory. Women confined at the poor-houses were taken care of by the managers, and all their wants and requirements were supplied in accordance with medical advice. Provision was made under medical advice for new-born infants whose mothers' breasts were dried up from hunger. I recollect that the poor-house at Gulbarga was supplied with a number of feeding-bottles. Due provision was also made for the maintenance of orphan children, under which designation came also those that were abandoned by their parents or natural guardians. Every infant child was placed under the care of a steady female as

nurse, and to every two grown-up children one married female was allowed as an attendant. Medicine, food, clothes, and all other requisites for children were provided in accordance with medical attention. The dresses of the orphans in poor-houses were all alike, and all wore red caps. It was an interesting sight to see these little children, whom a similarity of misfortune had thrown together, taking their recreation thus arrayed of a morning or evening on the open ground before a poor-house, and to think of the strange vicissitude which had separated them from their parents, and to put them under the care of guardians who would have found it difficult to tell where their young charges were born or reared. The courtyard of the poor-house at Gulbarga, where these children were housed, was planted with trees and shrubs, and embellished as well as the circumstances would permit, and on one of my visits I remember with pleasure seeing these children playing about as happily as possible in their little garden. Their personal comforts, and their nursing and medical treatment when sick, were conducted on a generous scale, without regard to expense.'

At the end of the famine, it was found some children belonged to British territory: these 'were reported to to the British Resident at Haidarabad by the Central Famine Relief Committee, and were made over to a Christian Mission at Haidarabad.'

Before we leave this picture a glance may be directed towards another Indian State. There was famine at this period in His Highness Holkar's Dominions. Mr. Raghunatha Row, the Prime Minister of the State, in his report on the Famine period, intimates that the Maharajah, when the famine was sore in the lands bordering his territory, essayed to do as the English did and trusted to trade to provide food for those in want.

But His Highness's courage failed him. At first he 'relied on the good results following the application of the principles of political economy,' and determined to let the grain market alone, but either the results were not good at all, or were not good enough, for His Highness soon changed his tactics in the face of the foe and fell back upon time-honoured principles. Three circumstances are alleged to have caused the change of front: (1) a combination among the dealers; (2) the effectual, though not formal, stoppage of all exports from the surrounding country; and (3) the insuperable difficulty of obtaining corn from the Central Provinces. These are the pleas put forward by Mr. Rughanatha Row in his report on the administration of the Indore State for the revenue year 1877. Finding the grain-sellers combining to force up prices, Holkar went into the market himself and bought a quantity of grain, and shops were opened for its sale; these shops were superintended by responsible officers of the State, who, for the time being, must have neglected their special and more legitimate duties to become tradesmen. Seven shops were opened, 53,191 maunds purchased at a cost of Rs. 95,069 and sold for Rs. 88,596, involving a loss to the State of Rs. 6,473. In addition to the above, in the provinces salaries were paid in grain at the rate of twelve seers per rupee. Mr. Rughanatha Row says:—'The able-bodied poor were allowed to work and were paid their wages in grain, while the emaciated, old, and decrepit people were fed and clothed. The poor who found asylum in Indore from other

countries, were fed and clothed and finally sent back to their homes at the Sirkar's expense, amounting to Rs. 31,800. Rs. 32,610 were remitted to several famine committees in British India. The suspension of the collection of export duties on corn, which had been ordered in the previous year, was continued during the year under review at the sacrifice of revenue amounting to about Rs. 10,000 a year. The import duty on corn was also suspended at a loss of about Rs. 12,000.' The famine in Holkar's territory was, therefore, fought entirely on native principles, and was successfully fought. So successfully, indeed, that Holkar was able, in addition, to give great relief in the adjoining Bombay Districts, to the great annoyance of the Hon. Mr. Gibbs, of the Bombay Council, who, more than once, was on the point of proposing His Highness's relief should be altogether stopped by the superior power of the Bombay Government. Collection of revenue was remitted, the great thing which ought to have been done by Sir George Couper in the N.-W. Provinces a year later but was left undone by the Lieutenant-Governor with most lamentable and fatal results. Comparing Holkar's administration with Sir George Couper's, Native-Indians are sure to say it was the wiser and more humane; who is prepared to say that they are wrong?

After these instances, there need be little surprise if, in times of trouble, the native of India prefers the mode of relief adopted by his own people in preference to that carried out by the British.

The same principle, however, holds good of all periods,—of times of prosperity as well as of times of adversity. There is no British district which for general prosperity can compare with the State of Travancore; fifteen years ago it was termed 'the model State,' and it has since in no wise fallen from its high position. No Briton is responsible for this success. It has been, and it still is, the work of purely Indian statesmen —of one man especially, Sir Madava Row, aided most wisely by the Princes of the reigning house. In more or less degree, all that is said of Travancore is true of the majority of the Indian States. When, however, as in the case of Mysore, we assume charge of a State, a blight falls upon it, and the consequences are lamentable. The story of Mysore is a sad and sorrowful one. On the death of the late Maharajah, and until the majority of the infant heir, the Government of India had control of the State. A British official was Chief Commissioner. British officers were everywhere. More highly paid, and more comfortable, posts than those in the lovely climate of Mysore were not to be found in all India,—(save, perhaps, in the wrongly-held districts of Berar, respecting which the cost of administration is significantly omitted on p. 102, No. 2,735, Parliamentary Papers, 1880, while that of all other places is given). The public works and other departments were under their special control; they had the country to deal with after the most approved British fashion. When they took charge of the State, so admirable is the system of tanks, it was almost proof against famine.

These tanks, varying in size from small ponds to extensive lakes, are dispersed through the country to the number of 38,000; the largest is forty miles in circumference. Some of the anicuts on the rivers are of great antiquity, having been constructed a thousand years ago, while the most recent are not less than three centuries old. Most of these were allowed to get into a condition of disrepair, and were useless for the storage of water. The seasonal rains partially or wholly failed in 1876, 1877, and 1878 in Mysore as in other places. So inefficient was the grasp taken by English officers of the situation that one person out of every four died from want of food and scarcity-induced diseases. The population in 1876 was five millions; when handed over to the Maharajah in 1881 it was only three millions and three-quarters, and these in a poverty-stricken condition. As regards finances, we spent the savings of thirty years and ran up besides a debt of £800,000. Even this was not the full measure of our maleficent action in the unfortunate State. When the Maharajah was installed we added 10 lakhs of rupees to his annual tribute. The consequence is that at this moment, in spite of the strenuous efforts of a wise Indian statesman, the late Runga Charlu, C.I.E., and the earnest attempts of the present Minister, Mr. Seshadri Iyer, the State is on the verge of bankruptcy. It is safe to assert that, had an Indian Minister of the calibre of Sir Madava Rao, or any one other of a dozen who could be named, been in charge of Mysore during the Maharajah's minority, the famine notwithstanding, the State would

at this moment have been among the most prosperous in the whole continent.

While this page is being written the *Madras Mail* of October 29th, 1884, reaches England. It contains an article entitled, 'The Anxious Financial Condition of Mysore.' That anxious condition is thus described:—

'When the Maharajah assumed the government he found his revenue reduced from the results of the famine; a load of debt, the interest on which amounted to more than four lakhs of rupees; a budget, where the income hardly covers the expenditure; and the prospect of an increased subsidy of ten lakhs more than has been paid hitherto. The argument that is certain to be made is, that the country was on the verge of insolvency under native rule. We managed it for thirty years, and brought it into a state of prosperity. We then gave it back to native rule, and after a few years of native government, it is again on the brink of bankruptcy; *ergo* the best thing for the country will be for the Maharajah to accept a pension and hand over his territory to us permanently. Will, however, those who love justice say that the facts carry out this conclusion? Let us suppose the case of the Maharajah to have been that of a ward under a trustee, such as would come under the ordinary civil law. Could we go into court with clean hands, and give a satisfactory defence? It would require a very able advocate to make one out. This, however, is a matter of State, and cannot be ruled by mere justice and equity. The bankruptcy of Mysore would deal a severe blow to the argument that natives are qualified to govern themselves, but to cite Mysore as an example of such failure would be unjust in the extreme. In a word, Mysore is not receiving fair play.'

It may be noted in passing that the journalist's remarks are based on a speech made by the Minister in

a Parliament of representative ryots, summoned once a year to Mysore to hear from the Dewan the condition of the country, and to be taken into counsel as to the policy to be pursued. We in our wisdom, declare the Indian people have no faculty for self-government, that they are such a contemptible order of beings it would be folly to ask their advice; give an Indian Minister the chance and he associates the people with him in his task of government. Once more, *we* are the men, and wisdom is our possession, is ours alone. Who can doubt it?

Some farther statements may be given, showing the blighting influence of British control. The Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces in 1878 described the state of certain districts in Jhansi, as one of overwhelming 'indebtedness and ruin.' His Honor enumerated among the causes the following, which are given in Mr. Justice Cunningham's own words, he, as a member of the Famine Commission, having written a Memorandum on the subject:—

(1) The fact that the British Government obliged the people to pay a second time the revenue which had already been exacted from them by the Orcha State in the Mutiny.

(2) A series of bad seasons combined with unrelaxed revenue demand:—'The crops of 1867 were a failure. The year 1868-69 was one of famine; one-fourth of the whole stock of cattle in the district died, and the poorer classes emigrated to Gwalior or Malwa, or perished from starvation

or disease. *In the midst of this distress the British officials were inexorable in demanding payment of the revenue, and, in order to pay it, the people were obliged to commit themselves to written contracts of the most one sided and ruinous character. They thus fell an easy prey to the money lender, whose exactions the Civil Courts have not been slow in supporting. The famine and the injudicious action of the Revenue authorities had reduced the people to a state of absolute poverty.'* *

This poverty is summarised thus—The ascertained debts of the revenue-paying proprietors in three pergunnahs are reported as 16½ lakhs, and their annual profits fall short of their annual liabilities by some Rs. 80,000 a year, which is running on at compound interest. A specimen of the way in which debt accumulates is given in the case of some zemindars, who ten years ago borrowed Rs. 3,600 of 'the most respectable firm in the district.' They have since paid Rs. 6,999, and the account, when last balanced, showed the debt to be Rs. 9,766.

'The Zemindars, it is needless to add, "are quite destitute;" population is diminishing, cultivation has decreased from 258,000 to 231,000, and an area of 37,800 acres is infected with a weed (kans) which only capital can eradicate.'

'What,' continues Mr. Cunningham, 'seems to be wanted is some machinery for bringing the best ability of the Government to bear forthwith upon these

* The italics are *not* mine: they are Mr. Justice Cunningham's.

acknowledged failures, which the Government of India has described, in the case of Jhansi, as "a blot upon the administration." The state of things in Jhansi, apparently, has been known for many years, yet the machinery for improving it is extraordinary slow in getting into motion; the Senior Member is six months before he can write his Minute upon the Report; the Junior Member takes another six months with his; the North-Western Provinces Government takes another six or seven months to frame its letter to the Government of India; meanwhile the compound interest debt, which increases at the rate of Rs. 80,000 per annum is running on, and the condition of the patient becoming hourly more desperate, while the doctors at their leisure are discussing the most appropriate remedy.'

The remarkable good sense which our fellow-subjects in the East possess in matters of self-government is indicated in the Rules which were passed by the revived Village Councils of Ceylon. Some of these Rules were quoted in an article appearing in the *Fortnightly Review* * some years ago; an extract from them may, however, be given here. Their good sense will doubtless astonish some whose ideas of orientals are gathered from wrong notions which have been too long current:—*e.g.*, 'Rule 7. At the request, by petition, of the parents or guardians of twenty-five or more children for the establishment of a school, a school shall be established, which is to be built at the expense of all the villagers within two miles of the proposed school: provided

* 'A Home Rule Experiment in Ceylon,' *Fortnightly Review*, August, 1875.

always, that a schoolmaster is provided without charge to the villagers [*i.e.*, at the cost of the Government]. The repair and upkeep of the school-house or room shall be provided for by the levy of a moderate fee from the pupils attending the school, or by labour given gratuitously by the parents or guardians of such children. *Any parent who does not send his children to either the village school or any other place of education shall be considered as totally unfit for holding any office under Government, or of being a member of a Gansabhawa'* (Village Council).

'Boys from six to fifteen years old, and girls from six to twelve years old, shall be sent to school by their parents or guardians, except when prevented by sickness or other material cause; and the parents or guardians infringing this rule shall be subject to a fine not exceeding one rupee.'

'13. No cart-racing shall be permitted upon any public road, and no vehicle shall be driven thereon without a light at night.'

'14. Gambling and cock-fighting are prohibited. Every headman is requested to prosecute offenders against this rule before the Village Tribunal, as also all disorderly persons and vagrants, also persons using obscene and abusive language.'

Another rule prohibits pawning articles 'without notice previously given to the village headman.'

CHAPTER IV.

ANOTHER argument in favour of Indian over British rule is personal,—that is, relates to the individuality of the rulers. The British Officer cannot, from the very nature of his position, make the good of the people whose affairs he administers his first object. Not the men and women struggling it may be against great difficulties in obtaining daily food can be his first object, his foremost care. The largest sum yet obtained in the district as revenue is ever before his eyes; how he can exceed it, so as to earn the character of a particularly smart officer, and gain rapid promotion, is, of necessity, the ambition and hope of the typical British administrator. An official so described is a true type of the picked men who constitute the Indian Civil Service. Here and there is to be found an officer who regards human life, reasonable comfort, and a modicum of happiness in the people as his chief concerns; but such instances are rare, very rare, and the men who thus consider lives before rupees are not the men whose promotion is most rapid, or who are regarded with favour at imperial head-quarters, or who are posted to the most salubrious or pleasant districts. We rack-rent our tenants whenever opportunity and the 'settlement' permit; we make them pay for land which they do not

cultivate;* we make them pay heavily on their own improvements until the last thing which a cultivator cares to do is to sink a well or adopt any other means whereby the out-turn of his holding may be increased. It is all very well for Sir James Caird † to assert that the increased yield of one bushel of grain on each acre of cultivated land once every ten years would furnish food for the increase of population: while *we* rule India with the rigidity and carelessness for individual interests which are our chief characteristics at the present time, the land will *not* yield its increase. It is not worth the people's while to grow the extra bushel, seeing it will be required for additional 'home' charges—not the Indian 'Home,' but the English.

The rigidity which is complained of, is specially seen in the decrees of our Courts when indebted ryots are sued by the money-lenders. If the state of things which prevailed in the Deccan at the time of the investigation by the late Commission were realised in this country and we were honest with ourselves, no London journalist—and it is the journalists of the metropolis who are the great panegyrists of our rule—

* The Native States hold out one advantage which the British cultivator does not enjoy. While the ryot here is made to pay his fixed assessment due on his registered holding, irrespectively of the actual cultivation, the Native States levy assessment only on the land actually cultivated. This appears to be fair, for land will never be thrown up while it yields a fair crop; and it is harsh if, owing to the diminished productive capacity of the land, or the absence of capital, a cultivator should have to leave his holding fallow, that he should have his difficulties enhanced by having to pay assessment without reaping any harvest in compensation.'—*The Karbari of Kolhapur*, Famine Commissioner.

† India: The Land and its People, p. 210.

would, for very shame, ever again put the trumpet to their lips, and give the note of command to a wondering world to pause and admire the beneficence of British rule in India. Here are some instances in proof of the harm we have done—(the quotations are from the Report of the Deccan Riots' Commission, prepared by Mr. W. G. Pedder, then Secretary to the Government of Bombay):

'In one case a Sowkar took advantage of the temporary absence of a perfectly solvent peasant to obtain, on the plea of his having absconded, an *ex-parte decree, with immediate execution*, on a bond of Rs. 500, borrowed to provide the land with the means of irrigation, sold the estate, worth Rs. 6,000, and bought it in himself for Rs. $1\frac{3}{4}$!'

'A few years ago, an old peasant in the Gaekwar's country, then infamously misgoverned, was complaining to a British officer of the oppression his village suffered from, but on being asked why he did not come into British territory, where land would be given him, he replied, "God forbid! At least we have no civil courts!" There is, however, a depth lower than penury or exile. Sometimes the wretched debtor executes an agreement which almost avowedly makes him the bond slave of his creditor. In one case cited by the Commission, a cultivator and his wife, after their land and property had been sold, passed a bond to labour for their creditor for thirteen years, home or abroad, for food and tobacco and one blanket a year!'

'Jan, an old widow, borrowed Rs. 150, many years ago, for the wedding of a son, since dead. Thirteen years ago, for this debt, she executed a mortgage bond for Rs. 300, and gave possession of her land, about forty acres, with a well. The Sowkar has had the entire produce of the land ever since, and will neither restore the land nor give an account. Twenty years ago Andu borrowed Rs. 17 in cash, and a maund of grain—has

paid, at different times, in liquidation, Rs. 507, and has executed many bonds, two of which for Rs. 875 are now outstanding.'

Mr. H. P. Malet, a Bombay civilian, writes :—

'Under the Land Revenue Survey it was expected that no remission of revenue need be granted in the yearly settlements. From 1838 to 1852 I never made a settlement without being forced to make remissions. Natural or unavoidable causes had brought on penury, but in all that time the bankers were exacting their usury from the people. Up to the last year of my revenue service (1853) I found instances of personal slavery, where, for a few rupees or a few bushels of corn the cultivators had bound themselves on stamped paper to serve their bankers for a certain number of years, or for life. These cases were called personal service, similar to the service of an ordinary servant, but it was not the case—they got food, clothing, and house, but no pay. The ordinary daily pay of an Indian cultivator is about 3d. of our money. On this he could live in his own economical manner, and shift pretty well in times of scarcity. Now that all subsistence has risen in value, and but little food is stored in the villages, the ryots are at once in distress when the season crops fail; the banker sends his slaves to the Government works to maintain themselves and to pay to him the value of the labour he loses; and thus, instead of mitigating the intensity of distress, our Indian Governments have done a great deal to enhance it. What with the enhancements of the Revenue Survey, the civil courts, the rapacity of the banker, and the ignorance of the people, a vast social revolution has been going on for many years, tending to the destruction of a race of men who deserve protection and encouragement at our hands.'

Mr. C. H. Crosthwaite, described as a revenue officer of large experience and sound judgment, tells the story

of the Thakoors or landowners of a certain village who, having got into debt, engaged (on pain of eviction), to pay off the debt, amounting to Rs. 6,000, by annual instalments of Rs. 500. Mr. Crosthwaite proceeds:—

'For five years the instalments were punctually paid. Two thousand five hundred rupees had been paid off, and the Thakoors began to think themselves out of the wood. In the sixth year, however, it happened by some accident that they were a few days late in paying the money into court. The money-lender, who had been watching them as a cat watches a mouse, petitioned at once for the execution of the original decree. The Thakoors pleaded that the delay was only trivial and accidental, but to no purpose . . . . . No one, from the judge downwards, made any allusion to the justice and equity of the case . . . . . The question before the court was not whether a most grievous and iniquitous wrong was about to be done, but merely whether the letter of the agreement had or had not been infringed. They wanted justice, they were given law. The pinching and parsimony of five years had all gone for nothing. They had lost at one moment all their land, and all the money they had paid besides. They knew that if their land was put up to auction it would fetch five or six times the amount due on the land. This, however, they were told could not be done. The money-lender had got a decree upon their land under certain conditions. They had not kept those conditions; and the money-lender was entitled to have his decree executed . . . . . They left the court with frowns upon their faces and curses in their hearts. They still, however, as they said to themselves, had their lands. They had lost their proprietary rights. They could no longer boast themselves landowners. But the old fields—over which they had toiled year by year—still remained to them. No one could turn them out of the fields. They had still

to learn what English law was. Before many days had passed, down came the money-lender . . . . . to settle the rents of his new property. He began by doubling and trebling their rents. They sternly refused to agree with his terms; and he left them threatening vengeance. After a few days, ten or twelve of the most prominent landowners were served with summonses to answer suits for ouster, that had been filed against them in the Collector's Court. They pleaded long possession and occupancy right. The money-lender produced his decree. The Collector informed them that when they pledged their proprietary rights, they had pledged their cultivating rights also, and the one went with the other. They were summarily ejected from their lands, and were glad to accept them back again at the money-lender's own terms. The money-lender's rental now stands as follows:—

Rental	Rs.	1218
Revenue paid to Government ..	,,	300
Profit	Rs.	918

His claim with interest and cost amounted to 6,000 rupees. Out of this he pocketed 2,500 rupees in hard cash. For the remaining 3,500 rupees he has acquired an estate that has yielded him a net profit of 918 rupees for the last four years; not a bad investment on the whole. As for the Thakoors . . . . . they have not murdered the money-lender as yet. But if any one wishes to see rage, hatred, and despair pictured on the faces of living men, let him go some early December morning to the village of Biroree, and see the Thakoors shivering round their little fire of dung and straw in the village square.'

In the Indian States things are not ordered thus. The money-lender is not the paramount power in Travancore, in Rajputana, in the Nizam's Dominions, in Mysore, or elsewhere outside the British Provinces. Mr. Furdoonjee

Jamshidji, in his Settlement Report of the Paitan Taluka in the Arunugabad District of the Nizam's Dominions, says: 'It must be remembered that the ryots here enjoy certain privileges from which their brethren in the British dominions are debarred. While many of the superintendents of revenue survey in the British districts are raising an outcry against the proceedings of the civil courts as affecting the ryots, while they state how unscrupulous Marwadis commit frauds, and by tricky proceedings make the ignorant and needy cultivator pass a bond for ten times the amount of his original debt, how the terms of this bond are rigorously and mercilessly enforced by decrees of the civil courts, and how the poor ryot is sold out of house and home, while these officers and many others are denouncing this great evil, a beneficent and thoughtful provision in our civil laws protects the cultivator from the maws of the ruthless Marwadi, and guards him from the danger of falling a victim to his artful machinations. For in our courts a mere execution of the bond on which the claim rests does not make the contending or absent debtor liable to the amount sued for, until the creditor proves to the satisfaction of the court the consideration for which the bond was executed; and if on going over the accounts it is found that an usurious rate of interest has been charged, the court at once reduces it to a reasonable rate. In the execution of a decree against the property of a cultivator, his house, his agricultural implements, his cattle, and a supply of grain enough to last him and his family for a period of six months are

exempted from attachment. This wise measure saves the cultivator from beggary and ruin.'* There need be little wonder, under these circumstances, at an unprejudiced observer like Mrs. Burton (the wife of Captain Burton, Consul at Trieste), in a work recently produced, remarking that the traveller passing from British territory into the Nizam's Dominions is struck by the change for the better perceptible in the ryots and their surroundings. Fourteen years ago even the British Resident at Hyderabad (Mr. C. B. Saunders) was constrained to say that 'the land-tax is moderately assessed, and the peasantry—no longer suffering under the evils belonging to the revenue system of former days—enjoy a very fair share of prosperity.'

In so important a matter, too, as the enhancement of rent at the periodical assessments the advantage is all on the side of the cultivator in Indian territory as compared with the cultivator under the control of a British officer. Not that the latter is ever consciously unfair or desirous of doing anything other than which he believes to be right and just, but he is inexperienced, unfamiliar with the host of unwritten and unwriteable customs and experiences which are a part of the

* To sharply contrast the consideration shown by Indians in dealing with Indians, as indicated in the passages quoted in the text, with British administration, let a Member of Parliament, on the re-assembling of the House of Commons, call for a copy of the Bombay Land Revenue Act of 1879, let him ask that the Land Revenue Act of 1827 be printed in a parallel column with that of 1879, and issued as a Parliamentary Paper; the British public will then become acquainted with landlord legislation of a most merciless character. Englishmen will hardly believe it possible that such an enactment as that of 1879 can have proceeded from their fellow countrymen But the proof will be before their eyes.

existence of the Indian administrator. The latter learns them as he grows up without knowing that he is learning.*

In yet another matter of no less importance the comparison is all in favour of the Indian administrator over the British officer. In times of drought and famine everywhere the fields yield either very scanty crops or no crops at all. Are, then, the rents based entirely, be it borne in mind, on the annual yield, remitted? In the Indian States they are remitted with a liberal hand; the generosity thus shown by the State landlord is repaid many-fold, as will be shown when we come to deal with famines as a whole. It suffices

* The *Times of India* of April 12th, 1879, reviewing some particulars of a new settlement in one of the Nizam's districts, remarked:—'The net results of Mr. Furdoonjee's settlement show an increase of 22 per cent. over the old assessment, and it includes the road cess. It is noticeable, however, that this increase in revenue is not due to any general enhancement of assessment rates, but mainly to more accurate measurements by which an increase of 19,000 acres of cultivated land has been attained over the cultivated area as shown in the Tehsil records. Now an increase of 22 per cent. would appear to be very moderate compared to enhancements of rates in the neighbouring talukahs in British territory. We find that the revision of Indapoor taluka enhanced rates by 53 per cent., of Sholapoor by 77, Madeh by 77, Bhimthurree by 69, Punderpoor 77, Barsee 66, Heveli 66, Pabul 48, Soopa 36, and Tharmal 32 per cent. And yet these enhancements of rates were considered moderate at the time they were announced. As, however, they were made at a time when the reaction in prices had set in in full force, Government was compelled, in sheer justice to the complaints of the peasantry, though against the inclinations of survey officers, to offer a concession of rates in a resolution dated the 29th October, 1874, in which it was laid down that in no case was the increase of revenue by the re-assessment of a taluka or a group of villages to exceed 33 per cent.; that in case of an individual village the enhancement was not to go beyond 66 per cent., and in case of a single holding beyond 100 per cent. Even this resolution, in the opinion of the Deccan Riots Commission, has not solved the difficulty. In fact Mr. Peddar considers that Government might with advantage lay down a general rule that the enhancement on a revision of settlement in any taluka should not exceed 25 or 30 per cent. These opinions satisfactorily show that Mr. Furdoonjee's settlement is quite moderate.'

here to record the fact that, though, as has been shown, in the Indian States the assessments are moderate the remissions are liberal, and, as a consequence, the ryots tide over a period of scarcity and distress with comparatively slight harm. No one who was in India in the early part of 1877 is soon likely to forget the dire conflict which raged between the special Famine Delegate, and the Government of Madras as to whether the land revenue in the Madras Presidency should be remitted or merely suspended. The Delegate, knowing the aversion of the supreme government at that period to spend much money or lose revenue on account of the famine, argued strongly and persistently in favour of suspension. The Madras Government, on the other hand, insisted upon remission, and in the end prevailed. But where one rupee was remitted, it is safe to say the rulers of Indian States would have remitted five and would have gained in the long run by so doing. The quaint couplet composed by John Bunyan is wonderfully apt and accurate in relation to generous action at the beginning of an Indian famine. The Bedford Dreamer wrote :—

> 'A man there was, though some did count him mad:
> The more he cast away the more he had.'

From the India Office itself comes a most significant instance of the manner in which an Indian State can consider the prospects and lives of its subjects while a British Province can do neither.. The little State of Pudukota is completely environed with Madras Districts, some of them Districts in which remission was made

difficult four years earlier. In 1881-82, says the Statement of the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India issued in August, 1883, the year opened badly, but the season ultimately resulted in a very good general harvest owing to which prices fell unprecedently and caused so much distress amongst the ryots that it was thought advisable not to press for payment of land revenue, more than a quarter of which remained unrealised at the end of the year. It is impossible to imagine the British Authorities similarly acting. Yet, who can doubt that Mr. Seshiah Sastri, the Minister, acted with conspicuous wisdom in doing as he did? And, who can wonder that such consideration is appreciated by the cultivator?

The materials are not available for a complete comparison between the manner in which the public works in an Indian State and in a British Province are carried out. Inasmuch, however, as the village system of administration is maintained in the former in all its vigour while it has been nearly crushed out of existence in the latter more than a presumption exists in favour of the Indian State and the way the work in it is done. It is matter of common observation, by our civilians even, that we have failed to do as well as our Indian predecessors, that the village committees have lost much of the power of self-rule and self-help they formally possessed. The President of the Madras Municipality, (Mr. Arundel,) when a magistrate at Coimbatore, wrote on this subject as follows:—

'It is a singular feature, of the centralizing tendency of our bureaucratic rule, that the village communities have lost much of the power of self-rule and self-help they formerly possessed. The native jury system, the *punchayet*, has been rudely shaken. The decisions of such a body, if ever it sits, no longer bears the old authority, and for the upkeep of irrigation works the punchayet, or native jury, cannot be relied on. . .

. But the communal labour, though it has languished almost everywhere, and is in many places almost in a state of suspended animation, has never completely died out, and exists in various forms and various degrees in different parts of the Madras Presidency. . . . It flourishes with the greatest activity upon works such as temporary drains in river-beds and river-fed irrigation channels, where the expenditure of time, money, and labour is greatest, and where the neglect of common duties is immediately followed by common loss or common ruin. It has become most lethargic as regards rain-fed reservoirs, where only a trifling expenditure of labour is regularly needed, and where the results of neglect are not immediately felt.'

Whether things can be as bad in non-British Provinces as they are in some of our districts, the present writer cannot confidently assert. But this must be said, in all he saw in India he never became acquainted with anything to equal the neglect of which he was an eye-witness in Madras in the terrible year of 1877. Here is the record made while the incident was fresh in his mind. In May of the year mentioned, during a cyclone, more than twenty inches of rain fell in Madras and its neighbourhood in three days. Even the rain which fell was a source of disquiet, so much of it was wasted. After such a crisis as had been passed through,

and with much suffering still to come, arising from the want of water, the least that might have been expected would be that when rain did fall it would not be permitted to run to waste. Yet, on the day the rains ceased, and for many days after, lamentations were upon almost every lip as millions of gallons of water were seen to flow away entirely unused, much of which might, and ought, to have been stored against a dry and sunny day—the oriental equivalent for the proverbial 'rainy day' of England, which needs providing against. As an instance of the frightful waste of waters which occurred, the case of the Adyar river may be taken. Nothing was done to conserve the water in its channel. For three days the river, 250 yards wide at the Marmalong bridge, flowed full from bank to bank. In the middle of the stream, for the width of one hundred yards at the least, the current was moving at the rate of two miles an hour: the depth of water was four feet on an average. It may be that there was not tank accommodation available for the storage of more water. But, even from the tanks, the waste was enormous. The Marmalong tank at Saidapett (a suburb of Madras) may be taken as an indication of the waste permitted. This tank, when it was seen by the writer a few days after the rain, was discharging over its waste weir a volume of water six yards wide and one yard deep, flowing at the rate of five miles per hour. The reason given for this outflow was that, if the water were retained, some of the banks of the tank might give way. Yet the level of the water in the tank was below what

it frequently had been, and no disaster followed. The truth was this: the budget for petty repairs of tanks was so cut down at the beginning of the revenue year, that funds were not available for carrying out such precautionary works as were absolutely needful. The system by which works are done is so unsatisfactory that engineers, though they see the necessity for saving water, are unwilling to take the responsibility of keeping the water in the tanks, in the absence of that protection to the banks which they feel is required. They choose, therefore, the lesser of two evils, and, rather than risk a breach of the banks, with consequent flooding of the country around, and much damage, they consider it wise to let the water run to waste, and keep the level in the tank very low. Nine months previously, when Lord Lytton issued his minute about the necessity of economy everywhere, and called upon the local Governments to report what savings could be effected upon their budget estimates, the Madras Board of Revenue reported that a considerable saving could be made on 'estimates for the annual petty repairs to tanks, channels, &c.' The consequences ought to have been obvious. What they were in a single case has been shown, and that was but one instance out of many. Tanks are the prime pre-requisites for cultivation in many parts of India, and, when economy is required, they are the very last things which should be tampered with. When they are neglected, the result is a flow to the sea of a precious fluid which represents in passing away unused a sacrifice of human lives.

Experience counts for less in India than anywhere. As a matter of fact there is no experience worth speaking of. The experience acquired is in England, at Bayswater, at Cheltenham, and elsewhere, enjoying a pension. Such an instance as has just been recorded of the unwisdom of cutting-down sanctioned estimates might have been supposed to serve as a beacon for ten years at least. So far, however, from this being the case, in the latter part of the following year, under the influence of a scare in the Finance Minister's Department, an order was promulgated to 'save' on the estimates sanctioned and being expended for public works. The saving was to be carried out in characteristic fashion;—that is to say, taking a portion of the Madras Presidency only, from one to two hundred thousand labourers, earning sixpence a day, were 'locked out,' while the costly European supervising staff was maintained intact: in that no reduction was made. This evil was great; the greater evil, perhaps, was the neglect to keep in good repair the tanks and other works connected with irrigation, upon which successful cultivation depended.*

These illustrations are simply indications of what is happening everywhere and at all times under our rule

By way of explanation some remarks may be quoted here which were made by the present writer at the time in protesting against the adoption of this course, and which were commented upon by Miss Florence Nightingale in the *Illustrated London News*. The remarks are these:—

'To estimate the sad and disastrous effect of this measure if it be put into force, we may observe what the expenditure on public works is in this Presidency in a normal year. In the Appendix (pp. 111-117) to the Madras Administration Report for 1875-76 we find certain facts which may be summarised as follows:—

in India. With the best intentions in the world we cannot do as well for the people as they can do for themselves, and as their countrymen in the Indian States are actually doing for them; if we would but recognize this fact there would be some hope of our doing better in the future. But the one thing we will not see is our own utter failure to rule India in and for the best interests of its people.

	Rs.
Total annual expenditure on public works, in round numbers ..	90,00,000
Deduct establishment charges, cost of tools, &c., roughly	8,00,000
Balance for expenditure ..	82,00,000
Deduct from this for materials, &c (a liberal estimate, seeing that the greater portion of the expenditure is for irrigation works for which no materials need be purchased)	34,00,000
Balance available as pay of labourers	48,00,000

That is to say, out of the total appropriation for Public Works four lakhs of rupees monthly are spent in payment of labourers' hire. The working season in many parts of the country is not more than six or eight months in duration, and the work afforded is not continuous. Such as it is, however, it means all the difference in the world to a vast number of people between just enough to maintain life upon and not enough for the purpose.' Taking everything into account, and striking an average for the whole year, the probable monthly earnings per each workman is not more than Rs. 4. Divide this sum amongst the four lakhs mentioned, and we get 100,000 workmen employed continuously. Each of them will support a wife and some children, and probably an aged relative, say, at the least four souls. Thus we have half-a-million of people maintained every month by the public works in this Presidency in a normal year. Most of this half-million souls will lack their daily support at the close of the works.'—*Madras Times*, Dec. 21, 1878.

CHAPTER V.

IT is sometimes urged, as an argument in favour of our not only keeping under our control the Provinces we already possess, but of the absorption of the existing independent States, that the taxation in our territories is lower than elsewhere. Now and then the India Office is responsible for some fearful and wonderful statistics in proof of such a statement as this. For example, in Appendix I. to the Report of the Famine Commission appear some Miscellaneous Papers bearing upon the condition of the country and people of India, At the end of a Paper on agricultural statistics, in which the facts relating to twelve independent States are set forth, a comparison of the incidence of land taxation per head of population, is made as follows :—

NATIVE STATES.	Incidence of land revenue per head of population.			British provinces adjoining.	Incidence of land revenue per head of population.		
	Rs.	A.	P.		Rs.	A.	P.
Rajputana—							
Udaipur	1	1	4				
Alwar	2	6	5	Punjab	1	2	2
Bhartpur	2	13	2	N. W. P. Including wate-rate ..	1	7	0
Dholpur	2	15	8	Excluding water-rate ..	1	5	1
Bundi	3	13	9				
Central India—				Oudh	1	0	5
Gwalior	3	8	7				
Rewah	3	0	1				
Karpurthala	3	5	8				
Bombay States—							
Kolhapur	1	1	6	Bombay	1	11	6
Mudhol	3	0	0				
Nizam's Territories ..	3	3	11	Madras— Including wate-rate ..	1	0	7
Travancore	0	11	7	Excluding water-rate ..	1	0	0

Three years ago, when the Appendix reached the writer, he made the following note, on the above figures, at the bottom of the page on which they appear:—'I distrust these figures. Before accepting them I should like to see the data on which they are founded, and know whether the conditions are the same in each case. Accepting them, however, as correct, I wonder the India Office should publish them, for they condemn most strongly the system of rule for which that Office is responsible. At the same time the testimony in favour of Indian rule is remarkable. It is shown that, in the Nizam's Dominions, more than three times as much can be obtained in the way of taxation from that sheet-anchor of Indian finance, the land, than in Madras, the inhabitants in His Highness's country being prosperous, contented, and loyal, while in Madras there is ever-increasing poverty and daily-growing discontent. Accepting these official statements as trustworthy, the argument in favour of more Indian, and less British, administration becomes irresistible.' It turns out, however, as was suspected, the facts are not exactly as stated. The calculation was made on the supposition that the Nizam had less than six million subjects; he has nearly ten millions, and the heavy rate becomes lessened, though it still appears to be higher than in Madras. Probably it is higher. One reason why it is so is the useless and burdensome expenditure upon the Contingent, of which the reader will hear something. But, although higher, it is less hard to bear than the lower Madras rate. Life, for the son of the soil,

is easier, happier, and better in an independent State, where the money obtained by taxation is spent in the country, circulates among the various traders, than in a Province which is drained of its necessities to pay high salaries to aliens who send as much as they possibly can of the money they receive on the monthly pay-day out of the country.

If proof is wanted that the position of the average cultivator is better in a Native-Indian State than in a British Province, official documents issued from the India Office will furnish that proof. In the publication from which the preceding illustration is cited, may be found a 'Note on the Economic Condition of the Agricultural Population of India,' by Mr. J. B. Peile, of the Bombay Civil Service. Mr. Peile gives certain evidence, on the results of Indian farming, which is of a startling character,—that is, startling, considering the source whence it comes. To give some idea of the scale of an ordinary agriculturist's transactions during the year the following particulars are set forth :—

	Area of Farm.	No. of Family.	Gross Receipts.	Expenses.				Balance.
				Cost of Hired Labour and other Outlay.	Rent or Revenue.	Domestic Expenses.	Total Expenses.	Credit.
North-Western Provinces.								
	Acres.		Rs. A.	Rs. A.	Rs. A.	Rs. A.	Rs. A.	Rs. A.
Landowner - -	52	3	318 0	28 0	87 0	162 0	277 0	41 0
Occupancy Tenant -	22	5	298 0	40 0	71 0	127 0	238 0	60 0
Central Provinces.								
Occupancy Tenant -	44	7	345 0	20 0	51 0	215 0	286 0	59 0
Do. -	25½	6	178 0	9 12	26 0	123 6	165 2	12 14
Hyderabad.								
Occupancy Tenant -	80	5	552 8	96 0	50 0	180 8	326 8	226 0

To those who hold the views contained in this little work, the importance of the foregoing statements cannot be overrated. They more than concede all that is contended for. In Hyderabad, as compared with the North-Western Provinces, it would appear that a farm of fifty acres produces two-fifths more of crop; the tenant in the Indian State pays three times and a half as much for hired labour and other outlay, the tax on his land is thirty-seven per cent. less, on domestic expenses he spends nearly twenty rupees more, and, at the end of the year, has Rs. 226 in hand against Rs. 41, that is, *five hundred and fifty per cent more!*

Another count in favour of the home ruled States is to be found in the circumstance that while British India has increased its debt five hundred per cent. in forty years, they have no debt at all worth speaking of. A great deal of credit for this may be given to the British authorities. That there is no desire to deny. The argument, as it is intended to be expressed, and as it is hoped it will be understood, recognizes to the full that, for the present and for a period to come which cannot well be indicated, Great Britain, as the paramount power in India, has a useful work to do. With that she ought to be content, and should leave each Presidency, Province, and State to be administered according to the idiosyncracies of its respective races, as, to quote two examples only, and those extreme ones, is now done in Travancore and Cashmere. The mention of Cashmere suggests that by way of retort it may be remarked affairs are badly managed in the Himalayan kingdom,


THE GREAT FAMINES OF THE 19TH CENTURY.



1833.





1837.



1854.









1868-69.

and that great loss of life occurred there recently during a time of famine. That is a retort which will come with bad grace from any person connected with British Indian rule. Whatever responsibility may attach to the Maharajah of Cashmere for what he may have done or have failed to do, it cannot, by any possibility, be so great as that which clings to Sir Richard Temple for his acts in Southern India in the early part of 1877, or to Sir George Couper for what he did and for what he left undone in the North-Western Provinces in 1878. Further, the whole question of Famine administration is the very last upon which we ought to use the words of censure and taunt respecting the neglect—real or imaginary—of others. There is nothing in the whole range of Indian administration in which we have been so completely and so discreditably worsted as in our Famine Campaigns. Once only did we fight successfully and in a manner creditable to us as a nation.* Lord Northbrook was Commander-in-Chief during the campaign. This was in 1874. Before that year our record was a melancholy one; after that year the record has been not less melancholy but infinitely more disgraceful, for we had light whereby to walk rightly had we chosen to do so. We did not so choose, and the guilt of causing millions of deaths lies at our door.

The sketch which faces this page is an instructive one, and will, in the lessons it teaches, well repay diligent

* I am not here expressing approval of the precise course carried out in 1874. Further experience has suggested other and perhaps better methods than were then adopted. The principle, however, was the right one, and is beyond all praise.

study. It indicates roughly the respective areas of the greatest famines of this century. All the serious scarcities and famines are not there recorded. To show them would require not eight maps, but more than twice eight. On page 23, Report of the Indian Famine Commission, is to be found an elaborate table, embracing the period from 1769 to 1878, or 109 years, and showing (1) the years in which famines and scarcities have occurred in the chief Provinces of India, (2) the degree of intensity and duration of each, (3) the intervals of time between their occurrence, and (4) the resulting averages as regards each Province and the whole of India. Thus, of severe famines there have been four in Bengal, nine in the North-Western Provinces and Punjab, eight in Rajputana and Central India, nine in Bombay, and eight in Madras. Taking the whole of India, once in every four years there is a scarcity or a famine, in some part or other and in certain parts more than in others.

The reader cannot fail to observe, on glancing at the sketch, that the greater proportion of the famines has occurred in the British Provinces, and that those in the British Provinces (amongst which must be placed Mysore in 1876-77) were more severe and were marked by a greater attendant mortality than famines in the Indian States. There is something more than accident in this circumstance.. It is not asserted that, in the literal sense of the expression, 'the very land is curst' because it is administered by the foreigner and largely for the benefit of the foreigner. But there is a sense in which this expression may be accurately and soberly

employed. Nor is it contended that the rain—(which, eighteen centuries ago, we were told, falls alike upon the just and the unjust, and that it is the worst kind of Pharisaism to interpret Divine displeasure by the occurrence of events which are common to all men),—ceased to fall in British Provinces because of British misrule.* Nevertheless there remains a solid substratum of fact for consideration, as to whether (1) there would not have been fewer famines in India if we had not busied ourselves in annexing State after State and Province after Province, and administering them after our own fashion, and (2) when the famines did come in the cycle of seasons they would not have been less disastrous. In view of the remarkably good opinion which prevails amongst ourselves as to our unparalleled skill and ability, and our marvellous philanthropy, these may seem hard sayings,—nay, to some they may appear astounding propositions.† The facts, un-

* An experienced Anglo-Indian, to whom, in conversation recently, I mentioned this statement, remarked, 'In the main, no doubt, you are correct. In my opinion frequent or non-frequent famines arising from drought is a question of trees or no trees. Our Provinces have been disafforested; in the Native States, where the old customs still prevail, the people, it may be only from habit, take care to plant as many trees as they can.' I asked, 'Is not this a condemnation of our rule?' 'Yes,' was the response, 'Nevertheless, I cannot agree with you (it is true I have not yet seen your arguments) that India would have been better off without us than she is with us. I grant you the balance of advantage or otherwise does not incline much either way, but such inclination as there is goes to the credit of the British.' Perhaps this is the best that can be said. It only lacks one thing—accuracy.

† The facts regarding Famines being as described in this chapter, an extent of the misunderstanding generally prevailing may be gathered from the circumstance that *The Times*, of Feb. 2, 1885, defending in a leading article, British Administration in India, says that our Government has given 'fair assurance of subsistence for the chronic recurrence of famine.' Exactly the opposite state of things is the consequence of Anglo-Indian rule.

fortunately, show them to be marked by an almost scientific accuracy of description. Here are the facts as to geographical distribution and loss of life:—

FAMINES DURING THE YEARS 1802-1878.

LOCALITY.	YEAR.	BRITISH OR INDIAN TERRITORY AFFECTED.	LOSS OF LIFE.
1. Bombay and small part of Nizam's Dominions ..	1802-3	British; Indian slightly ..	Not stated
2. North-Western Provinces	1804	Indian	Do.
3. Madras	1807	British	Do.
4. Bombay	1812-13	Do.	Do.
5. Bombay, Madras, N.-W. Provinces	1823-25	Do.	Do.
6. Madras	1833	Do. Indian slightly ..	200,000 out of 500,000
7. N.-W. Provinces	1837	Do. Do. ..	1,000,000
8. Madras and Hyderabad ..	1854	Do. Do.	
9. N.-W. Provinces and Rajputana	1860	Do. Do.	
10. Madras	1866-67	Do.	
11. Orissa	1866	Do.	5,000,000
12. Behar and N. Bengal ..	1866	Do.	
13. Western and N.-W India	1868-69	Mainly British ..	
14. Rajputana, and Central India	1869	Mainly Indian ..	
15. Behar	1873-74	British	None.
16. Southern India & Bombay	1876-78	Do.	5,250,000
17. N.W. Provinces	1878-79	Do.	1,250,000
			12,700,000

The figures given show a total loss of life of 12,700,000. For five famines the life-loss is not stated. A careful examination of pages 6, 20, and 21 of Parliamentary Paper 4,061, 1884, will show that the last totals are largely under-stated. Judging by the experience of the later disasters, respecting which tolerably accurate figures are available, an estimate of life-loss of 1,300,000 for the five famines, details of which are not available, is not unreasonable; on the

contrary, it might be doubled and then be within the mark. The more moderate estimate gives a total loss of 14,000,000. It is not easy, by the mere statement, to measure the significance of these figures. A standard must be found. Fortunately one, easy to apprehend, is at hand.

Mr. Mulhall, the statistician, has estimated that the loss of life by war in the civilized States of the world from 1793 to 1877 to be 4,470,000. In this estimate all the countries of Europe and the two Americas are included. Since we have been supreme in India we have maintained a general peace on that continent. When there has been fighting we have done it; fighting has been tolerably frequent and the loss of life has been large, though not excessive. See, then, it will be remarked, how great a boon we have secured to the people of India. They have not been subject to periodical slaughter by war as have others. We have, indeed, been 'as God' to the Indian races. Have we? It is true we have preserved them from the Moloch of War, but it is only that they may be trodden down by the Pale Horse of Starvation. Note the comparison:

Loss of life by War in all civilized States, 1793-1877 - - - 4,500,000	Loss of life by Famine in India, 1802-1879 14,000,000

Truly a record to note with pride! We do, indeed, order these things better in India than do the miserable rulers of Europe. How often have we claimed credit for the countless blessings which have resulted from our stoppage of war? In face of the facts which the

Famine Commission has, almost unwittingly, revealed, one is compelled to say: Better, better far, had it been for our fellow-subjects in Hindostan that they should have continued subject to the raids of the Mahrattas through a couple of centuries than that they should have been under Beneficent British Rule for three generations. Their sufferings would, in such case, have been far less than they have been under our governance, and as they are continuing to be year in and year out. It will not do for supporters of British authority to retort that, but for our rule in India the state of things, bad as they are shown to be, would have been much worse, *i. e.*, a Famine loss of 14,000,000 plus a War loss of say, two or three millions more. It is of the essence of the argument of the present writer that England is largely responsible for the famines which have occurred in India during this century. Mr. Raghunath Rao, late Prime Minister at the Court of Indore, in a Memorandum on Famines in India, says:—'In the fourteenth century there was only one famine. In the fifteenth century it was the same. In the seventeenth century there were two famines. In the eighteenth there were eight famines. In the seventy-seven years of the nineteenth there were more than twelve famines;—I am told there have been eighteen.' The list on a previous page, compiled—be it never forgotten—from the Famine Commissioners' Report gives thirteen famines as having occurred during the century, while the Commissioners also prove that once in every four years there is a scarcity or famine somewhere or other in India.

An examination of the startling statement, that we, the British, are largely responsible, directly and indirectly responsible, for the increased frequency of Famine in India may be made.

The respective populations in the British Provinces and in the Indian States are, according to the census of 1881, as follows:—

British India	198.790,853
Indian States	55,150.456
Total	253,941,309

These proportions of four to one have, no doubt, prevailed throughout the century. The British Peace has worked excellently extra-territorially as well as in British India. Taking the cases on both sides only where we have the figures, and, leaving out of consideration all instances where the death-loss is not stated, it would appear that the Indian States have lost about one-and-a-half millions against twelve-and-a-half millions in the various Presidencies. If the details are pursued farther we find such awful results as the following:—

District.	Population.		Deaths.		Proportion.
	1833.				
Guntoor	500,000	..	200,000	or	1 in 2½
	1866.				
Orissa	3,700,000	..	1,000,000	or	1 in 3¾
	1868-69.				
Rajputana	14,700,000	..	1,200,000	or	1 in 12¼
	1876-77-78-79.				
Mysore	5,000,000	..	1,100,000	or	1 in 4½
Madras	19,400,000	..	3,000,000	or	1 in 6½
Bombay	10,000,000	..	1,100,000	or	1 in 9
N.W. Provinces	18,400,000	..	1,250,000	or	1 in 14¾
Hyderabad	1,900,000	..	70,000	or	1 in 27

The above facts, confessedly incomplete, yet as accurate as can be ascertained, are not comforting to the panegyrist of British rule, especially when he takes, as he always does, for the text of his panegyric the assertion that our sole aim and our accomplished end in India are the advantage of the people, and that this is secured by us as it could not be even hoped for in any other way. Thus, it was in a British Province (*viz.*, in a Madras District) that two-fifths of the population were swept away in time of famine; it was in Orissa and in Mysore (under British control) that one-fourth of the people died; it was in Madras that a mortality of one in six (it was one in four in some of the affected districts) occurred; it was in Bombay that a loss roughly stated at one in nine was recorded (in Kaladgi it was one in four); while it was in Rajputana, where a severe famine admittedly existed, that the average rose to one in thirteen; and in the Nizam's Dominions that the lowest mortality, viz., one in twenty-seven, was reported. And yet the affected districts in the last-named State were surrounded on three sides by the worst-affected districts in the Madras and Bombay Presidencies,—that is to say, between Bellary in the one Presidency and Kaladgi in the other. Yet, farther, the Nizam's officials had to make provision for many thousands of refugees from the British Provinces.

Even if the figures given on the foregoing page had shown that in the Indian States mortality had been as great as in the British Provinces that would hardly have improved matters. If we, in a time of wide-spread

calamity, cannot do better than the Indian rulers, we, who have railways where they have but metalled roads and not too many of these, or only a small railroad mileage, where is our boast? When reference is made to the great mortality by famine in 1877-78 in Southern India the remark is sometimes heard, 'Yes, that was very bad. But, see how much worse famine was over a hundred years ago,—in Warren Hastings' time!' In addition to the obvious answer that two wrongs do not make one right, there is the further reply that we have facilities for dealing with widespread distress which Indian monarchs never dreamed of, which were not available to the British a century ago, and, therefore we ought to do better. The stock illustration used by the objectors alluded to is the famine in Lower Bengal —(a British Province, by the way)—in 1770. Warren Hastings declared that 'one-third of the population perished' of hunger. One may take leave to doubt that so great a mortality occurred. Accurate statistics were then unknown, there was not even the corrective afforded by newspapers and contemporary historians to reduce word-of-mouth exaggerations to some test, however rough. But the principal reason for doubting that the mortality was so great is,—as usual,—to be found in official records. The Governer-General informed 'the Court of Directors that, in spite of the terrible loss of life, there was, in the following year, *no diminution of revenue.*' At the present day, with a desire no less keen than that Warren Hastings cherished, to collect every penny of revenue possible, there was a loss in two years

in Southern India (1878-79) of nearly four millions sterling. It is clear that the famine of 1770, if no falling-off of revenue followed, could not possibly have been so severe as was that of 1877-78.

The average Indian ryot has not yet taken to the study of Blue Books and Government Records, and, therefore, has not reasoned out for himself the above conclusions on the data cited. Notwithstanding, there can be little doubt that, on the borderland of the respective countries the broad fact is known and appreciated with a force and thoroughness which come only from an actual experience of the pinching shoe. Little wonder need be felt, therefore, that to the ordinary Indian there should be that decided preference for Indian over British rule which the closest observers of the cultivators and those best acquainted with their minds tell us exists.

The first of the two propositions set forth remains to be considered,—namely, that there would have been fewer famines in India if we had not busied ourselves in annexing State after State and Province after Province, and administering them after our own fashion. To say this is not to assert that a single shower of rain would have fallen over the face of the country which did not fall. But it is to say that we, because we are foreigners who hate the land and the life it necessitates, because we regard the people with scorn and contumely, and because our sojourn is brief, do not possess and at no time have possessed the aptitude to govern India thoroughly and well. With a knowledge only of a

few of its factors we have endeavoured to solve the problem; we have failed, and our failure has been disastrous. Even where a good and wise man has rightly apprehended a portion of the facts, the knowledge has been peculiar to him and with his departure or his death the advantages gained have been lost. Such a calamity as famine does not occur as a consequence of the policy carried out, as a matter of course and habitually, in England, or in Germany, or in any European State, or in the United States of America, for the sufficient reason that the policy of those States is conducted by natives thereof, who are to the manner born, and who can secure the continuity of an approved course of action. Aptitude for wise government is to the more thoughtful and statesmanlike among them a part of their existence. The people and the land, to the foreigner, are, in most cases, a sealed book and in all cases an imperfectly-understood one. Further, the native of any country understands his country-folk, shares their feelings, is one with them in their joys, their fears, their sorrows, looks at the present and the future with the same eyes they gaze with, and is, therefore, not less skilful in apprehending the real points of a given situation than he is careful to avoid making a blunder the effects of which would fall heavily upon them. Thus it is, in general terms, that famine is less frequent in an Indian State than in British Indian Provinces.

A number of minor but highly important considerations combine in an Indian State to bring about this result, and to reduce what, in a British Province is a

famine-period, to a time of scarcity and pinching. Some of them may be indicated.

1. The more widespread prosperity, the more general well-to-do character of the people, which enable them to tide over their difficulties without falling into absolute ruin. In a British Province, thanks to a variety of causes, so narrow is the margin of profit remaining to the cultivator after the land-tax is paid that existence, in good times, is barely tolerable, and in bad times is impossible. Nothing in times of fair harvests has been laid aside for bad harvests because there has been nothing to lay aside. The grain-pits which, a century ago, were in constant use, instead of being filled with grain and kept as a reserve are empty, probably have become blocked up and their locality forgotten. Further, the whole social and business economy of the State as compared with the Province is richer and more diversified. In the State the money raised by taxation from the inhabitants is spent among them;—the clothes the people wear are, to a large extent, woven on looms owned and worked by natives, and so with regard to all household furniture and cooking utensils. In the Province, on the contrary, all the big salaries are drawn by foreigners, who, in some cases, are content to live on one-sixth of what they receive, and send five-sixths to Asia Minor, Bayswater, W., where The Universal Provider daily swells to greater proportions while the Indian tradesman as certainly day by day grows thinner and finally disappears. In the same way the cultivator, who would prefer to give the weaver in his own village so

many rupees' worth of grain at harvest-time for the family's clothes is compelled to turn that grain (often at a loss) into money, and pay for Manchester cottons which may or may not be as good as he would get at home. This, however, is not all. Hand-weaving being driven out of existence by the Lancashire looms, the weaver either sinks into a position of beggary and his family become beggars with him, requiring support from the alms of the village, or he strives to obtain a holding, gets some inferior land, and drags out a miserable existance, during which, whatever goes unpaid, the Government tax is paid. As in this one instance so in all the varied departments of the complex Indian life. England fattens on British India's helplessness and poverty.

2. The Indian statesman, because he is an Indian, is quick to perceive the coming danger, whether it be in the shape of physical causes leading to famine or social and political discontent resulting in mutiny. When the last great famine was coming with giant strides upon Southern India, had indeed already gained a footing there, and ought to have been recognized for the danger it was by every one in authority, the Governor of the Presidency of Madras was on a pleasure trip in the Bay of Bengal, rusticating in the Nicobars, and making calls upon the Governor of Ceylon at Colombo. It is not possible to imagine Sir Madhava Rao, Sir Salar Jung, Mr. Raghunatha Rao, Mr. Seshiah Sastri or any other experienced Indian administrator absent from his post when such peril was in the air. An

adequate grasp of the situation in the autumn of 1876, followed by prudent and energetic measures, would have saved to Southern India at least two millions out of the four millions who perished for want of food, and from the diseases which privation produced. It is true the Duke of Buckingham and Chandos, who was Governor of Madras at the time, had no wish to run away from duty, had no desire to shirk any effort,—indeed, in 1877 he displayed praiseworthy energy, was instant in season and out of season, but the famine was then at its height. The worst that can be said is that a want of foresight characterised gubernatorial counsels at a time when foresight meant human lives. But, alas! to say this is to admit the whole case so far as the inferiority of our rule is concerned. Some links in our chain of administration may be good, but its holding power depends upon the weakest link. The strength as a whole must be estimated by that weakest link.

3. Following upon the point just raised comes this,—that the want of foresight makes the expenditure which has inevitably to be met much greater than need otherwise be incurred, while hosts of lives are lost which would in other case be preserved. One secret of the success whereby the great famine was overcome in the Nizam's Dominions was the promptitude with which the trouble was grappled with, and the rapidity with which the remissions of revenue were made. By care and skill in the latter respect a Famine Campaign may be fought with no greater money expenditure than under the system now in vogue, and

with no loss, or a comparatively small loss, of life,—say one in twenty-seven instead of two out of five. That is to say, British Famine administration might become as good as the Indian. Take the famine of 1877-78. The cost to the supreme government in those two years on account of relief was £7,440,000. Remissions of revenue had to be made, amounting to £3,610,000, thus made up,—

Province.	Amount.
North-Western Provinces	£400,000
Punjab	60,000
Madras, 1877	1,250,300
„ 1878	1,500,000
Bombay, 1878	400,000
Total	£3,610,300

If these remissions had been made at the beginning of the famine, if taxes had not been collected when it was seen the crops must fail, and if the people had been allowed to keep this money in hand,—in Madras say £2,750,000—the writer of these lines, for one, has little doubt that an additional expenditure of two millions sterling would have met all needs, and, what is more, the awful scenes of suffering would have been fewer if not wholly non-existent, while at least two out of the four millions who died might have been saved. More than this: money being in hand while the health of the people was still good, wells by the hundred could have been digged.

(It would be easy to 'condescend to detail,' and by an examination of the financial and agricultural position

of any British district, say, of Chingleput, of Salem, or of Coimbatore, in the Madras Presidency, work out the manner in which, as it is here argued, remissions made in time would have for consequences—(1) little or no abnormal loss of life in distressful times, (2) little or no present or eventual loss of revenue, and (3), astonishing as the remark may seem, the country prove to be in a better position at the end of the period of distress than at its beginning. These are points upon which we might have hoped for sound counsel in the Report of the Famine Commission. One examines that Report for anything of the kind in vain. It is able to the last degree—considering the clever men who constituted the Commission the deliverance could not fail to be able—but the ability is confined within narrow limits, and the Report misses, or (as in paragraphs 165 to 169) inadequately considers, some of the most essential points as regards Prevention. The Commissioners look to Public Works and European supervision as one important means of relieving distress when a famine is in possession. Were it not well to look in another direction? Would it not be better to take famine by the forelock, save all or nearly all the expenditure incident upon costly European supervision, and secure far more valuable and important ends than the efforts made in mitigation only could possibly effect? To indicate, however, in as satisfactory a manner as could be wished exactly what is meant, and to make the argument clear to English readers, the objector would need to hold in his hand the statistics relating to a particular district, running over

a series of years. These are nowhere to be found in this country save in the India Office; indeed, it is not absolutely certain that they are to be found there.)

The remarks made above, before the writer was tempted into the bye-path of parenthesis, holds good proportionally of Mysore. It is not probable, if either of the Indian statesmen mentioned in a preceding paragraph had been at the helm of affairs in Madras and Mysore, with such freedom of action as they would possess as Ministers in independent States, they would have permitted things to drift to such a pass that a hideous mortality, several times greater than has marked the most bloody war of this century, became unavoidable. It may be remarked that it is easy to be wise after the event. Such a remark, however, has no force in this instance. There was experience enough in recent Indian history to ensure wisdom before the event had there been prescience enough in the Foreign rulers of the country and had they possessed the wit to make use of that experience. This prescience is to be looked for in vain. In the nature of the case we may not expect it to be exercised, save on rare occasions,—exceptions proving the rule. The English people would not expect similar prescience in the conduct of their affairs if the administration of Great Britain,—first in the person of their monarch, that monarch being a despot, and next in the persons of subordinate governors of England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland respectively,—was undertaken by a Chinese Prince changed every five years or less, and by Chinese Mandarins, acting under

the influence of the Imperial Court at Pekin, and with their hearts set upon a speedy return to the Flowery Land. In like manner it is unreasonable to hope that Englishmen can possibly govern India so well as the Indians can govern themselves. In the second part of this book an endeavour will be made to show that success has been obtained by an Indian statesman in one particular State, in a generation of time, which is far beyond what we have accomplished or can hope to accomplish. This, too, while we have had all things in our favour and the Indian Minister had well-nigh everything against him. More, however, yet remains to be said on the branch of the subject now under consideration.

CHAPTER VI.

NOT the least important feature in a consideration of the relative merits of British and Indian Government is the excessive costliness of the former as compared with the latter, and the fact that all the good appointments are held by foreigners. How great an evil this is may be inferred from the statement made by a late Controller-General of Indian Accounts (Mr. E. F. Harrison) before the Select Committee of 1872. 'The average salary,' said he, 'of a native engaged in the Land Revenue Department is £20 a year and the average salary of a European is £1,200 a year.' This holds good throughout the whole official realm.

From a Parliamentary return moved for by Mr. John Bright, which has not yet been published though it has been laid upon the table of the House of Commons, the following facts relating to the number, and salaries, pensions, and other allowances to persons in the employ of the Government of India, who are resident and non-resident in India, are taken:—

RESIDENT.

Number.	Salaries or Otherwise.	Amount. £	s.	d.
17,093	Salaries	6,811,422	15	0
1,725	Pensions	679,079	16	0
430	Gratuities and Absentee Allowances	149,670	8	3
	Total	£7,640,172	19	3

NON-RESIDENT.

Number.	Salaries or Otherwise.	Amount. £	s.	d.
7,660	Annuities, Furlough Pay, &c.	3,069,565	0	0
865	Home Establishment and Miscellaneous	403,800	0	0
	Total	£3,473,365	0	0

Combined Totals, £11,013,537 19s. 3d.; nearly the whole of which is paid to Europeans and Eurasians, and only a small portion to natives of India.

For salaries and soldiers in British India nearly three-fifths of the net revenue is appropriated. Of that amount about one-fifth only is spent in the country: the remainder enriches an already wealthy land. On page 102 of Part II. of the Report of the Famine Commission, the following particulars (with others) are given in a table showing the strength and cost of Administration in each Province:—

Province.	Administration.	Per £100 of Revenue.
	£	£ s.
Punjab	694,000 ..	29 6
North-Western Provinces and Oudh	1,200,000 ..	19 13
Bengal	1,629,000 ..	29 16
Central Provinces ..	273,000 ..	31 19
Berar	— ..	—
Bombay and Sindh ..	1,197,000 ..	30 15
Madras	1,142,000 ..	25 13
Assam	172,000 ..	29 11

In the Nizam's Dominions the ratio of cost works out as follows:—Including payments to His Highness the Nizam the amount is less than twenty-five per cent., being about seventy-two lakhs, all of which is spent in the Hyderabad State and none of which comes to England. If the ratio had been double still the advantage would have been with the Indian State. Home-raised the money is home-spent. Apart from the amount expended on the Court the ratio is only a little over ten per cent.

It will be noted by the careful reader that no figures are given in respect to Berar. The question might be asked in the House of Commons whether common rumour in India is right when it alleges that the reason or the omission is owing to the authorities at the India Office being conscience-stricken at what was laid before them, and unwilling to sanction the publication of the statement that the administration of these 'Provinces held on trust' amounts to *fifty-five per cent.* of the gross revenue collected? This is the way in which those acquainted with the administration of Berar fill in the blanks.

To maintain our costly and unsympathetic rule we scruple not to adopt the most rigorous and cruel methods of raising revenue. Here are two sets of instances. The first set emanates from a Ratepayers' Association in Tinnevelly, and has reference to the license-tax imposed by the Municipality on trades and professions. The particulars are as follow :—

A is a vakeel (solicitor) practising in the Court of the sub-magistrate within the municipal limits. He appeared before the sub-magistrate only in two cases during the official year. The fee he received in remuneration for his labour was Rs. 7 (14s.) according to his account book. He was taxed Rs. 12 (24s.) in Class IV.

B is an authorised vakeel in the District Munsiff's Court He had not appeared in a single case during the official year. He, too, was taxed in Class IV.

C is a widow earning one anna (three half-pence) a week by spinning cotton. She is a 'sweeper' in the house of Z. Her earnings are hardly sufficient for her daily maintenance. She was taxed one rupee (2s.) in Class VII. Not being able to pay her tax her spindle is sold and she lives by begging.

D is the wife of a cultivator. During her leisure she cards wool and gets a monthly income of one rupee. This amount is emerged in the family expenditure, thus leaving her or the family no surplus income. She was taxed one rupee in Class VIII as a manufacturer!

E is a snuff-seller. Having no physical strength to attend to any other trade, he daily buys four annas (sixpenny) worth of tobacco, makes snuff out of it and sells the snuff for five annas. There is, according to his account, an income of three half-pence a day. He was assessed one rupee in Class VII. He had no other income or trade.

F is a native doctor (Vithian) practising as a physician. His monthly income is not more than four rupees, which is hardly sufficient for his maintenance. He was taxed Rs 3 in Class VI. Being unable to pay he was thrown into gaol.

G sells matches from street to street and earns two annas [? per day] as an itinerate dealer. He is taxed one rupee in Class VIII. Not being able to pay, and the distress warrant of the Bench magistrate being unable to release the dues to the Municipality, he is thrown into gaol?

H is a poor man bringing fire-wood every other day from his village outside the municipal limit. He gets two annas a time, which is hardly sufficient to keep body and soul together. He is assessed one rupee in Class VIII and having failed to pay the tax is prosecuted.

Ex uno disce omnes. Who, at all acquainted with the *minutiæ* of Indian administration, does not find similar instances spring unbidden in the mind? The writer, when serving as a Town Councillor in Madras during the last few months of his stay in India, saw a part of the compound in which the Municipal Offices stood, largely strewn with doors, shutters, &c., removed from the huts of those who had not the wherewithal to pay the rate-collector's demands, and who had nothing of any value for seizure but portions of their houses.

Sir William Wedderburn (as quoted by the *Indian Spectator* of Sept. 3, 1882) shall furnish the companion instances from the action of the officials of the Bombay Government. The land-tax, instead of being a fair assessment upon the land, is, owing to certain 'artificial and arbitrary rules, often at variance with actual facts,' declared to be 'for the most part paid out of the wages of labour, and operating thus as a poll-tax upon the poorest classes of the agricultural community. The journalist asks if there is any doubt. 'If so,' he proceeds, 'it might be as well to cite an illustration of the manner in which land rent has been collected in the village of Nepti, near Ahmednuggur, quoted by the distinguished judge. The village contains "a fair amount of garden land." The gross produce is worth Rs. 12,001, while income from other sources gives Rs. 3,731. *Per contra* bare family maintenance amounts to Rs. 11,345, the cash expenses of cultivation to Rs. 3,007, and the assessment to Rs. 2,392, giving a grand total of Rs. 16,744. What do these figures reveal? That against an annual gross produce of Rs. 12,001 the wretched villagers had to expend for their "bare family maintenance" Rs. 11,345. Now it must be admitted that these Rs. 11,345 represent the money value of their wages of labour in the field during the part of the year when they were at work there. What sum is then left on which an assessment could be demanded? Only Rs. 656. According to Sir Charles Wood's despatch only half of this could be taken as the Governmental demand. But what had the poor villagers to pay? Why, Rs. 2,392? It may be

asked whence they obtained the money to meet this Governmental demand? We answer, partly from the money-lenders and partly from moneys earned during the time not devoted to cultivation. But besides meeting this *cash payment* the villagers had to spend Rs. 3,007 for the cultivation of the fields of their village which eventually brought in produce valued at Rs. 12,001. This could not have been paid out of any savings or capital. For Sir W. Wedderburn states that the village has a total debt of Rs. 33,132 on which there is an estimated charge of interest to the extent of Rs. 7,000 to Rs. 8,000. It is plain, then, that the cash expended to get the produce of Rs. 12,001 must have been borrowed either from extra wages earned elsewhere, or from the intermediary capitalists, or both. Is it necessary to go further into the monetary details of this wretched village? The moral is so painful that it is best to pass it over in silence. It is simply this: that the *total crop was insufficient to pay the cost of cultivation.* And yet, the "paternal" Government was inexorable in its demand to extract from the villagers, "barely" able to maintain themselves, an assessment of Rs. 2,392! But this case of the village of Nepti is no solitary instance. Sir W. Wedderburn states that the vast majority of holdings in the Deccan belong to this class, namely, of villages where the total crop is insufficient to pay the cost of cultivation. One has only to refer to official administration reports to be convinced of the accuracy of this statement. It is also worth remembering that the Bombay Presidency is not the only one where such

state of matters has existed for years past. There is the province of Oude. In his pamphlet called 'The Garden of India,' Mr. Irwin gives similar examples of two villages, and states that 'the only way the peasant makes both ends meet is by stinting himself in food and eating less than is necessary for health.'

Turn to what quarter we will the testimony is the same. Sir William Wedderburn and Mr. Irwin, in what they described, had the Deccan and Oudh in their view. From Southern India the same cry is heard. 'I enquired, frequently,' says Mr. W. R. Robertson, head of the Agricultural Department in Madras, 'from the ryots why, if the cotton crop paid so badly, they occupied their good soils with it to such a large extent; their general reply was, that they grew cotton in order that with it they might pay the assessment on their land. I asked why they could not grow grain, which would give a larger money return on land of the quality required by cotton. In reply, they said that if they grew nothing but grain *they would have nothing wherewith to pay Government rent, as they and their families could and would consume the whole produce of the land,* they having to content themselves at present with only two meals of food per day instead of three; *that as they could not eat cotton it was therefore available with which to raise money for paying the rent.*' The italics are Mr. Robertson's.

One example will suffice to indicate that when a transaction takes place between the British Home Government and the Indian Authorities, in which the

interests of the people of India are at stake, it is generally on the principle that, whatever happens, the superior party gets all the advantage. The chorus of praise which was chanted in the English press and in the Imperial Parliament respecting Mr. Gladstone's determination that the British Treasury should pay five millions sterling towards the cost of the Salisbury-Lytton Afghan aggression is still present in our minds. We have only to close our ears for a moment to what is passing around us and the familiar strains are heard. So seductive were those strains, and so high the pitch of national self-exaltation attained, that the country's pulse is still throbbing and the nation's heart still palpitating with the effort. It did not appear to some people that we had done anything strikingly magnanimous, even if we did part with five millions of British gold in regard to a war, costing nearly thirty millions sterling, undertaken for British and not for Indian ends. This transaction, however, was not the only one which passed between the two countries at that time. Something else was undertaken almost simultaneously, and this is how the two transactions look when the balance is struck and all the incidents are regarded in a comparative light:—

England's gift to India on account of the Afghan war—a war, it must not be forgotten, which was fought for Imperial, and	India's forced sacrifice (forced by the House of Commons) of revenue, by abolition of all Customs' Duties on English

not for Indian, reasons,—
£5,000,000
payable by instalments.

Cottons, while part of the Indian revenues are maintained by poisoning a large number of Chinese, and another part is raised from a starving people,
£1,100,000
per annum.

No one, who will divest his mind of the prejudice that, in dealing with India, we can do no wrong, can look at these contrasted statements without shame. The facts stated, however, do not cover all the ground: they relate only to the Indian Budget for 1882-3. To be quite accurate, on the *contra* side of the account ought to be added £200,000 per annum sacrificed by Lord Lytton and Sir John Strachey, in the worst of the famine years. This is the way in which the transaction was regarded at the time by the *Indian Mirror*, a daily newspaper published in Calcutta, owned, managed and edited entirely by Indian gentlemen. 'It would,' said that paper, 'have been far more just and righteous to the poor of India if the duty on salt, which cannot be too cheapened in price to them, had been altogether relinquished than that the same course should have been followed with respect to the import duties on cotton goods, which they have scarcely ever felt, and have never complained of. But Lancashire knows the value of its votes, for which both Liberal and Conservative parties are bidding high; and, under the plea of intro-

ducing Free Trade, Great Britain has been privileged to send British manufactures, exempt from Customs duties, into India, while the products of India, such as rice, sugar, and tea, continue liable to the same duties in British ports. It is of no use attempting to disguise the melancholy fact that the enormous sum of £1,108,000, representing the Customs' Duties on British manufactures, has been absolutely taken from the half-starved people of India, and given away to the British nation which is rolling in wealth.'

The enquiries in which we are now engaged may be carried, perhaps profitably, a little farther. An examination of the annual accounts of Great Britain and of India reveal significant lapses from duty, and show great zeal for Free Trade abroad and little concern for the same doctrine at home. The English revenue from Customs is exactly ten times as large as the Indian receipts from the same source. We, of course, always act on principle. An impost on Lancashire Cottons existed in India; in removing the impost we were actuated solely by a desire to pay homage to Richard Cobden's memory, and to make our Eastern Empire thoroughly orthodox, even as we ourselves are unimpeachably orthodox! Alas! no, *not as we are*, for, India being weak and helpless, her people dumb, with not even the shadow of a Representative Assembly in all her borders, we insisted on greater piety from India than it is agreeable for us to exhibit ourselves, while the times of our Colonists' ignorance in these matters we winked at, and continue to wink at. The Colonists

are strong; India is helpless. Before insisting upon the abolition of certain Customs' duties—a mere nothing—in the East we should have taken the beam out of our own eye in the shape of abolishing the taxes on chicory, chocolate, cocoa, coffee, fruit, tea and tobacco, and have remitted revenue to the amount of £13,000,000. Were that done the English Customs' List would then be in the position of the Indian tariff, —viz., the only articles left for excise attention would be intoxicating drinks, drugs, and the like. Great Britain could far better afford to lose thirteen millions of revenue from Customs in a single year and readjust modes of taxation to meet the deficiency than India could afford to lose the million and a half she had to sacrifice by command. This great wrong was done to India, and, save here and there in a provincial newspaper, no voice was lifted up to point out the wrong. Even the late Mr. Fawcett was dumb, and every one else in Parliament appeared to be both blind and dumb.

It is, however, when we come to deal with the Expenditure side of the Indian account, that there is occasion for serious searching of heart as to the waste and extravagance of British Indian expenditure. If the British army (already by far the costliest army in Europe) were maintained on the same scale of expenditure as are our forces in India, the annual cost would be not—as now—fifteen and a half millions but twenty-five millions! In like manner Law and Justice would involve an expenditure of five millions against half a million; what in this country are called the

Miscellaneous Civil Services, and cost seventeen millions and a half, would cost thirty-four millions and a half; Administration, which here requires half a million a year, in India is held to require five times as much; only in regard to Customs charges is there, on a comparison, any advantage in India. The sums thus wastefully expended are raised from a population of sixty-seven millions of adult males, whereof no less than 67 per cent. are tillers of the soil, having an average income of only £1 16 per head annually.*

During the past forty years the Indian revenue has grown nearly fifty per cent.; the English revenue has increased by nearly the same amount. The latter increase has grown out of the marvellous wealth of England; the former has been wrung out of the direst necessities of India, and at the price of rapidly-approaching exhaustion. Proof of this is seen in the circumstance that during the past fifty years there has been, in England, a gross remission of taxation amounting to nearly seventy-five millions; in India, save in Customs (at the bidding of England), and slightly in salt, with various experiments in direct taxation which proved there was no wealth which could bear the imposition of a special tax, there have been no remissions of taxation worthy of mention. On the contrary, year by year, both imperially and locally, the charges of the tax collector have increased. The painful character of Indian finance may be gathered from

* Mulhall's 'Progress of the World,' p. 223.

the following statement of surplus and deficit ranging over a period of forty-two years, viz:—

Year.	Surplus. £	Deficit. £	Year.	Surplus. £	Deficit. £
1840	—	2,080,000	1863	1,820,000	—
1841	—	1,690,000	1864	80,000	—
1842	—	1,690,000	1865	—	190,000
1843	—	1,270,000	1866	2,770,000	—
1844	—	1,340,000	1867	—	[illegible]
1845	—	630,000	1868	—	[illegible]
1846	—	1,390,000	1869	—	[illegible]
1847	—	830,000	1870	120,000	—
1848	—	1,840,000	1871	1,480,000	—
1849	—	1,370,000	1872	3,120,000	—
1850	560,000	—	1873	1,770,000	—
1851	620,000	—	1874	—	[illegible]
1852	730,000	—	1875	320,000	—
1853	630,000	—	1876	1,670,000	—
1854	—	1,960,000	1877	—	[illegible]
1855	—	1,820,000	1878	—	[illegible]
1856	—	1,040,000	1879	2,040,000	—
1857	—	470,000	1880	—	[illegible]
1858	—	7,860,000	1881	—	[illegible]
1859	—	13,580,000	1882	1,660,000	—
1860	—	10,770,000			
1861	—	4,020,000	Total	£19,390,000	£74,940,00 0
1862	—	50,000			

Net Deficit.....£55,550,000

During those years the debt of the country has increased from £34,684,997 in 1840 to £157,388,879 in 1881.

A year's expenditure in England on account of India is instructive. The figures for 1881 will serve for illustration. The summary is as follow:—

Expenditure for Public Works, Interest on Debts, Stores, &c.	14,420,525
Administration	229,645
Civil Furlough and Absentee Allowances	217,747
Superannuation, Retired, and Compassionate Allowances	1,071,287
Army: Non-effectives	2,208,316
	£18,142,520

The above, however, represents only a portion of the

resources of India expended in England. The pay of the English troops in India—officers and men—is, part of it, sent 'home;' the pay of civilians is similiarly dealt with,—to how large an extent may be judged from the fact that a Member of Council receiving £6,000 per annum has been known to live at an hotel on less than £1,000 a year, sending the remainder to England: then, there are profits of trade, say 15 per cent. on the total trade of 1882, viz., £9,000,000; to this must be added remittances of unofficials in all kinds of professions and trades, and various other items, making, probably, to take a moderate estimate, five millions more—or a total expenditure in England of profits and receipts of all kinds, per year, of more than THIRTY MILLIONS STERLING.* That is, nearly every rupee of net taxation is taken from India in each of the twelve months in which the taxes are collected by its foreign rulers.

During the past ten years, on official account alone, nearly £140,000,000† of money obtained in India have been paid in this country. On non-official account at least another hundred millions (more likely one hundred and

* Mr. A. J. Wilson says:—'In one form or another we draw fully £30,000,000 a year from that unhappy country [India], and there the average wages of the natives is about £5 per annum—less rather than more in many parts. Our Indian tribute, therefore, represents the entire earnings of upwards of six million heads of families—say of 30,000,000 of the people. It means the abstraction of more than one-tenth of the entire sustenance of India every year.'—'A World in Pawn.' *Fortnightly Review*, March, 1884.

† 137,122,625 is the exact amount stated in the Statistical Abstract for 1882-83 pp. 54, 55.

fifty millions) have been remitted. The combined totals, if they could be accurately obtained, would be found to be not much, if any, less than three hundred millions sterling. This, in a sense, is the subsidy India pays for its connection with England. It is true, in return, she has received railways and a few canals, not to mention barracks, (in some of which the risk was nearly as great as crossing the Bayouda desert), and is receiving the services of a great host of British officials. But, most of the railways were made for strategic purposes, in the interests of the foreign rulers and not by desire of the governed, or to serve their ends; while, as for the officials they are expensive at the price, seeing that all they accomplish could be better done by Indians themselves. Furthermore, the luxury is too costly for the means of the people ruled. Although India has received something in return for all this expenditure and therefore the word 'tribute' which is employed above may seem out of place it yet holds good. There is also this very important consideration, that, by the acquisition and retention of India a field was provided for English enterprise and industry, and many men found employment who otherwise would have been thrust upon the over-crowded marts of England. If we were as solicitous for the good of the people we rule as we profess to be reforms might, at this moment, be in progress in India which would ensure at least half the sum mentioned as coming to England year by year circulating among the people who provide it.

to the infinite relief of trade and the increased prosperity of the people everywhere.

The poverty of the inhabitants of British Provinces is almost beyond the realisation of English imagination as it is certainly outside the realm of English experience. There was nothing like it in the worst parts of Ireland save during the famine of 1848. There is nothing to compare with it in any part of Great Britain. One-fifth of the people in British India, *i.e.*, FORTY MILLIONS, go through life on insufficient food. This is an official estimate, and errs in under-statement. Under our rule the condition of the people is getting worse year by year. From special returns prepared by the Madras Board of Revenue for the Famine Commission, it would seem that, since 1814, taking in each case the average of five years from that date, and comparing the first quinquennial period with the last, viz., 1815-1819 with 1870-1874, the cost of second-sort rice has doubled, save and except in the irrigated districts. That is *while in England the process of the law has had the effect of reducing the price of the staple article of food, and making in cheap and plentiful for every one, the exactly opposite principle has prevailed in India.* This statement is as true of the 'dry-grain' food—*i.e.*, millet, and the like, as of the 'wet'—*i.e.*, rice. Ragi—a species of dry grain—during the period mentioned, has doubled in price, the number of seers per rupee being, in some cases, 52·6 in 1819-1823 against 35·4 in 1870-1874. while the fluctuations have been from 65·5 in 1814 to 16·0 in 1866, and much less than sixteen in the famine

years of 1876 and 1877. Again, testing this by an English standard, it is as though the 4-lb. loaf in England had gone up from sixpence to two shillings on exceptional occasions, and had permanently increased to one shilling, without corresponding advantages to the purchaser in the way of larger means of earning money. Indeed, when the prices have been at their highest range the opportunities for earning money have been the fewest. Cumboo and Cholum, 'dry' grains largely used by the people, show the same change to a steadily-increasing and permanently-increased price, with the difference, as regards Cholum, that the five years from 1861 to 1865 were the worst in the returns referred to above. The returns for the period from 1875 to 1880 are available; they show that period to have been the most severe for a century.* While the

* Confirmatory evidence is to be found in a valuable statement by Mr. Norman R. Pogson, C.I.E., F.R.G.S., Imperial Astronomer for India: the statement was prepared for the Famine Commission. Mr. Pogson's figures cover a large number of years, two brief periods are here taken for contrast, viz., from 1811 to 1838, and from 1851 to 1878, as follows:—

Mean price of Paddy per garce.		Mean price of Paddy per garce.		Mean price of Paddy per garce.		Mean price of Paddy per garce.	
Year.	Rupees.	Year.	Rupees.	Year.	Rupees.	Year.	Rupees.
1811	103·0	1818	85 7	1825	148·1	1832	121·0
1812	158·5	1819	86·0	1826	102·3	1833	147·5
1813	142·0	1820	82·3	1827	80·0	1834	104·3
1814	112·5	1821	102·0	1828	88 5	1835	91·3
1815	92·5	1822	106·0	1829	101·3	1836	95·3
1816	88·0	1823	176·5	1830	101·5	1837	95·7
1817	97·3	1824	205 7	1831	77 5	1838	106 7

Mean price of Paddy per garce.		Mean price of Paddy per garce.		Mean price of Paddy per garce.		Mean price of Paddy per garce.	
Year.	Rupees.	Year.	Rupees.	Year.	Rupees.	Year.	Rupees.
1851	70·0	1858	148·5	1865	191·5	1872	121·7
1852	63·7	1859	122 5	1866	230·0	1873	149·5
1853	107·5	1860	149 0	1867	201·0	1874	143·3
1854	134 7	1861	170·0	1868	217·0	1875	152·7
1855	140·7	1862	169·5	1869	191 5	1876	245·5
1856	111·5	1863	163·5	1870	130·5	1877	280·3
1857	139·3	1864	171·5	1871	113·7	1878	251 5

price of food has enormously increased wages have not risen. In a most valuable body of evidence on the contemporary condition of Southern India, furnished by the officials of the Madras Presidency to the Famine Commission, again and again is the report of district officials after this wise—'The hired labourer is not able to subsist upon the earnings of labour, and he is frequently forced to borrow.' The value of this labour is threepence a day and under. Elsewhere in India, as has already been abundantly shown, the same rule holds good. There has been no proportionate increase between the wages paid and a higher price for food. Save in the towns the wages of labour are largely paid in grain, and less grain is supplied for a given amount of work than was formerly the case. But, let it not for a moment be forgotten, these remarks apply not to India as a whole, but only to the British Provinces, respecting which ninety-nine out of every hundred descriptions which are published in this country are of a highly flattering and eulogistic character. The men who pen the descriptions are the men who are responsible for what is described: not one mother in ten thousand is prepared to admit want of beauty in her children,—if they have demerits she fails to see them, or, if she discerns them, is ready to declare it is not her business to acknowledge them, that in fact, when all is said, the demerits are not demerits but marks of perfectness.

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CHAPTER VII.

A GATHERING up of the threads already stretched upon the loom will show, readily enough, how the pattern, insensibly almost, makes itself, and why there need be little wonder that the people of India are more anxious for self-rule than for a continuance of foreign control. Life, in the Indian State, is more varied, less under an unsympathizing constraint. Besides, it is *their* life, not the life and practices of foreigners, which the people enjoy. Sir John Malcolm said, many years ago, that 'the people of India must, by a recurring sense of benefits, have amends made them for the degradation of continuing subject to foreign masters.' As a matter of fact the 'benefits' are no longer apparent,—it is doubtful if they ever existed to any great extent,—while the degradation is daily more keenly felt. British Indian subjects do not find their position one whit better than that of their compatriots under purely Indian government. Eighteen years ago, a high official * in one of the British Provinces was, in common with his brethren, called upon to bless our rule in contrast with native-Indian rule. Balaam-like, he found himself unable to tune his voice in harmony

* Hon. A. A. Roberts, C.B., C.S.I., Judicial Commissioner, Punjab, 'Correspondence regarding British and Native Administration in India,' p. 112.

with the text supplied by Under-Secretary-to-Government-in-the-Foreign-Department Wyllie, viz.,—'that the masses of the people are incontestibly more prosperous, and *(su asi bona norint)* far more happy in British territory than they are under Native rulers.' For good and sufficient reasons given Mr. Roberts (the official in question) doubted whether the people at large thought themselves, or really were, more prosperous and happy under our rule than they were under Native governments. 'Certain sections of the people,' he writes, 'as the smaller landed proprietors or a portion of them, and also some of the trading classes, are perhaps better off than they were; but the masses, —the tenants, and farm-labourers, artisans, domestic servants, and others,—earn, no more in British territory than elsewhere, aught but a bare subsistence for themselves and their families. The price of food and of all the necessaries of life has risen so enormously within the last few years, that I doubt, although there has in some parts been a proportionate rise in wages, whether the masses are so prosperous as they were before the mutiny, or as they used to be under the Native Governments. An intelligent Native observed to me the other day that it was the general remark that famine prices had prevailed for several years. I have certainly observed that for the last six or seven years, the average price of wheat-flour in the North-Western Provinces and in the Punjab has not exceeeded 18 or 20 seers for the rupee, while the price of rice in Bengal has been rather dearer. These rates are to the masses

famine prices, and the people feel and say that these prices are one result of British rule. Another remark which the same individual made to me was that the idea was very prevalent that sickness had greatly increased under our rule; that people were not so robust as they used to be, and that they rarely now-a-days attained to an old age.' 'I have,' he continues, 'long been under the impression that the mortality among natives is excessive, and the census of the North-Western Provinces, which was taken in 1865, and which shows a decrease of upwards of a quarter of a million on the population of 1853, tends to confirm this view. It is unreasonable to attribute this diminution either entirely, or in any great measure, to the mutiny. A decade has since passed, and there has been ample time for an increase of population. The people talk of these things and attribute them partly, if not entirely, to a visitation of God, consequent upon the introduction of British rule, and draw an inference unfavourable to it.'

The occasion for the expression of this opinion was provided nearly eighteen years ago by the Marquis of Salisbury (then Lord Cranborne, M.P.) In a debate on the Mysore Succession, which arose in the House of Commons in May, 1867, Lord Cranborne instituted a comparison between the British and Indian systems of government in India, and pointed out certain defects inherent in the former. The Officiating Commissioner of Central India (Mr. R. H. Davies) fairly summed up the argument thus,—

A number of small well-governed States in India, would be more conducive to the political and moral advancement of the people than the present British Government, because—

(1) The rudeness and simplicity of Native administration, though intolerable in Europe, have a rough and ready efficiency well calculated for dealing with great emergencies, such as famine;

(2) And have a fitness and geniality in the eyes of the people which compensate for any material evil which may co-exist;

(3) Migrations of Natives from Native States to British territory are unheard of, while the contrary case is common; and

(4) Owing to listlessness, heavy heedlessness, and extreme centralization, the British Government is, in a considerable degree, inefficient, and occasionally productive of terrible misery, as, for instance, the Orissa Famine.

Such a charge put the Governor-General on his defence and, through the late Mr. J. W. S. Wyllie, his Excellency called upon the chief officials of the Empire to take up Lord Cranborne's statement and answer it. Letters, Observations, Memoranda, and Notes were received from more than thirty leading officials, who were not left much choice as to the opinion they were to express. The Viceroy informed his subordinates what his own view was, viz., that the people were now more prosperous and far happier than they were

before we came to play the part of an earthly Providence to them. And, he added, that he considered 'the present would be a good opportunity for proving this belief.' The case was thus prejudged before it was heard, and any opinions to the contrary found their way to the front rather against the wish than with the concurrence of the Governor-General. All but one of the answers received were strongly in favour of British as against Indian rule; one, to be noted directly, could not forbear to bless in a minor degree. The complete exception was the Hon. A. A. Roberts, whose striking testimony has been cited. It is obvious that not one of the officials, save Mr. Roberts, a Judicial Commissioner, was in a position to give a fair and unbiassed answer on a matter which involved, according to the judgment recorded, either praise or censure of one's own work and the work of one's friends: all were actively engaged, in a more or less responsible degree, in administrative duties, and were, therefore, asked to be judges in a cause to which they were parties. To make this State Paper of any real value, the views and opinions of a similar number of Indian Statesmen, presently or recently engaged in administration in Indian States or in British Provinces, guaranteed against displeasure if their verdict were unfavourable to the foreign Raj and induced to speak fearlessly, should have been obtained, and a consideration based upon the whole. As it is, the evidence is entirely one-sided. Only the defence is heard; the plaintiffs have no opportunity given them to produce

their case. Nor are the witnesses on the stand cross-examined. Indeed their statements are recorded as judgments. Amid the pæans of praise, pitched in a high key, a note of discord was raised: in the mass of opinions printed it seems but a feeble note,—nevertheless, as time goes on and rapid exhaustion of the soil accompanied with frequent enhancements of rent are proving by the irresistible logic of facts that our 'benevolent despotism' is working woe and causing mischief everywhere, this note is sounding higher, and ever higher, while the other notes are becoming fainter and fainter, and will ultimately die away in the clear air of undisputable facts. Sir Richard Temple, in 1867, was Resident at Hyderabad, and had the good fortune to be in frequent communication with Sir Salar Jung. The beneficent influence of that wise statesman on the strikingly ingenuous mind of Sir Richard is apparent in the communication he forwarded to head quarters in reply to Mr. Wyllie's circular. Of course Sir Richard Temple went with the stream,—never, in all his Indian history, did he fail in this respect: consistent in inconsistency,—and concluded with the assertion that 'British rule in India is demonstrably superior to Native rule.' Nevertheless, in the same paper, he had previously made the following significant and remarkable statements, which somewhat weaken the *ex cathedra* remark just quoted:—

(1) 'In 1850, I was employed in the Allahabad district, on the frontier of the Rajah of Rewah. In that tract, at that time *ou*

rule was not more popular than that of the Rajah.'

(2) 'From 1854 to 1860 I had particular knowledge of the protected Sikh States, Cis-Sutlej. These are intertwined and interlaced among British districts supposed to be administered in our very best method. Yet I never knew any immigration from those States to our districts. *The villages of the Puttiala and Jheend States especially were among the finest and happiest I have ever known, and seemed to be on a par with the choicest pieces of British territory.*' *

(3) 'From 1863 to 1867 I have been acquainted with the British districts on the frontiers of the Native States of Bundelcund, of Sindhia, and Bhopal; *and have never observed that the people preferred our management over that of the Native States. Indeed several tracts in that quarter had been unsuccessfully managed by the British.*'

(4) 'I have recently observed evidence in the old Hyderabad records, that, after 1819, *when*

* The same thing was said of the Rajpoot States forty years before. An eye-witness, quoted in White's State of British India, 1822, says,—'I have beheld small independent States governed by Indian Râjahs, where the cultivation appeared superior to that of the Company's Provinces, and where the independent aid of the peasantry announced a greater security of rights.' Again: 'In passing through the Rampore territory, we could not fail to notice the high state of cultivation to which it has attained compared with the surrounding country; scarcely a spot of land is neglected; and, although the season was by no means favourable, the whole district seems to be covered with an abundant harvest.'

the Peshwah's Dominions in the Deccan were brought under British rule, our revenue settlements were in some districts not successful, and did not compare favourably with some of the Nizam's districts.'

(5) 'In 1864 I passed through the Baroda territory and the Gaekwar's Dominions; *certainly that district*, the valley of the Mhye, *is in external prosperity hardly surpassed by any British district that I have ever seen at least.*'

(6) 'In the Deccan, of late years, *the constitution, system, and principles of the Nizam's civil Government are really excellent;* this much is certain. That the result must be more or less beneficial to the country is hardly to be doubted. Whether full effect is given to the intentions of His Highness's Government throughout the Deccan, I cannot yet say; but independent testimony is constantly reaching me to the effect of great improvement being perceptible.'

(7) 'Judging from the published reports, I should suppose that *the Native administration of Travancore must be excellent.*'

(8) 'I believe, too, that the administration of the Gwalior country, when under the Minister Dinkur Rao, afforded a fair example of what Native rule can accomplish, and that *it still continues good under the Maharajah Sindhia.*'

(9) 'I have, on the whole, a favourable opinion of

the administration of the Nagpore country by the Mahratta sovereigns of the Bhonsia house. There were many excellent points about their rule.'

(10) 'Further, in justice to Native rule, it should be said that, within the century of our supremacy, there have not only been good sovereigns, who are too well known to require mention here, but also good Ministers, really capital administrators, who have adorned the service to which they belong; such as are Purneah of Mysore and Tantia Tope of Indore in the past, and Sir Salar Jung of Hyderabad, Sir Dinkur Rao of Gwalior, Sir T. Madava Rao of Travancore, in the present.'

(11) 'There are Native States, though of limited sphere, where the practical result comes out nearly as well as in the best British districts.'

These statements have been spoken of, in advance, as remarkable, by which it is not meant that they are unexpected. On the contrary they are exactly what one, at all acquainted with the facts, would look or. But they are remarkable in a geographical sense. Let the reader, who is not sufficiently acquainted with the various countries of India to be able, by a mental effort, to locate a district or State when its name comes before him in reading, turn to any map of India and, mark with a cross the various places mentioned in Sir

Richard Temple's statements, No. 1 to 9. If he does this, he will find that from the far North to the extreme South there is scarcely a part of India which is not praised as being governedwithwisdom, firmness, discretion and, as a consequence, with success from the point of view alike of the ruler and the ruled. The races comprised in this testimony are as diverse as it is possible to conceive of. There is not a greater difference between the Russian and the Spaniard (to take two European types) than there is between the Sikh and the Travancorean. The Sikh villages were 'among the finest and happiest' Sir Richard Temple had ever known, 'and seemed to be on a par with the choicest pieces of British territory,' while, in Travancore, the native administration is declared to be 'excellent.' These States are extremes each in its way, yet the verdict is one and the same. Take all which lie between: 'really excellent' is the comment that alone can be used.

There is little need, however, to trust alone to the 'ancient history' of Sir Richard Temple's views expressed eighteen years ago. In the Moral and Material Progress Report respecting India, issued in 1883, we have the following statements regarding Travancore and Cochin:—

'The financial condition of Travancore is highly satisfactory though the revenue shews a falling off of £27,888 on the previous year (£592,496 against £620,384). On the other hand the expenditure has decreased in spite of heavy charges on the Maharajah's account and a large outlay on Public Works. The great measure of reform during the year was the re-

organization of the Judicial and Police Establishments, and it is in contemplation also to revise the Revenue Establishments. The total export trade aggregated £759,022 and the imports £543,121; 95 per cent. of the whole trade was with British India and Ceylon. The principal articles of commerce were copra, or cocoa-nut oil (exports), and tobacco (imports).'

'The Cochin State appears to be in a very satisfactory condition, financially and otherwise. The revenue was £147,883 against £144,928 in 1880-1, the expenditure £141,029, and there was a balance of 32 lacs. £25,613 were spent on public works, and great progress is shewn in the advancement of education, the administration of justice, and the extension of forest conservancy.'

Again, of Pudukotai, it is said:—'The Sirkele proposes to obtain money for the creation of a village Police Agency (by the appointment of village headmen and taliaries) from the enfranchisement of Inam lands held by the militia and other *quasi* military tenures. This is a very delicate task.' Delicate, indeed, and practically impossible for a British administrator, but not beyond the skill of Mr. Seshiah Sastri, whose statesmanlike skill has been exercised wisely and well in larger spheres than Pudukotai can afford. The official report proceeds, 'There was a steady improvement in the working of the different courts and the introduction of the Court Fees Act has had a beneficial effect. The abolition of the amani system (sharing of produce) and the substitution of a money assessment for a grain rent is nearly completed.'

For the purposes of the argument, which does not dispute the advantage accruing from over-lordship on

the part of the British Raj, which, on the contrary, looks forward to a continuance of that supreme control for many a year to come, more emphatic testimony than that cited above could not be desired. Given a continuance of British supremacy in India side by side with wide freedom to Indian States and Home Rule for British Provinces there is no reason why every historian should not be able, ungrudgingly, to utter similar praise to that expressed by Sir Richard Temple, in 1867, and by the official writer in 1883, of every part of our great Empire. Later, in these pages, will be found a humble attempt to show how this may be accomplished without harm to either Indian or British interests and with great gain of the highest and noblest kind to both.

In a 'Report from Commissioners upon the North-West Provinces, 1808,' of the State of Rampore, it is asserted by British officials that cultivation was in a prosperous condition. They add :—

'As we have no reason to conclude from the description we had received of the present Regent, that this state of prosperity had been produced by any personal exertions on his part, we were solicitous to trace its source, and to discover whether, in the nature of the tenures, the mode of arrangement or otherwise, there were any peculiar circumstances which it might be useful for us to advert to in the course of executing the duty entrusted to us. The management of the Nawaub Fyz-oolah Khan is celebrated throughout the country. It was the management of an enlightened and liberal landlord, who devoted his time and attention, and employed his own capital, in promoting the prosperity of his country. When works of magnitude were

required, which could not be accomplished by the efforts of the individual, the means of undertaking them were supplied by his bounty. Water courses were constructed, the rivulets were sometimes made to overflow and fertilize the adjacent districts, and the paternal care of a popular chief was constantly exerted to afford protection to his subjects, to stimulate their exertions, to direct their labours to useful objects, and to promote by every means the success of the undertaking.

'If the comparison for the same territory be made between the management of the Rohillas and that of our own government, *it is painful to think that the balance of advantage is clearly in favour of the former.* After seven years' possession of the country, it appears by the report that the revenue has increased only by two lacs of rupees, or £20,000. The papers laid before Parliament shew that in twenty years which have since elapsed, the collective revenues of Rohilcund, and the other districts forming the ceded provinces of Oude, had actually declined £200,000 per annum.

'We could not fail, however, to observe the singular difference which the application of greater capital and greater industry is capable of producing in the state of contiguous lands. While the surrounding country seemed to have been visited by a desolating calamity, the lands of the Rajahs Diaram and Bugwaut Sing, under every disadvantage of season, were covered with crops produced by a better husbandry, or by greater labour. It should here be explained, that the neighbouring lands alluded to in the report *consisted of British territory, already five years in our occupation.*'

What Indian statesmen have accomplished in the past their successors to-day and in the days to come can also achieve, *if we will let them.*

Sir Richard Temple supplements his remarks of 1867, by devoting a part of the evidence given by him before the Famine Commission to land revenue systems in the

independent States and their effect upon the people. Sir Richard says Indian statesmen have profited by the example of British administrators. Admitted, to the hilt. The present writer is ready to acclaim this fact to the full. It in no way conflicts with his contention. But, if the point were pursued to its logical conclusion, the praise would be found to be based upon circumstances of a humiliating character to honourable and modest Britons. Sir Richard further says, that, though he will not 'say the superiority is very great,' yet the condition of the peasantry in British territory is superior. He adds:—'Let the area and population of any given State be compared with any similar area and population in British territory, and it will be found that the Native State levies from the people a much greater amount of land revenue than does the British Government.' Sir Richard is answered, and answered most completely, by his quondam colleague in Bombay, Mr. J. B. Peile, whose remarkable facts appear on page 64. It having been shown above that there is no desire on the part of the writer of these lines to misrepresent Sir Richard Temple's attitude, let note be taken of the following admissions:—

'In most cases, the Native States either follow the model of British administration, or else allow customs and prescriptions to grow up which have virtually much the same effect; and to this rule the exceptions are happily becoming fewer and fewer. In some Native States, such as Kolhápur, in the Southern Marátha Country, there are land revenue settlements being made,

including cash assessments, just as good as those in British territory. In other cases, such as the Sikh protected States in the Cis-sutlej territory, the land revenue assessment is scarcely, in its results, inferior to that of the Punjab. In many Native States systems of settlement prevail which, though nominally different from ours, tend to virtually much the same result. And in some Native States, such as those in Káthiáwár, where collection in kind still prevails, the division of the crops is so considerately conducted that the system is preferred by all concerned to any other system that might be devised. In the Nizam's territory, the land revenue administration is not quite so advanced as in British territory; but nevertheless there again we see a considerable observance of the British model, and, considering the difficulties against which the Nizam's Government has had to contend, there is perhaps no portion of the continent of India which has exhibited so much improvement within the living generation.'

The Earl of Northbrook, while Viceroy of India, had excellent opportunities of judging Indian Princes, Indian Statesmen, and Indian States. A few years after his return from India he gave an address in Birmingham. In that address he declared that the feeling of the princes and chiefs in Rajpootana and Central India was thoroughly loyal towards the British Government, and in no part of India did he find the feeling of the people for the British Government more cordial than in these independent States. From a report of the address which appeared in *The Times*, the following passages may be cited:—

(1) The Rajpoot princes of the present day retain many of the high qualities of their race. He would

give them as the type of a Rajpoot prince some account of the late Maharajah of Jeypore, who died within the last few months. This prince governed his country well. He established an excellent college, which was affiliated to the Calcutta University, and a school for the education of the sons of his nobles. Female education was not neglected, and some progress had been made in inducing the daughters of the higher castes to attend his girl schools. A school of art had been for some time in existence, and some of the art products of Jeypore, notably the enamel, were of great merit. The gaol was in good order. The Maharajah had established hospitals and dispensaries. Public gardens adorned the city of Jeypore, which, lighted with gas and well supplied with water, was one of the finest in India. There were many works of irrigation in the Jeypore State, and the Maharajah always promoted any public works likely to benefit his people. A few years ago the Customs tariff was revised and the internal transit duties were abolished. When he was at Jeypore he assisted the Maharajah in inaugurating a monument to his predecessor, Lord Mayo, and in opening a public hospital built in his honour. Although it was then three years since his assassination, the Maharajah could not speak of Lord Mayo without tears in his eyes—one of the many instances of the affection which was deservedly felt for him by the princes of India. The Maharajah during the Mutiny placed the whole of his forces at the disposal of the British Government, and he exerted himself in the most praiseworthy manner for the relief

of the terrible distress which was caused by a famine which devastated Rajpootana in 1868. When he was Viceroy the Maharajah was a member of the Legislative Council of India, and on several occasions he (Lord Northbrook) was greatly indebted to him for advice and assistance.

(2) The time was rapidly approaching when the native princes, both in Rajpootana and in other parts of India, would be acquainted with the English language. When Lord Mayo was at Ajmeer, in 1870, he suggested to the princes and chiefs the foundation of a college where their sons might receive a good education. The suggestion was warmly taken up, and £60,000 was almost immediately subscribed for the purpose. He (Lord Northbrook) had the satisfaction of seeing this institution—which bore the appropriate name of the Mayo College—opened, and several of the young princes and chiefs of Rajpootana among the pupils.

(3) It must not be supposed that the native princes of other races and religions were not worthy of equal praise. The late Rao of Cutch zealously seconded Sir Bartle Frere's efforts to suppress the slave trade in Zanzibar, where many of his subjects resided.

(4) The great Mahratta States of Gwalior and Indore were now governed upon enlightened principles.

(5) The internal administration of the Nizam's territory by Sir Salar Jung had been highly successful.

(6) The small Mussulman States of Central India and the Sikh principalities of the Punjab were not

behindhand either in their material progress or in their loyalty to the British Government.

(7) The late Rajah of Travancore was a most enlightened ruler, and he was ably assisted by native statesmen, especially by Sir Madava Rao, a native of Madras, who, after having been for some time the Minister of the Maharajah of Indore, was chosen by him (Lord Northbrook) to administer the State of Baroda during the minority of the young Prince, and had amply justified the selection by the success of his administration during the last five years.

(8) Other native statesmen had done signal service in the improvement of the administration of the different native States. He might mention Sir Dinkur Rao, in Gwalior; the Khan Sahib, in Jowra; Shahamut Ali, in Rutlam; Pundit Mumphool, in Ulwur; and Nawab Faiz Ali Khan, in Kotah.

Sir George Campbell, K.C.S.I., M.P., in one of his official reports as Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, says:—'The result of Mr. Kemble's inquiries on the Nepaul frontier is discouraging, in that, after very fairly weighing the respective advantages and disadvantages of both, he comes to the conclusion that the condition of the Nepaul ryot is on the whole better than that of the British ryot. Although the smaller rent taken from the former by the Nepaulese Government is supplemented by forced labour and the purveyance system, on the other hand the illegal cesses and exactions of zemindars,

middlemen, &c., and other vexations, turn the scale against the British cultivator.'*

Little more needs to be said as to the reasons why the inhabitant of India should, like the native of Ireland, or the native of England for that matter, desire Home Rule. Indian rule, tempered and controlled by some of the finer aspects of British administration, is better suited to the Indian man and woman than British administration untempered and uncontrolled. A combination of oriental flexibility with English inflexibility produces an almost ideal condition of government. In the Second Part of this little work, it will be shown how this has already been realised, and that if we want a large and sufficient experiment made before extending the practice we already possess it. Sir Salar Jung told Sir Richard Temple, in 1867, that he had heard every one of the following objections to British, as compared with Indian, rule, urged again and again, viz., — *a.* severe or strict enquiry into revenue-free privileges (Inams, &c.); *b.* sale of estates in default of payment of land revenue; *c.* the enforcement of a fixed demand even in bad seasons, on the ground that there was no enhancement of demand in good seasons; *d.* the imprisonment of civil debtors; *e*, the sale of real property under decrees of Court; *e.* the non-recognition of castes or class privileges in matters of law and justice; *f.* the imposition of legal penalties, incurred as much in careless-

* 'The Ruin of an Indian Province: An Indian Famine Explained.' 1880. (C. Kegan Paul & Co.)

ness and thoughtlessness as from any intention to offend the law; *g*. the impartial unbending, sometimes almost frigid and unsympathetic demeanour, observed alike to all, rich and poor, gentle and simple; *h*. the prevention or prohibition of petty nuisances, measures which may be necessary enough for public health and order, but which many people regard as vexatious; and *i*. the withdrawal from all attempts to amuse the senses or stimulate the imagination of the public. Sir Richard is willing to admit that some of the things thus complained of 'are really faults which we should strive to amend.'

CHAPTER VIII.

THERE are, moreover, many grievances among well-to-do Indians in the British Provinces which do not exist in the Indian States. The Native-Indian Press, in 1867, formulated these grievances under two heads, with both of which all who are in any degree acquainted with present-day Indian politics are acquainted. Those grievances were thus formulated:—First, That the British Government does not sufficiently associate in its administrative system the Native gentry and the more respectable classes; Second, That the British Government does not allot to Natives an adequate share of public patronage, and does not promote them sufficiently to lucrative offices in their own country. These complaints, in spite of all the remedial legislation of the intervening years, in spite of Lord Ripon's noble efforts in a like direction, are, if anything, more true and more evil in influence in 1885 than they were in 1867. If it be the fact that a few Indians occupy positions of trust in the Civil Service and on the bench it is much more

the fact that where, by education and training there were ten fit for office eighteen years ago, there are one hundred now.

"No sweeter is their cup,
Nor less their lot of ill;
'Twas weary waiting years gone by,
'Tis weary waiting still."

We cannot, on the one hand, make it our boast among the peoples of Europe and America, that we are not afraid to educate our Indian fellow-subjects but nurture them upon our most freedom-teaching classics, and, on the other, expect that they, who drink at the same fount of knowledge as we ourselves,

'who speak the tongue
That Shakespeare spake,'

will be content with servitude and rest satisfied that sufferance should, through the ages, continue to be the badge of all their tribe.

This, however, is not all. Man, especially Oriental man, does not live by official position alone. He likes —no man in the world more so—to be decorated, to receive honours and emoluments, at the hand of the monarch or the monarch's representative. This is a feeling shared by all races and all ranks and conditions of men. What have we done to meet this not dishonourable, but often very praiseworthy, craving? Three Orders have been created,—(1) The Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, with three grades; (2) The Order of the Indian Empire, with two grades; and (3) The Crown of India,

solely for Ladies. How are these honours appropriated? The following statement will show :—

STAR OF INDIA.

Grade.	Europeans.	Indians.
G. C. S. I.	20 ..	17
K. C. S. I.	52 ..	19
C. S. I.	111 ..	32

INDIAN EMPIRE.

C. I. E. (*ex-officio*)	30 ..	6
C. I. E.	99 ..	59

CROWN OF INDIA.

C. I.	39 ..	9
Totals ..	351	142

That is to say, among the hundred and ten thousand English folk, exclusive of the rank and file of the British forces, connected with or in India three hundred and fifty decorations, have been awarded, while among the two hundred and fifty million Indians, including sovereigns (of Independent States) and statesmen and men of light and leading, only one hundred and forty-two have been distributed. In Madras, among the thirty-two millions of Indian inhabitants of that Presidency, only three are decorated, viz., the Hon. Venbaukum Ramiengar, C.S.I., the Hon. Seshiah Sastri, C.S.I., and the Hon. T. Muttusami Aiyar, C.I.E. This is as if (leaving the Knights of the Garter, the Knights

of St. Patrick, the Knights and Companions of St. Michael and St. George, out of consideration) there were only two Knights of the Bath and one Companion of that honourable Order among all the people of Great Britain and Ireland.*

There are other distinctions in India, it is true, such as the Order of British India, established for distribution in the Native-Indian Army, and the titles of Maharajah, Rajah, Rai Bahadur, Bahadur, &c., but these are most sparsely distributed among the two hundred million subjects of the Queen-Empress in the British Presidencies and Provinces. (The details in respect to these minor distinctions are, so far as is known, not available in print, and it would be idle for a non-official to ask for them from the India Office.) Sir Salar Jung told Sir Richard Temple that he considered complaints on this account of the greatest importance. 'I have known them,' he said, 'repeated in a variety of forms and shapes, and especially heard them often discussed in the trouble period of 1857.' Sir Salar, as reported by the Resident of Hyderabad in 1867, specified 'some of the honours and emoluments to which Natives

* It is a singular commentary on the above facts that I should find the *Madras Weekly Mail*, of Dec. 3, 1884, remarking, on the Honours Question, as follows:—'Every Queen's Birthday or January *Gazette* contains some such announcement as "AHMED KHAN, Talookdar, to be C.S.I." or "CHATERJEE JEEJHEBOY, merchant, to be C.I.E.," though in the Madras Presidency honours even to natives are awarded with a grudging hand. . . . . The policy adopted in India seems to be to exclude Europeans almost entirely.' In view of the figures given it would rather seem as if the policy were to exclude Indians almost entirely from Indian Orders. With the main contention of the *Mail's* article, that both Europeans, and Indians in Madras are overlooked when honours are granted, I am not indisposed to agree. I think Madras is cavalierly treated by the supreme authorities in this as in a great many other respects.

may attain under their own rule, but from which they are debarred under British rule.'*

If, under all these circumstances, and in view of all that has been stated, the native Indian should prefer to be governed by men born in his own country, subject to the same hopes and influences as he is himself, and actuated by a belief in India and its future, rather than by cold, unsympathetic and (it must, in candour, be stated) greedy foreigners, who, wittingly or unwittingly, are draining his country of its bare necessities, and who have no care or ambition for its future, that future being to them a thing apart, is he so greatly misguided? Were England subject to a foreigner would not an Englishman of this character be considered a noble patriot, whose conduct we should admire and hold up for imitation the more frequently as he the more thoroughly laboured for the freedom of himself and his countrymen? Surely, sturdy British patriots will, once they realise the facts, be not backward in admiring, more than that even, will be active in promoting, true patriotism in their Indian fellow-subject, though the ultimate consequence be a little less wealth for enjoyment in England, and a great deal more money for distribution in India.

* Sir Richard Temple added, 'He (Sir Salar Jung) used to hear it asked, how it was that such foreign rulers as Aurungzebe, far more violent and troublesome than the British ever were, who did wrongs such as the latter had never ventured to do, did not excite such animosity as seemed to rage against the British in some quarters. He thought that the answer might partly be found in this, namely, that none of our predecessors ever were so utterly foreign to the country as we are; that, with all their faults, they settled among, and amalgamated themselves with, the people, which we, with all our virtues, can never do. This, he seems to think, is the most insuperable of all objections against our rule.'

PART II.

THIRTY YEARS' ADMINISTRATION IN AN INDIAN STATE

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THIRTY YEARS' ADMINISTRATION IN AN INDIAN STATE.

CHAPTER I.

'Facts are chiels that winna ding,
But must aye be respeckit.'

—*Scotch Proverb.*

HITHERTO, the evidence of the superiority of Native Indian rule, under the protecting influence of British supremacy and by the adaptation of what is good in British methods of administration, has been of a fragmentary character,—partly affirmatory, partly of negatives proved by contrast. This is satisfactory for rebutting purposes, but it does not afford sufficient basis upon which to erect a structure. It may be well to proceed to establish the foundation of the contention by inviting consideration of what has been accomplished

by an Indian statesman in the short period of thirty years. Naught shall be excluded from this record with a view of giving a more favourable view of the entire history than the circumstances warrant. All that, in return, is asked is that no prejudices against an Indian because he is an Indian shall be allowed to warp the mind of the reader and prevent him giving credit where credit is due.

The history of the largest Indian State in the Empire is taken, partly because the administrator who worked such beneficial changes as will be indicated has passed where 'beyond these voices there is peace,' and one can, therefore, comment with more unreserve than otherwise would be the case; and partly for the reason that if Indian self-government in its fullest form and force is possible in the Nizam's Dominions it is possible anywhere between Jummoo in Cashmere and Tuticorin in Tinnevelly. Nowhere in all the realm have there been greater difficulties to combat than the late Sir Salar Jung encountered in the State of Hyderabad; nowhere could a Minister be more harassed and thwarted through a great portion of his period of rule by an over-lord than was Sir Salar Jung by the Foreign Office of Calcutta and Simla, Lord Lytton, the speaker of most gracious words at Delhi, acting in the most ungracious manner throughout the greater part of his vice-royalty. To have achieved success under such circumstances required qualities of the highest order, while the triumphs recorded merit ungrudging recognition.

(1) THE NIZAM'S DOMINIONS IN 1853.

It is impossible, by means of any parallel to be drawn from a European source to describe the condition of the Nizam's Dominions in 1853, when Sir Salar Jung became His Highness's Minister and undertook the conduct of the State's affairs. Impossible, because in no circumstances such as have existed in Europe for centuries have there been such relations constituted between one Power and another as would permit of one country treating another country, however powerful and however weak they were respectively, as the great Mussulman State was treated by the British authorities. In 1853 'the Nizam came into our power by a process which has been often and successfully repeated in our Indian annals. There is a curious phenomenon in the insect world where an egg is deposited in the body of a living creature, which nourishes itself upon the substance of its unwilling nurse, gradually taking up all the fat, flesh, and tissues of the victim, till it dies, or drags on a futile existence. Our Government in India has frequently laid such an egg, in the shape of "a Contingent," within the confines of friendly States. Oudh, Gwalior, and the territories of Scindia, were thus treated, and by no other means were the dominions of the Nizam brought within the grasp of Lord Dalhousie.' In these words does Mr. Edwin Arnold, C.S.I., Editor of the *Daily Telegraph*, commence a narrative of Lord Dalhousie's dealings with the Hyderabad State. During the course of those

dealings the Governor-General of a body of merchants, whom accident had made supreme rulers in Hindostan, through the Nizam's incapacity for accounts and book-keeping by double entry, perpetrated a gross act of injustice. The Viceroy compelled the Nizam to 'assign' his most valuable Provinces as security for a debt which, it is doubtful, really existed. This act is only kept in countenance by the strange perversity which apparently refuses, even at this day and with Earl Kimberley at the India Office, with Mr. Gladstone in power, with Mr. Chamberlain and Sir Charles Dilke as his lieutenants, to undo the wrong. It is not possible, however, (at least for the present writer) to believe that any one of the statesmen just mentioned is really and fully acquainted with the Berars Question. For this reason: knowledge could not be possessed by them or one of them without justice being done; in this instance it is easy to be just. Let those who have seen references in the English newspapers to General Sir Orfeur Cavanagh's praise of English rule in India, delivered in Exeter Hall in November, 1884, read the eighteenth chapter of Mr. Arnold's work, entitled 'The Marquis of Dalhousie's Administration of British India.' It is calculated to cause the most serious misgivings in an Englishman's mind as to what goes on in our Eastern Empire, unknown and unsuspected in the home country. It is not intended here to tell in any detail the story of the annexation of the Berars, the most prosperous Provinces in the Nizam's Dominions. Most, if not all, Members of

Parliament have been placed in possession of the facts to adequately set forth the whole circumstances of the case would require a pamphlet in itself. That British egislators have not by the information which has been placed at their disposal been moved to harass the India Office until justice be done is, it must be confessed, a matter of no little surprise. The average Englishman, strong in his belief as to the honesty of British administrators, would scarcely believe, unless chapter and verse were given, and hardly even then, that such things could be done as were done when the Berars were acquired by Lord Dalhousie or that *any* English Ministry could permit the wrong to remain unredressed one single hour after it once became acquainted with all that happened. Yet, the wrong *was* done; the wrong is *still* unredressed.

The reader is simply asked to note that, from whatever cause and as the consequence of whatever duplicity, when Salar Jung entered office in 1853 as Dewan, or Minister, to the Nizam, the condition of the State of Hyderabad was as bad as it well could be, so far as finances and general good government were concerned, while from the patriot's point of view the situation was like unto that of France immediately after Alsace and Lorraine were annexed by Germany. With this difference, however, France lost her Provinces after hard fighting, fighting which she herself provoked; the Nizam lost his territory in quite another way. Turbulence and disorder, in spite (rather in consequence) of the large forces, regular and irregular, which the supreme authority, *i.e.*, the British

authority, decreed, prevailed throughout the land. The revenue was in a most distressing condition. The returns for 1853 show the revenue was low, the treasury empty, the Nizam in debt. Worse than that, and to make matters deplorably bad, the Berars, yielding Rs. 43,47,933 per annum, had been assigned to the Government of India. There was not even the wherewithal to pay official salaries. Prior to this time the monarch's jewels had been mortgaged for seven lakhs of rupees. The total debt of the State was Rs. 2,70,00,000 (£2,700,000), over two years' revenue. His Highness's Dominions were never in a worse condition, nor could they, short of absolute bankruptcy, well be worse. Let not the charge be made that this was owing to Native-Indian incapacity for administration. Such a charge would be falsified by what happened in the State and by what will be described in the pages immediately following. What may be charged is this,—that *our* policy towards the Indian States, our greed and rapacity,* our control and influence were alone responsible. No hand but that of a wise and resolute Indian could change the condition of affairs. Things were, as has been said, at their worst. The Man was ready to grapple with them, a man, too, belonging to a race which (Sir Lepel Griffin tells his credulous countrymen) † has 'no genius for government;' he belonged to a people who, the same disinterested and

* 'As job followed job, and superfluous offices were made, it became a proverbial expression current in Hyderabad, "Poor Nizzy pays for all." '—*Calcutta Review*, vol. xl., art. 'The Nizam's Contingent.'

† *Fortnightly Review*, Oct., 1883, p. 495.

wholly unbiassed advocate declares 'have failed to realize the first principles of government, and whose practice is founded upon all that is mendacious and short-sighted, and unstatesmanlike and unjust.' It is, by the way, a curious comment on such an expression as this, to note the readiness with which, before the United States of America were ripe for such a course, Salar Jung abolished slavery in the Nizam's Dominions. This he did in 1856, within three years of his entering office. In the decree respecting the abolition the Minister declared that both seller and purchaser would be punished were the traffic in human flesh continued.

(2) REFORMS NEEDED; REFORMS UNDERTAKEN; REFORMS ACCOMPLISHED.

In view of the abuses which existed on every hand if Salar Jung, who was only twenty-five years of age when he became Minister, had contented himself with their removal he would have accomplished great things. But, he recognised that while he had to pay off arrears, to liquidate debts, to clear away mortgages, and to resume districts which had been pledged for comparatively small loans, he had also to devise means for augmenting the revenue. He needed revenue for the following, among other purposes, viz., for,—

1. The creation of Civil and Criminal Courts in Taluks and Districts, and for their proper supervision at head-quarters;

2. The establishment of costly machinery, consisting of highly-paid officials, to carry out the revenue administration;
3. The creation of a Department charged with the collection of revenue derived from other sources than land;
4. The inauguration and maintenance of a Revenue Survey and Assessment;
5. The organization of an efficient Police Force;
6. The institution of a Public Works Department, to look after the means of irrigation and communication, upon which agricultural prosperity largely depended;
7. The spread of Education by provision of schools, colleges, etc.;
8. The opening of Hospitals and Dispensaries in every important centre of population;
9. The introduction of sanitary arrangements in the capital and chief towns;
10. The improvement of postal communication; &c.

All these reforms were undertaken; without exception they were accomplished. The land revenue, as the mainstay of an Oriental exchequer, was first taken in hand. Here the results achieved were of a thorough character. Salar Jung, by the energy and tact which he exhibited, restored the confidence of the people not only in the Government but in himself as the Executive authority of the Government. His predecessor could not have borrowed ten thousand rupees from the Hyderabad bankers without difficulty; before Salar Jung

had been long in office it was remarked that the leading bankers would have limited their loans by his demands alone, in the implicit reliance that he would not borrow money which he could not repay. The anecdote respecting the confidence reposed in Lord Durham by the House of Commons fifty years ago has passed into the commonplaces of history. Lord Durham,—a dull speaker and an honest man,—was, one evening, expounding the national finances and desired to prove a certain point by the production of figures which he had prepared for the occasion. His notes were in confusion; he could not find what he wanted, and at length he said, 'I can assure the House I have worked the matter out and find the result is as I have stated; I trust the House will accept my statement.' The statement was accepted, and the incident is often used to point a moral as to the confidence which English statesmen, as men of integrity, inspire in their co-temporaries. In the case of Salar Jung the belief in his integrity reached a far higher plane and was more flattering to the Minister than was the incident in the British House of Commons to Lord Durham.

The Minister's wise and firm administration of the land revenue cannot be better laid before the reader than in his own words. He appeared, in 1879, before the Famine Commission, and gave evidence. Sir Salar thus described the course he took:—

'When I first took charge of the administration of

the country 25 years ago, I found the batai* system prevailing in Telingana as regarded wet crops, and for dry crops there was a fixed money assessment. In Mahratwari the assessment was fixed in money. In Telingana the Government share under tanks was either 10 or 12 parts in 20, under wells 8 in 20. The amount on each village or cultivator was fixed in Mahratwari by Shekdars answering to Mahsuldars, and Mokaddams and Moharrirs answering to the Patels and Patwarries, who in conjunction with Mahsuldars performed the same duty in Telingana. In Telingana whole taluks of Rs. 60,000 or Rs. 70,000 were farmed out to Zemindars. In Mahratwari, talukdars received large tracts on fixed payments. Sometimes, after two or three years, the talukdars would withhold payment when the State was in need of funds, and cause a default of some thousands of rupees of revenue. The jaghirs were large; the personal ones were nominally about 40 lakhs, including Berar and Tankha jaghirs, about 35 lakhs (1263 F.). But this was not the actual revenue, but what was called the kamill or full possible payment, which always was in excess of the real payments in Telingana, and still more so in Mahratwari. I gradually introduced changes; I brought in cash payments, commuting the crop-rents into cash at the average value of 10 years. The Tanka jaghirs were resumed by degrees, as well as some personal jaghirs. The Tankha jaghirs were on every opportunity commuted into cash payments by judicious treaty with the jaghirdars, and personal

* The 'batai system' it may be explained was an ancient custom, upon which a European reformer would hardly have dared to lay his hands. It was a division of produce, and something more. The share of grain that fell to the State was converted to money on the spot, by compelling well-to-do artisans, cultivators, or village money-lenders to take it off the hands of revenue officials at about Rs. 5 per *khandi* over and above the bazaar rate of the time. 'Any quantity which could not thus be disposed of was sold by open competition. . . . . The officials, who were supposed to watch over the large heaps of grain in the interests of government, very often helped themselves without the slightest scruple. The cultivator, under this system, had no inducement to improve his holding so as to bring in a large return.'

jaghirs were resumed when the incumbents died, or it was found that they had no good title. Now only 12 lakhs of Takha jaghirs remain, including sebundy and contingencies, and ten lakhs of Tankha pure and simple, and even these are in the possession only of the old nobility, or as such as were given from the Dewani Elaka as Tankha jaghirs and were subsequently incorporated with the Sarfkhas districts. Personal jaghirs are nearly untouched.'

This may be supplemented by a brief comparison, showing the increase of land revenue in the Indian State and in British India respectively. Later on, will be seen the object which is had in view in instituting this comparison.

GROSS LAND REVENUE COLLECTED.

The Nizam's Dominions.		Rs.	*The British Indian Empire.*		£
Collected in 1853	..	64,85,098	Collected in 1853	..	16,190,000
„ in 1881	..	1,83,40,861	„ in 1881	..	21,860,000
Increase	..	Rs. 1,25,14,098	Increase	..	£5,650,000
Per centage of increase 260 per cent.			Per centage of increase, less than 25 per cent.		

The ability of the Minister who could achieve such a result, who could abolish the farming of revenue, resume grants of land, increase taxation, and yet leave the people better off than they were before, and more prosperous than corresponding classes in British territory, is beyond all praise. Of the total demand nearly the whole is collected, the exact per centage being 98.55. A comparison may be instituted:—

The Nizam's Dominions.			*Presidency of Bombay.*		
Per centage of Collection on Demand	..	98.55	Per centage of Collection on Demand	..	97.52

The Presidency, too, has this advantage over the State that the whole of its Districts have been brought under the operations of the Revenue Survey and Settlement. When a like condition of things has been obtained in His Highness's Dominions, the superiority of wholly Indian administration will, it is safe to say, be shown in a collection of over 99 per cent. Short of perfection in administration more cannot be done. This is a sample of fact of which Mr. J. K. Cross, M.P., in view of his declaration at St. Bees, should take special note, *and act accordingly*.

The increase in land revenue, however, cannot be expected to continue. The Nawab Yar Jung, a member of the Board of Revenue, in a Report on a Tour of Inspection made in the Southern Division, says, very appositely :—

'I must here observe that in future I do not anticipate any appreciable increase in the land revenue, nor do I desire it. From the statements appended to the administration reports, compiled in the life time of H. E. the late Minister, it appears that during the last 30 years the land revenue has increased enormously. In return for the security of life and property, a benefit which the administration of the late Minister conferred on the raiats, Government has received a fair reward in the shape of an extended area under cultivation, and consequently an increased land revenue. The late Minister had taken over charge of his office at a time when anarchy prevailed every where throughout the country. . . . . Now, however, the conditions are quite different. Agriculture has almost reached its highest limit, and is stationary and it will remain so unless Government itself supply means of improvement

to the cnltivators. There is no doubt however, that the introduction of the Survey Settlement in the Mahratwara, and the construction of additional irrigation works in the Telingana, districts, will be followed by a further appreciable enhancement of the land revenue. In the former case, a ten per cent. increase all round over the present land revenue will meet the most sanguine expectations of its elasticity. In the latter case the circumstances are quite different, as there is yet great room for improvement, and I would not be surprised if a large outlay upon the almost inexhaustible natural resources for irrigation possessed by the Telingana districts increased the land revenue by fifty per cent., or even more.'

The spirit evinced in this passage is that which characterizes the Nizam's Minister and his chief officers. They do not consider they have reacheda point of perfectness. They do not feel that they have already attained, and may 'rest and be thankful.' Rather, they recognise greater success is to be obtained and they energetically press forward to secure it.

A comparison has been made above, between the increase of land revenue in a defined period in British India and in the Nizam's Dominions. Now, however, the parallel may be carried a little farther, and the late Minister's last year of office be compared with his first.

1853.	Rs.	1881-2	Rs.
Total Revenue ..	68,01,130	Total Revenue ..	3,11,40,538

Or an increase of 357.84 per cent. This was the result of unremitting care and consideration, combined with the exercise of the often dis-united qualities of prudence and stonewall firmness. In this unique combination of

qualities the late Sir Salar Jung stands head and shoulders above his contemporaries,—Anglo-Indian and Indian. Later on, this fact will be found to be more fully developed, in a sense not too flattering to British good opinion of itself.

It is not possible to ascertain the exact amount of increase in the extent of cultivation. No records are in existence giving a correct idea of the amount of cultivated land previous to Sir Salar Jung's administration. There are, however, in certain Talukas of the Marhatwadi Districts which came under the operations of the Revenue Survey introduced by the late Minister eight years ago, certain records from which the necessary data may be obtained. From these it appears that in fourteen Talukas from 1874 to 1882, the cultivated area in 1854 amounted to 10,03,094 acres; this in 1881 had increased to 22,12,289 acres. The net increase, therefore, as compared with the first year of Sir Salar Jung's office, was 12,09,195 acres or 120.55 per cent. From this it may be gathered that, at least in some of the Talukas in His Highness's Dominions, a great increase had been effected in the area under cultivation during Sir Salar Jung's administration. These Talukas belong to the Mahratta portion of the country and may be fairly said to represent the state of things there. The case of Telingana, which comprises more than a third of the Hyderabad territory, is, however, entirely different. Here the obnoxious Batai (or payment in kind) system prevailed, by which the cultivator though theoretically

entitled to one-half was not practically allowed to reap more than one-fourth of the produce of his field. The position of the cultivator was, therefore, more precarious than that of his brother in Mahratwadi. Shortly after his accession to office Sir Salar Jung, who had had personal experience as a Talukdar of the evils arising from the Batai system, abolished it, and replaced it by cash payment. This, coupled with the various reforms he introduced from time to time in Revenue administration considerably ameliorated the condition of the ryots, and, as a natural consequence, the growth and development of the area under cultivation was greater here than in the adjoining Mahratta Province. The following statement will show the proportion of the cultivated to the cultivable area in the Nizam's Dominions during the last two years of Sir Salar Jung's tenure of office:—

Year.	Area occupied by cultivators.	Unoccupied area.	Total cultivable area.	Per centage of occupied area to cultivable.
1881	1,50,85,893	53,74,032	2,04,59,925	73·74
1882*	1,51,40,695	55,93,554	2,07,34,249	73.02

The condition of agriculture everywhere depends on the number of inhabitants a country possesses. Be the extent of a territory ever so large, if its population is sparse cultivation will be confined to a limited area. In the Nizam's Dominions Telingana is, owing to the insalubrity of its climate, not so thickly peopled as Mahratwadi. Thus while in the latter the number of

* In the middle of this year Sir Salar Jung died. Decadence immediately followed from causes only too easily to be accounted for. Mr. Gorst, M.P., as will appear in the next chapter, largely helps us to an explanation of this state of things.

inhabitants to the square mile is 134.29, the former can boast of no more than 95.19 souls to a mile. The result of this numerical disparity is that, in 1882, 83.63 per cent. of the arable land was cultivated in Marhatwadi, whilst only 51.22 per cent. was brought under tillage in Telingana. Regard being had to the density of the population the proportion of cultivated to arable land is not smaller than the general standard existing in the contiguous British districts. Assuming the population per square mile to be 100 in the various provinces named below, the following result is arrived at :—

Province.	Year.	Per centage of occupied area.
H. H. the Nizam's Dominions	1878	66.70
Ditto Ditto	1879	64.26
Ditto Ditto	1880	64.54
Ditto Ditto	1881	64.20
Ditto Ditto	1882	63.57
Bombay	1874-75	64.41
Ditto	1875-76	63.87
Central Provinces	1878-79	66.32

These figures conclusively prove that the proportion of cultivated land in the State of Hyderabad is in no degree lower than that obtaining in the adjoining British Provinces and that the material condition of the agricultural population is in no respect inferior to the condition of those classes to the British Districts,—very much, indeed, to the contrary.

As with cultivated area so with regard to population and the number of tenants, no regular census of the country was taken until 1881. There is, therefore, no

data to go upon so far as the whole country is concerned. But evidence is forthcoming respecting the number of people in certain districts. From this evidence may be gathered an idea of the progress made. Thus, according to Dr. Bradley's report, written in 1848, 'the total population of the Paitan Sarkar, including that of the city, amounted to 32,015 or 77 inhabitants to the square mile, the total area of the Sarkar being 412 square miles.' But, according to the census taken by the Survey Department in 1876, the population amounted to 42,636, which, spread over an area of 390 square miles (excluding certain Jaghir villages from the total area of 434 square miles) gives 109 inhabitants per square mile. This shows an increase of 32 souls to the square mile, or 33.18 per cent. on the whole population in the course of 28 years. Calculating from these facts we find that the average increase per cent. of population for ten years is 11.85. Taking all things into consideration the average increase of population for that period in the whole of the Nizam's Dominions may be safely put down at 10 per cent. The increase in the population of the whole of British India for the ten years ending 1881 was a little over 8 per cent. In the adjoining Presidencies, however, that is in Madras and Bombay, and in the (British-ruled) State of Mysore, the last recorded ten years' statistics show a decrease, and, what is more, through the circumstances already described, a decrease brought about under awful

conditions. The facts compiled from India Office records are as follows :—

BRITISH PROVINCES.

Province or State.	Population, 1872.	Population, 1881.	Population as it should be if rate in Bengal and the Nizam's Dominions prevailed	Decrease.
Madras	31,281,177	30,868,504	34,096,483	3,227,979
Bombay	16,308,343	16,489,274	17,776,094	1,286,820
N-W. Provinces & Oudh	42,002,897	44,107,869	45,783,158	1,675,289
Mysore	5,005,412	4,186,188	5,455,899	1,269,711
	Total Decrease			7,459,799

THE NIZAM'S DOMINIONS.

	(Estimated)			Increase.
Hyderabad State ..	8,861,035	9,845,594	9,845,594	984,594

Here, again, are facts which may give pause to Mr. Cross, and lead him to consider what there is of superiority in the administration of the above British Provinces that they should show so serious a decrease in population, while the much-decried Hyderabad State, like-climatically situated with parts of Madras and Bombay and the whole of Mysore, show a gratifying increase. The effect upon the mind of the present writer is to make the task of restraining a denunciation of British rule very difficult indeed. Such facts as these ought to have effect. Is it, in regard to Indian affairs alone in the world, that the Scottish proverb quoted at the head of this section, is to be proved inaccurate? The late Sir Salar Jung is indeed happy in his death in that he can leave such results behind him to confound his critics, and over-

whelm with confusion those who endeavour to belittle his great achievements.

Among reforms in England, in recent years, there are none respecting which more credit is taken than in regard to the removal of those imposts which interfere with the freedom of trade; their abolition, whether in the shape of Navigation Laws repealed or in Customs' duties of a vexatious character removed, rank among the highest achievements of our greatest Finance Minister, Mr. Gladstone. How did Salar Jung act in this respect? Was he short-sighted and able only to count the rupees he might collect in a particular year, arguing that 'sufficient for the day is the evil thereof'? Or, did he, with wisdom and foresight, look ahead, and argue that the freer trade became, the fewer the restrictions imposed upon producer and consumer alike, the greater the general prosperity of the people, and the richer the revenue receipts against which no reasonable taxpayer could protest? He adopted the latter course. No European Minister could have carried out such a policy with greater resolution and wisdom. Here are a dozen petty and harassing imposts which he remitted :—

1. A tax upon herdsmen.
2. ,, ,, weddings.
3. ,, on hides.
4. ,, on bazaars and markets.
5. ,, upon weavers.
6. ,, ,, trades and professions.
7. Transit duties.
8. An impost for protection against enemies.
9. A tax for supplying straw.
10. A tax upon the sale of vegetables.
11. A tax upon the sale of bamboos.
12. Import duties on grain.

The revenue foregone by some of these abolitions may be set out thus:—

TAXES REMITTED.

		Yearly Receipts. Rs.
1.	Petty cesses	1,32,509
2.	Tax on fruit trees..	55,547
3.	„ pasturage per head of cattle	2,66,233
4.	Municipal rates	43,494
5.	Transit duties	3,79,776
6.	Import duty on grain	2,00,000
7.	Tax on trades and professions	2,95,071
8.	Reduction in taxes on cotton, safflower, indigo, &c.	6,50,000
	Total	Rs. 19,82,610

Contrast with this the incidents recorded on page 86 of the manner in which the license tax in British Provinces harasses the seller of snuff and the gatherer of firewood. There need be little wonder that the *Times of India*'s 'own correspondent' at Hyderabad should write to that journal, while Sir Richard Temple was Finance Minister at Calcutta, and exclaim, 'What a contrast there is between the policy of Sir Richard Temple and Sir Salar Jung!' or, that he should add, 'One is for raising taxes; the other is for abolishing them. While the three Presidencies are groaning under the levy of the income-tax, the territory of His Highness the Nizam enjoys perfect immunity from these vexatious imposts. Although a municipality has been established here, neither house-tax, nor wheel-tax, nor any other local cesses come to vex us. On the contrary, a long-existing tax has been recently repealed. His Excellency has

abolished, for a term of three years, all taxes that had been hitherto levied on certain professions, and which annually yielded Rs. 2,50,000.' If Sir Salar Jung, or any other of half-a-dozen Indian Statesmen who could be named, had been Finance Minister of India for a few years, instead of Sir Richard Temple and financiers of his calibre, the state of Imperial Indian Finances would be in very different position to that in which they are at present, while the prosperity of the Empire and the condition of the people would, through the past twenty years, have been vastly better.

How were the satisfactory results above mentioned, so far as Hyderabad is concerned, brought about? The answer is, By the judicious fostering of large sources of income and the equally judicious remission of small imposts. The increases were in Land Revenue, Abkari, and Law and Justice. New sources of revenue were found in Forest Administration, in Frontier Customs, in Stamps, in Road Taxes, and in the Postal Department. Considerations of space and the fear of wearying readers alone prevent the detailing of incident after incident calculated to show the forethought and prompt decision characterising the changes in tax-collecting and general administration which Sir Salar Jung carried out. Respecting one department, however, something must be said. We make it a boast that, under British administration, trade flourishes and commerce increases. It is true the total trade of British India is one in which the foreigner gets one pound sterling profit against one

shilling or may be one penny gain by the Indian: but let that pass. Being the great manufacturers of the world there is scarcely anything touches us as a nation so closely, in the way of administration, as the fostering of trade. How does the Indian Minister, the man of the race which (says Sir Lepel Griffin) has 'failed to realise the first principles of Government,' stand in this respect? Does trade languish under his rule? Is it in a decaying condition? As will have been seen the hindrances, in the Nizam's Dominions, in the shape of taxation imposed, not only on the foreign trade, but also on internal exchange of commodities, were extremely great. With a view of improving trade the Minister adopted the most rigorous arrangements, and compensated 'vested interests.' For example: The Sarf-Khas jurisdiction and the Jaghirdars together were calculated to have sustained a loss of about Rs. 3,62,571 by the abandonment of their right to levy transit duties. Territory, yielding a net revenue (after cost of collection was reckoned) of Rs. 2,61,702, was granted in compensation in addition to an annual payment of Rs. 1,02,288 in cash. The consequence is that the import of 'European goods' into Hyderabad territory has increased from two and a half lakhs of rupees (£25,000) per annum to nearly six crores of rupees (nearly £6,000,000.) If the import trade in British India had increased in like proportion (that is, two thousand six hundred per cent.) during this century the business done by British merchants with India would be vastly greater than it even

now is. It is, therefore, clear from the point of view of legitimate 'British interests,' to use an expression often indicative of what is least creditable to the English name, that the greater the scope given to Native-Indian rule the larger will be the trade which the people of India will carry on with Great Britain. Merchants in Great Britain, and those whom they employ, ought not to oppose the principle advocated in these pages of Home Rule for Indian States. On the contrary, the desire to extend trade, one of the most legitimate of national desires, should lead them to be as active in support of this phase of Indian reform as the merchants of Lancashire were in securing the repeal of Indian import duties on Cotton goods.

(3) EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY IN ADMINISTRATION.

Take, again, economy in administration, and the Nizam's officials bear the palm from British officials. Here is an instructive comparison:—

COST OF COLLECTION OF CUSTOMS' REVENUE.

H. H.'s Dominions.	Rs. a. p.	*The Berars.*†	Rs. a. p.
Average per cent. ..	6 7 3	Average per cent. ..	45 14 5

Or seven times higher! Being British administration it must of necessity be higher. The Secretary to the

† The condition in H. H.'s districts and in the Berars are exactly the same, or should be, seeing the territories join each other. The expensive administration of the Berars, and the consequent withholding of profit revenues from the Nizam has long been known to all acquainted with Indian affairs.

Government of India, writing in July, 1860, of the Berars, said, 'It must be admitted that the civil payments are much higher than they would have been under Native rule.' The figures quoted are for the years 1284 (Fasli) in the Hyderabad districts and 1873-74 in the Berars, almost identically the same periods. The averages in the Berars for the four years immediately preceding and including that mentioned were :—

	Rs.	a.	p.
1869-70	40	3	3
1870-71	30	4	6
1872-73	23	1	1
1873-74	45	14	5

The variation in two succeeding years in His Highness's Dominions was within a rupee, but on special occasions, when much vigilance was necessary to prevent smuggling, has been as high as Rs. 13-6-4 and Rs. 14-12-6. Such high averages as are noted in connection with the Berars are not peculiar to those Provinces, though they are specially discreditable, considering the circumstances under which the Berars are held: they are essential to the costly and not additionally efficient British rule. This will be seen from the following particulars respecting the percentage of expenditure on income from customs in the Punjab for three consecutive years :—

	Rs.	a.	p.	
1865-66	31	3	11	per cent.
1866-67	35	6	11	,,
1867-68	33	14	9	,,

The comparison, it should be distinctly understood, is between the percentages on trade carried on by land. On sea-customs, which is entirely in the hands of the British authorities, the percentage is comparatively small, being under 10 per cent.

In care for prisoners confined in the jails the Indian Minister was always well abreast with his British neighbours. During one particular year, taken at random, for which the figures are before the writer, the expenditure on this head was Re. 1-13-1 per cent. as compared with 14*a*. 9*p*. in Madras, 10*a*. 8*p*. in Bombay. Re. 1-3-11 in the Berars, Re. 1-5-7 in Bengal, and Re. 1-10-2 in the North-Western Provinces. Upon Police, in the same year, Sir Salar Jung expended upon village and general Police, Rs. 7-15-6 per cent., against, in British Provinces, exclusive of village chaukidari, Rs. 4-9-6 in Madras, Rs. 3-15-2 in Bombay, Rs. 7-0-3 in The Berars, Rs. 7-4-2 in Oudh, Rs. 3-11-4 in Bengal, Rs. 6-5-3 in the North-West Provinces, and Rs. 8-1-3 in the Panjab. So, in like manner, as regards Education, the Medical Department, and in other respects, one is compelled to answer the question, 'Is the British Government zealous?' by the answer, 'So also was the late Indian Minister of Hyderabad and so is his successor.'

Go yet farther, and in affairs which have a relation to the individual, particulars abound which redound to the credit of purely Indian administration. Sir Salar Jung did not content himself with reforms, retrenchments, and reductions which might affect others and leave his

own emoluments untouched. Upon entering office he reduced his annual honorarium to exactly half that received by his predecessor in the Dewanship, and even at a later period made a farther reduction of more than 25 per cent.; he also effected a saving of Rs. 80,000 per annum in the Peishkar's honorarium. The enquirer has yet to hear of anything approaching this act on the part of any British administrator in India.

The more carefully and closely the details of administration in the Nizam's Dominions are examined the more thoroughly is the conviction forced upon the unbiassed mind that the most perfect aptitude for business and the most statesmanlike grasp of a people's wants have, during the past thirty years, characterised all that has been attempted and accomplished.

No statement is more frequently put forward by the apologists for our rule in India, as proof that it is above all things efficient, than that which shows how greatly the revenue of the Empire has increased under our careful administration and judicious nursing. On that statement as affecting the revenue as a whole, with its eternal enhancements and its infrequent remissions, and with the frequently recurring deficits and the continually increasing debt, comments have already been made. Now, the question must be dealt with in a comparative sense, and it be shown that there is nothing which the British Government has accomplished which a

capable native Indian administrator cannot equally perform. Here is the comparison:—

The Nizam's Dominions.		*The British Indian Empire.*	
	Rs.		£
Revenue in 1853 ..	68,01,130	Revenue in 1853 ..	28,610,000
„ in 1881 ..	3,11,40 538	„ in 1881 ..	68,370,000
Increase ..	Rs. 2,43,38,908	Increase ..	£39,760,000
Percentage of increase nearly 357.84 per cent.		Percentage of Increase 230 per cent.	

In 1853 Sir Salar Jung had to face a deficit of thirty-one lakhs, besides many other debts. These he paid and, at the beginning of the year mentioned, had a balance of Rs. 65,36,239.

On the above showing the advantage would appear to lie with the Nizam's Minister and it does so to a greater extent than is indicated, For, during this period, while Sir Salar Jung had incurred no debt save for a railway forced upon the State by the British authorities, the English administration had encountered—

	£
Deficits	60,230,000
Surpluses	19,120,000
Deficits over Surpluses ..	£41,110,000

In forty-three years, in British India, these salient and highly important circumstances have happened, the Imperial Debt has increased 500 per cent., while

revenue and expenditure have each increased about 350 per cent.

The Nizam's State is not absolutely free from debt, nor does it owe the enormous sum of money which Mr. Gorst, M.P., in his article in the *Fortnightly Review* (April, 1884)—an article to be noticed hereafter—declares. Mr. Gorst asserted that debts amounting to four hundred and forty-nine lakhs (in round numbers, £4,500,000) were outstanding. These are the facts as contained in a Memorandum forwarded to the Viceroy in the very month that Mr. Gorst's strictures appeared in an English periodical. At the end of the year 1881 the amount of actual debt stood at Rs. 56,74,413, of which Rs. 34,83,496 were due to the bankers and Rs. 21,90,917 to the Sarf-i-Khas Treasury, that is, the Nizam's private treasury. By the end of August, 1883, the amount had been reduced to Rs. 26,92,537 as due to the bankers and Rs. 12,57,104 to the Sarf-i-Khas, amounting in all to Rs. 39,49,641. 'The first mentioned amount also includes Rs. 7,37,056 borrowed from the Hyderabad Branch of the Bank of Bengal on the security of the British Government Promissory Notes lodged in the Bank, and which are yet in their hands. This amount, therefore, has to be deducted from Rs. 26,92,537, which leaves Rs. 19,55,481 as the balance due to the sowkars. This figure, with Rs. 12,57,104 due to the Sarf-i-Khas, or Rs. 32,12,585 in all, represents the total amount of the State debt on the above mentioned date.'

The figures given below show what was done in the

way of reducing the liabilities of the State during the last six years of Sir Salar Jung's administration :—

AMOUNT OF DEBTS.

Year.	Due to Sarf-i-Khas treasury.	Due to Sowkars.	Total.
1877	26,45,924	56,60,352	86,06,276
1878	24,34,032	50,72,634	75,06,666
1879	23,40,744	38,79,999	62,20,743
1880	20,05,500	21,93,455	41,98,955
1881	21,90,918	21,27,092	43,18,010
1882	18,40,846	22,62,092	41,02,938

These figures speak for themselves and tend exclusively to prove that the finances of the State were carefully looked after. While the amount of debt was reduced from year to year, the cash balances increased greatly as will be apparent.

Year.	Amount.
	Rs.
1877	35,76,472
1878	40,09,025
1879	48,80,249
1880	68,14,251
1881	64,79,107
1882	65,36,239

If we eliminate the debt and take from the British accounts that which is revenue strictly, the comparison shows that the Nizam's revenue increased by three hundred and fifty-seven per cent. while the British Indian revenue grew by less than one hundred per cent.

It may not be retorted against the Indian Administrator that the Imperial Power has had to contend against difficulties, in the way of wars on the frontier and a terrible mutiny within its Dominions, because, in

the first place the relative military charges of the State and the Empire are much greater in respect to the former,—through no desire, however, of the Nizam,—while, in the second place, the Mutiny was due to misgovernment in the Empire: its absence, or its suppression when incipiently exhibited, is a testimony to good government and to promptitude and vigour in dealing with disaffection.

COMPARISON BETWEEN ANNUAL MILITARY EXPENDITURE.

The Nizam's Dominions.		*The British-Indian Empire.*	
	Rs.		£
Expenditure on Nizam's Army	62,53,200	Army Expenditure, 1882-83	16,128,000
,, on Contingent (per Administration of the Berars) ..	40,00,000	Percentage of annual income, slightly over 25 per cent.	
Total ..	Rs. 102.53,200		
Percentage of annual income, over 33 per cent.			

This, however, does not state the matter quite so fairly for the Nizam as it ought to be stated. In taking over and administering the Berars as security for the payment of the Contingent, the British Government obtained the not inconsiderable advantage of finding in it a pleasant preserve of patronage. British officers secured highly-remunerative appointments, and the cost of administration was and is so high that the percentage upon the

total revenue collected is not stated. If Sir Salar Jung had had the administration of those Provinces and had had only forty lakhs a year to pay to the supreme Government for the Contingent, the revenues of his State would have shown even better results than those noted above. As an essential element in this particular matter, let it be observed that if the Nizam had been relieved of the cost of the Contingent, and that body had been disbanded, the Nizam's own army would not have been increased and its cost to the State, Rs. 62,53,200, would have represented the sum total on soldiering account. The consequent relief to the Minister would have been great, while, either taxation would have been reduced or beneficial expenditure incurred. Further, the present crushing expenditure of 33 per cent. was, in the days when Sir Salar Jung was struggling with reform, more than one hundred per cent.; the expenditure remained a constant quantity, was, all the way through, an old man of the sea on the shoulders of the Minister. Sir Salar Jung's success becomes increasingly a marvel as one proceeds more and more closely to investigate the real circumstances of the case. Will not Englishmen see to it justice is no longer denied to the State he ruled so wisely and so well?

The aim of this little work being what it is, to exalt, against interested decriers, the complete fitness of the inhabitants of India for the administration of their own country, attention must be called to the fact that the success recorded is not due to Englishmen, but

to Indians. Mr. Gorst, in the article already referred to, makes the following assertion :—'Nearly all the present revenue officers are Mussulmans brought in by Sir Salar Jung from other parts of India, chiefly from the North-Western Provinces. They have no permanent interest in the country, no sympathy with its people. Their object is to make as much money as they can and go away to spend it elsewhere.' Considering that Mr. Gorst was himself a foreigner, obtaining as the result of a six weeks' stay in Hyderabad an almost fabulous fee from the Peshkar, that he was 'making as much money as he could and going away to spend it in England,' the charge comes with bad grace from him. As a matter of fact, however, he was, on the whole, as usual, wrong. In the early days of reform Indians living out of Hyderabad State were needed; they possessed the requisite knowledge; Hyderabadees were unacquainted with Survey, Settlement, and Revenue Administration. The present Minister has instituted an enquiry into the nationality of the State's Revenue servants, from which it appears that the number of officers in the Revenue Department, from the Secretary to Government down to Tehsildars, is 267. Of these 144 are Hyderabadees, 59 Hindustanees, 20 Madrasees, 33 belong to Bombay, and 2 are natives of other parts of India. The percentage of Hyderabadees and Hindustanees (including inhabitants of Madras, Bombay, and other places) on the total number, amounts to 54 and 22 respectively. Including all officers and clerks the total number is 2,589, of which 1,940 or 75 per cent. are Hyderabadees,

and 128 or 5 per cent. are Hindustanees. The following table exhibits the facts in a more detailed form :—

Nationality of Incumbents.

	No.	Percentage.
Hyderabadees	1940 ..	74.95
Hindustanees	128 ..	4.94
Madrasees	78 ..	3.01
Bombayites	232 ..	8.96
From other parts of India	202 ..	7.80
Vacancy	1 ..	.03
Europeans	8 ..	.31
Total	2,589 ..	100

Religion of the Incumbents.

Mahomedan	670 ..	25.88
Hindu	1859 ..	71.84
Parsee	49 ..	1.89
Christian	10 ..	.36
Vacancy	1 ..	.03
Total	2,589 ..	100

This is the ideal to which England ought to work in India,—eight Europeans out of two thousand six hundred officials. In his Report, dealing with these figures, the Minister remarks :—'I must however confess, that for my own part I do not at all like the idea of employing even the existing number of "foreigners," and that it is my earnest desire to raise the percentage of Hyderabadees in the public service up to 90. I have issued an order strictly prohibiting the appointment of foreigners to any post without the special sanction of Government, and this order has been published in the Government

Gazette. I have reserved to myself the right of filling up the highest appointments only, which do not number more than 20 or 25 in all. For the rest, I have left the various officers of Government quite unfettered in their selection, to fill up the vacancies as they occur.'

Like his lamented father the present Minister is fully alive to the advantages which English education and training yield. In proof of this he has given instructions for ten young natives of Hyderabad to be selected from the public schools in the State and sent to England in 1885, to be educated in various professions at the expense of His Highness's Government. These young men will be provided with suitable allowances, and will be encouraged to follow any profession towards which they are naturally inclined. 'It is proposed to make the cost of the education of a similar number yearly a permanent annual charge on the State treasury, at least for some time to come, provided the first experiment proves successful.'

The few comparisons made may suffice. The writer holds his hand from no lack of materials. The enquiry might be much farther pursued and the Indian State in no degree suffer by investigation. This much, at least, must, in fairness to our Indian fellow-subjects, be admitted, namely, that with the British administrative results before them as an example in some respects and a warning in others, they can improve upon the lesson those results teach and secure greater good to their subjects than is possible, when the Collector and his chief subordinates are British. If this is so, we are bound

by every consideration whereby we justify our hold of India in the eyes of the world,—that is, that we are in India not for our own benefit but for the salvation and nurture of the Indian people,—to adopt such measures as shall serve, while not lessening our power as the over-lord, to maintain peace throughout the continent, and at once to so readjust our relations with (1) the Native-Indian States, and (2) the British Provinces, as to give more and more self-control year by year to the sons of the soil, thereby bettering the condition of the millions for whose happiness and well-being in all respects, in the sight of God and man, we are responsible. Hitherto, those to whom the affairs of India have been entrusted, have seemed, in spite of having taken 'Heaven's Light' as their guide, to care little for the eventual judgment of God, and still less for the criticisms of those who find occasion to call their acts of omission and commission into question.

[It not being desirable to burden the text with too much detail a number of most important and interesting facts will be found in an Appendix to this Part. The attention of the reader is specially requested to Appendix III. entitled 'Anglo-Indian Official Testimony to Sir Salar Jung's Reforms.']

(4) A NATIVE INDIAN STATESMAN.

During the thirty years, (which are still under our review,) of his Dewanship, Sir Salar Jung encountered difficulties in no degree less serious than those with which successive Viceroys have had to grapple. In great crises as well as in minor difficulties he was found equal to every situation. As time goes on and the unimportant events in history sink into their due insignificance leaving only a few incidents as landmarks

of the period, Sir Salar Jung will stand out among the individuals who have made and are making the history of India in this nineteenth century, as incomparably the greatest figure of them all. Neither statesman nor soldier (though he never 'set a squadron in the field') will be found, in enduring merit, to reach the height on which he stands. The verdict of the historian will place him higher than them all. To him was given the power of self-restraint, the power to accurately weigh events and, in spite of forces of almost cyclonic strength pressing upon him from all points of the compass, to withstand ill-advised suggestions, and to pursue the even tenor of his way. When the events of 1857 have receded somewhat and we are freer to judge and to consider than we now are, it will be found that, even more than John Lawrence in the Punjab or than Sir Henry Havelock in the North-Western Provinces or even than Lord Canning at Calcutta, Salar Jung was, in that time of terrible trial to all Britons and to all who wish well to India, the Saviour of British Rule in that country. Anglo-Indians by the score have said with their lips and have left on record with their pens, 'But for the stand which Salar Jung made at Hyderabad all India would have been lost to us and we should have had to re-conquer the country from the sea-board.' Others—Sir R. Temple among them—have declared his conduct to be 'simply priceless.' Yet no historian has, to this present, put this prescient statesman in the position he has well earned, nor, when abundant opportunity offered, did any British Minister

exhibit toward him adequate gratitude. On the contrary, to our shame be it said, there have been men in high office in India who took a delight in subjecting him to insult and contumely, who degraded themselves in trying to humiliate him.

If ever there was an incident which justified the cynic in declaring that there is no over-ruling Providence directing the course of events and ensuring that what men sow that also shall they reap, even to the last handful of grain the sower casts, it was the loyalty of Salar Jung and his Master to the British in 1857. Four years before the Mutiny Lord Dalhousie had taken a step which should, if consequence follows cause, if Nemesis does indeed wait to follow up an act of injustice and swiftly punish the unjust, have made it impossible, on an outbreak occurring, for the Deccan and Southern India to stand fast in adherence to the British. Lord Dalhousie, whose practice the new Viceroy of India is somewhat foolishly implored to follow, had, by acts which even his lordship's instrument declined to describe, wrested from the Nizam the fairest and most prosperous districts of his Dominions, to support a Contingent, the existence of which, a few years before, even Lord Dalhousie himself had declared he could not defend.* The act was high-

* On one occasion, when the Nizam asked why the Contingent was kept longer than the proceedings of the Hindoo Princes threatened war, the reason given for creating it. Lord Dalhousie wrote:—'I, for my part, can never consent, as an honest man, to instruct the President, to reply that the Contingent has been maintained by the Nizam from the end of the war in 1817 until now because the 12th Article of the Treaty of 1800 obliged His Highness so to maintain it.'

handed and was unjustfiable. It ought, in the ordinary course of things, to have left behind it a rankling sore, a deep sense of injustice, and a determination that no opportunity should be lost of showing resentment. How comes it, if the Princes and statesmen of Indian blood are the crafty, designing, revengeful, treacherous creatures that many Anglo-Indian writers declare them to be, Salar Jung should, in that supreme hour of British peril, have stood in the breach and saved us from overthrow? He was still smarting under the degradation and shame of controlling the affairs of a greatly-reduced State. His personal safety appeared to lie in giving way to the forces of the hour. His ambition must have been fired by the probabilities of honour and dignity and even sovereign power which he might gain if, indeed, the prophets were right, if the days of British authority were numbered and the last sands of the English glass were running. Indian history has many incidents of a like kind; what man has done man may still do. Salar Jung remained proof against temptation. He nobly rose above all petty considerations affecting himself, and, what is rarer and more noble still, he passed over the recent and still palpitating insult to his State and courageously threw in his lot with the Power which had used his Master despitefully, and was (after the lapse of many years) to use himself even more despitefully. During that time of mutiny he went in daily fear of assassination, he was 'the object of threats, execrations, and hatred upon the part of the whole population.'

Still, he maintained his ground, and, without stopping to nicely consider all he was venturing in so doing, at once sent the Contingent and a portion of the Subsidiary Force to the help of the British troops. Colonel Fraser, in his work, 'Our Faithful Ally,' tells the story of the succour which this Contingent brought to the sorely-bested British forces. The Nizam's troops, it is stated, were first launched against the fortress of Dhar, which by forced marches they reached just after the escape of the rebel garrison, but in time to follow in pursuit. This rapid movement and essential service was followed up by the speedy and signal success of overtaking the fugitives, *en route* to Neemuch, and capturing a battery of eight guns (that of Mahidpore) which would otherwise have served the mutineers. 'This timely arrest certainly prevented a second Cawnpore tragedy at Neemuch, and probably—in crippling the rebel forces at a critical juncture—materially affected the ultimate issue of the war. For the successful result of this, their initiative (known as the action at Rawul), the Nizam's cavalry were ordered an extra (or *batta*) of five rupees a month to each man during the remainder of field service; and it is nothing short of humiliating to have to add that, with a symmetrical coolness peculiar to this sultry clime, the discharge of this impulsive obligation was left to the pliable Nizam. In their junction with Sir Hugh Rose at Saugor and in assisting to force the pass of Muddenpore, at the capture of Talbeit and fall of Jhansi, at the decisive action of Koonch, gained under

the fiercest strength of a tropical sun, and in a final demonstration against Tantia Topee; in each and all were the efficiency and resistless dash of the Contingent conspicuously displayed.'*

As Salar Jung acted during the Mutiny, so did he act throughout his able and fruitful career. He saw that the future of India was, for good and for all, bound up with England, and that the wise course for a patriotic Indian to take was to recognise this fact and to adapt the affairs he controlled to that which was beneficial in English modes of action. This was a man to cherish. How he would have been cherished were we but true to our professions! He was not a perfect man. Being human, he made mistakes; not being omniscient he could not sometimes avoid failing. All the agents he employed were not immaculate, and the wrong-doings of some of them reacted upon their employer. He had that fine touch of character, never absent from the man of first-class mind, which, though plans are fully carried out and ambitions realised, will not allow him to feel his work is perfect, but makes him strongly desirous, upborne by what he has achieved, to do still better. Sir Salar Jung had this noble characteristic in full measure. His latest English detractor, Mr. Gorst, has actually shown himself incapable of recognising so lofty and noble a quality of mind. In the course of his carping criticism of the dead lion, Mr. Gorst says:—'In domestic affairs his [Sir Salar Jung's] attempts to establish a sound system of

Times of India, art. 'Claims of the Nizam, Past and Present,' July 12, 1867.

administration failed completely; no one knew this better than Sir Salar Jung himself, and it is said that he frequently lamented the fact to his intimate associates.' Poor Mr. Gorst! In his unreasoning hatred of the statesman, he has failed to understand that sad disappointment which takes possession of superior minds when they review their work; they see a hundred faults where the onlooker notes but one; they observe neglected opportunities of which the observer is oblivious. Mr. Gorst has written himself down as unable to understand the intense yearning of a high-minded man to do better work in days to come than he has yet attempted. However, when all is said that can, by envy or malice, he said this much is certain, Sir Salar Jung proved that an Indian statesman could do for an Indian State all that a British administrator could do, and more besides. The country will largely gain by fostering and encouraging such men as he. 'We are in India only for the good of India,' trumpet forth a thousand tongues. Ten thousand acts prove the words a mockery, and declare we are where we are because it is more to our profit than to our loss. If we were honest we should stand aside and give place to such men as the one just described, whose peers were and are to be found in every part of India.

CHAPTER II.

MR. GORST, M.P., ON 'THE KINGDOM OF THE NIZAM.'

'All things look yellow to the jaundiced eye.'

IN judging of matters Indian the average Englishman or Englishwoman employs a different standard to that he or she uses in judging of anything affecting England or any other country, save India, on the face of the earth. Mr. Gorst, Q.C., M.P., is the typical Englishman in this respect; a lady travelling home from India during the autumn of a few years ago is the typical Englishwoman. The lady first. She was the wife of an officer on duty in the Nizam's Dominions. The husband was no subaltern, but a *burra Sahib* in deed and of a truth. On half-a-dozen occasions, while voyaging between Bombay and Suez, the lady expressed her opinions for the benefit of all and sundry regarding the administration of affairs in the State of Hyderabad. Her remarks, however, centred upon the Nizam's Minister, who was, to her, a veritable *bête noir*. Nobody, who heard her frequent protestations, could exactly tell why she should cherish the animosity against Sir Salar which she never tired of expressing.

Certainly her stock illustration convinced no one that she had occasion.

'Ah!' she would say, 'If you want to judge what sort of a Minister Salar Jung is, think of this: Why, this year, as on many other occasions, he has had to borrow money to pay *us*'—(who the 'us' might be was not clear)—'from the Sowkars! Fancy, a Prime Minister not being able to get along without going to the Sowkars!'

'But,' on the last occasion of the airing of her complaints, remonstrated one of her hearers, 'there is nothing very serious in a Minister negotiating a short loan until the collections of revenue come in. I suppose that is what Sir Salar has done. There may be a special reason for his doing so.'

A shake of the head was the first response, followed by 'Yes, but see: he had to go to the Sowkars!'

'Well, madam,' was the retort, 'is that very evil? Did not Lord Beaconsfield a few years ago, or more, go to the Sowkar Rothschild for a loan to buy Suez Canal Shares? And, has he not floated Exchequer Bills for the trifling sum of six millions sterling?'

This was the climax and the close of the particular conversation reported, with the exception that the lady, in an audible and highly-indignant whisper remarked upon the temerity exhibited in making a comparison between Lord Beaconsfield and Sir Salar Jung. Her opponent quite agreed with her, and in spirit immediately apologized to the Indian statesman.

Mr. J. E. Gorst, Q.C., M.P., furnishes an even more

complete illustration of the truth of the assertion which has been made in the opening paragraph of this chapter. He has earned an honourable reputation in England for the sympathy he exhibits on behalf of the races owning British supremacy. In him the Maories of New Zealand have found one of their best English friends. The Aborigines' Protection Society know him as an ally. By parity of reasoning he might have been expected to take a front place among British Indian Reformers. The contrary has proved to be the case. Three months of the Parliamentary recess of 1883-84 were occupied by him on a voyage to and a stay in India. He was in that great Empire a few weeks. On the strength of that visit he wrote an article for the *Fortnightly Review*: it was published in April, 1884. It was a slashing and wholly inaccurate production, worthy of the lieutenant of Lord Randolph Churchill. In this article Mr. Gorst was unsparing in his denunciations of the young Nizam and his minister Salar Jung. A marked tribute was paid to the memory of Sir Salar Jung by describing his administration as a total failure and his reforms as a huge fraud committed with certain political motives to hoodwink the British Government. The State of Hyderabad was verging on the brink of bankruptcy, a state of things brought about by the thoughtless and wasteful extravagance of the late Minister while the credit of the Government was nil. The peasantry were ground down by oppression and by a rack-rent system of taxation. Corruption and peculation were the order of the day.

Such, in a few words, is the purport of the article in question. Mr. Gorst has not a good word to say about any one except perhaps the Peshkar. Who, the English reader may ask, is the Peshkar? And, why, should Mr. Gorst think so highly of anybody in a State, for which he doubtless thinks Hamlet's description of the state of Denmark is fitting? The answer to these questions is to be found in a pamphlet written by one of the ablest publicists in India, Mr. Grattan Geary, Editor and Proprietor of the *Bombay Gazette*. Mr. Geary's pamphlet is entitled 'Hyderabad Politics: an Answer to Mr. Gorst, M.P.' In an appendix to this chapter will be found an interesting citation from Mr. Geary's pamphlet: it answers with tolerable completeness the second of the two questions asked above. Mr. Gorst himself tells us who the Peshkar is. 'The Peshkar,' he says, 'was a Hindu, mild and conciliatory in manner, and eccentric in his mode of conducting business. He carried his documents of State about with him in his pockets, and gave audiences at midnight in a cellar.' Mr. Gorst went to India to endeavour to obtain from the Viceroy his approval to the selection of the Peshkar as Prime Minister in succession to Sir Salar Jung. Armed with this approval he hoped pressure could be brought to bear upon the Nizam to make the appointment. The Peshkar represents Reactionary Hyderabad, the portion of Hyderabad which did all it could to thwart Sir Salar Jung's reforms. It will be seen that Mr. Gorst did not think very highly of his client. Perhaps the reader will think still less, when

he reads the following narrative of the aged opium-eating Hindu's idea of administration. A quarrel was proceeding between two parties, each of whom appealed to the Peshkar. The old gentleman attended to the appeals. He sent eight consecutive orders, four in favour of the petitioner and the other four in favour of the party petitioned against. The Secretary to the Irregular Troops, who was presented with these conflicting orders by the contending parties, was greatly perplexed and did not know which of the two sets of orders to act upon. In sore distress he applied to the Peshkar for instructions. Mr. Gorst's mild and conciliatory client wrote back to the effect that he was ashamed of having to issue such conflicting orders, that people who brought recommendations to him and urged him to act upon them ought to be ashamed of themselves. He hoped the Secretary would do just what was right and proper, and not mind the orders he had received! This was the Minister Mr. Gorst wished to force upon the Nizam. Fortunately, his Highness, if he has the misfortune to incur Mr. Gorst's contempt because he is young, had enough discernment to see that the Peshkar was conducting affairs to rack and ruin. In place of the 'mild and conciliatory' Hindu he selected Mir Liak Ali, the eldest son of the late Minister, who had been joined as Co-Regent with the Peshkar—a living man chained to a corpse. Most thoroughly has his Highness's action been justified. Liak Ali, who, in his turn, is known to the world by the honoured designation Salar Jung, is proving himself in every respect worthy of the position he occupies and

of the name he bears. He is diligent in the despatch of business, he is resourceful in emergencies, he is courageous and prompt to act in time of need. Events have already occurred to try his mettle: he has come out of each ordeal more than conqueror. In him the race of Indian Statesmen finds a representative and a champion of whom the whole Empire may be proud.

It would have been occasion of much gratification to the present writer, in giving his testimony to the many administrative virtues and excellencies of purely Indian officers, if he could have done this without importing the personal element into the narrative. He would have preferred to leave the statement for Sir Salar Jung, as it appears in the preceding chapter, divested of all extraneous matters. Mr. Gorst, however, has appealed to Cæsar: in his appeal he has made assertions affecting the character of individuals which are wholly untrue. Too little, unfortunately, is known in England of Indian statesmen and of Indian States. The reader will, therefore, suffer a few remarks intended to show, in matters of detail as well as in the broad region of administration, there is no truth in the charges alleged.

1. The article which Mr. Gorst contributed to the *Fortnightly Review* opens with a melodramatic scene. Outside a village Court-house three persons are described as 'standing in the scorching sun with heavy stones upon their heads.' They 'were being pressed in this fashion by one of the superior Revenue officials to raise the deficiency' of their revenue due to Government. '. . . After enduring the torture for twenty-four hours

they yielded, sold their bullocks, paid their rent, and what is since become of them and their families, God only knows.' Mr. Gorst carefully suppresses the source whence he derived this information. The story is evidently taken from an official report submitted by Major General Glasfurd, on the 4th of February, 1884, and is greatly exaggerated. General Glasfurd was, two years previously, appointed Survey and Settlement Commissioner. The late Minister particularly requested him while on tour to make a thorough and searching examination of the records of the different district offices. This anxiety of Sir Salar Jung to have the defects of his administration officially brought to his notice by a British officer of standing, together with many other instances of the kind which might be enumerated, the details of which are available, is a complete refutation of the statement made in the course of the article under notice, that the Minister hushed up scandals and did not allow British officers to know anything about his administration, except what he chose. To return to the incident: General Glasfurd made an extensive tour of the Nizam's Dominions, and after nearly eighteen months drew up a report describing the depressed condition of the ryots in the Bidar district. In his report General Glasfurd mentions the case of three ryots who were tortured by a petty Revenue official (not by a high official as Mr. Gorst would make people believe) 'who made them stand in the rain with heavy stones on their heads.' Mr. Gorst has 'touched' up the official statement by substituting the words 'scorching

sun' for the word 'rain.' Dramatic effect was obtained at the expense of truth. The General, in his remarks, says nothing about the length of time the ryots were kept standing. It is to be noted that throughout the tour the General recorded only this single instance (together with a few minor ones) of oppression coming under his notice. The cases occurred in one village in a district the ryots of which had been in a comparatively depressed condition owing to the suppression of poppy cultivation two years before at the instance of the British Government.

The Nizam's Government has always shown itself anxious to put down oppression on the part of its servants with a strong hand and to mete out severe punishment to the parties found guilty of such charges. Not long ago the young Nizam, accompanied by his Minister, proceeded on a short hunting expedition to a village in the Ibrahimpatan Taluk. The ryots of the Taluk complained of the irregular and high-handed proceedings of the local Tehsildar. His Highness personally recorded the statements of the complainants, and finding that a *prima facie* case had been made out, forthwith ordered the suspension of the delinquent functionary pending his trial by the regular Courts of law.

In the Khaman district 'several charges of bribery and maladministration were preferred against Mr. Govind Rao, the Talukdar.' The Minister at once appointed a commission composed of a Judge of the High Court and a member of the Inam Commission,

and directed them 'to proceed to the spot and inquire into the complaints. A case having apparently been made out against the first Talukdar, he was suspended from his duties, pending the final report of the Commission.' These two cases, taken from official reports lately published, tend conclusively to prove that the Nizam's Government is not slow in punishing offenders whenever their delinquencies are brought to notice.

Sir Salar Jung himself did not countenance unlawful conduct in the servants of his Government, whether high or low. The case of Hunmunt Rao, Chief Treasurer and Accountant General, is an instance in point. This man had been accused of peculation and corruption. Sir Salar Jung having satisfied himself of the reasonableness of the charges brought against him appointed a special Commission to try him. The Commissioners found him guilty and the man was mulcted in a heavy sum and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. Another instance may be quoted of a High Court Judge who, having been convicted of receiving bribes, was sentenced to imprisonment and fine. Instances might be multiplied of officials found guilty and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment for the commission of offences of different kinds. These strong measures had a salutary effect and no case of any importance occurred for nearly ten years after the termination of the last case among the higher officials until the conduct of Govind Rao, to which allusion has been made, was recently brought to the notice of the Government.

2. The writer has been at some pains to find out the facts of the solitary case mentioned by Mr. Gorst in support of his assertion that Sir Salar Jung hushed up scandals.* The allusion here is to the case of a high official now a member of the Board of Revenue at Hyderabad. This gentleman was formerly a member of the Oudh Commission in the British service and bore a very high character. At Sir Salar Jung's request his services were transferred to the Nizam's Government by the Government of India; he was, as a special case, allowed to contribute towards the civil pension fund to enable him to draw a pension after a certain period. On arriving at Hyderabad he was appointed a Sadar Talukdar or Divisional Commissioner. Anonymous petitions were sent to the British Resident, Sir Richard Meade, and among these was one narrating the story told by Mr. Gorst. The Resident, contrary to the general practice in such cases to consign papers of this kind to the waste-paper basket, demanded that a thorough and searching inquiry should be made into the matter. A Commission was appointed consisting of one European and one Native officer who, without giving the Sadar Talukdar notice of the visit, repaired to the scene of the alleged outrage. When the Commission reached the village where the offence was said to have

* 'Scandals were hushed up. On one occasion a high revenue official was charged with having seized while on tour the wife and daughter of a village officer, for whom he had conceived a criminal passion, and kept them for some time in his zenana. A commission of inquiry was appointed by Sir Salar Jung, but on arrival at the village they found that the officer with his wife and daughter had been spirited away and could not be found. The official thus accused still holds his position in the Nizam's administration. —Mr. Gorst's Article, *Fortnightly Review*, p. 523.

been committed, they not only found that the charges were unfounded but that there were no such persons in existence as those on whose behalf the petition purported to be addressed. The story was, therefore, a myth, and nothing more. In a Persian letter dated 10th October, 1879, Sir Richard Meade wrote to the Nizam's Minister as follows on the subject:—'The grave charges brought against the Sadar Talukdar have been proved to be groundless and the finding has given me satisfaction.' On his retirement from the Residency, Sir Richard left on record among the archives of his office references to this case and to the Sadar Talukdar in the following terms:—'There have been some anonymous complaints against Mr. ——. But His Highness's Government, after inquiry, has pronounced them to be unfounded, and I understand that he enjoys its full confidence. I believe him to be one of the most able and intelligent officials in His Highness's service.' The solitary instance on which Mr. Gorst has based his assertion having proved to be a fable, the superstructure which he built upon it necessarily falls to the ground. Far from hushing up scandals, Sir Salar Jung was ever ready to enquire into any charge brought to his notice, and never failed to sufficiently punish those who were proved to be guilty of misconduct. The Nizam's Government placed perfect confidence in this officer because they found him to be worthy of it. All the four successive British officers who have succeeded Sir Richard Meade as Resident since the date of the

enquiry have testified to the high qualities of this gentlemen.*

Like testimony of a flattering character to the Nawab has been borne by Sir Steuart Clive Bayley and Major Trevor.

3. The reference in Mr. Gorst's article to Inspectors from Hyderabad and the only honest Talukdar is to Mr. Sheikh Daood's suspension by Government. In 1874 the late Mr. Sheikh Daood, then Talukdar (Collector) of Aurungabad, introduced revised rates of assessment in the whole district, based on unsound principles. He caused a rough survey to be made by the Pativadis, of the different fields and then had the soils classed simply by asking the villagers, who were collected in one place, to specify the colour of the soil of each field. If one soil was said to be black, it was put down as first class; if brown or red as second class; and if gravelly as third class. The statements of the

* Sir Oliver St. John, when on a visit to Gulbarga, in June, 1884, wrote as follows to him:—

'Gulbarga, July 1st, 1884. My dear Nawab yar Jung,—As you are the founder of the excellent institution I have seen in Gulbarga and the author of its high reputation and increasing prosperity, I cannot leave the place without expressing to you how pleased I have been with all I have seen. The excellent administration of Gulbarga shows what can be done in the dominions of His Highness the Nizam: and it should be a subject of just pride to you to feel that you have been the pioneer of good government in the country, and that to your hard work other district officers are looking as the standard which they should try to attain.

'It gives me the more pleasure to congratulate you on the happy result of your labours, because like myself your earliest service was passed in Oudh, a province of which I have the pleasantest recollections.'

'With the best wishes for your future success and happinèss, Believe me, yours very truly,

(Signed) 'O. St. John.'

'Nawab yar Jung, Ekranu ella Khan.'

villagers were not checked by any tests, but were simply accepted as facts. When the statements were contradictory, as very often they were, then the statement which set down the soil at the highest class was accepted. As may be imagined, the so-called classification of the soils was thoroughly wrong; low classes of lands were often put down as first class and *vice versa*. But the mischief did not stop here, Mr. Daood introduced arbitrary rates of assessment. He calculated the cultivated area of the village in beegas, and the amount of the total assessment paid thereon. From these he produced an average rate, and this rate he proportionately divided into three classes, fixing them on each of the three different classes of soils. The consequences of this course of action was, as may readily be imagined, most disastrous, causing great fluctuations in the assessment of each field. For instance, a man who had hitherto paid only ten rupees for his field found he had to pay a hundred, and a man who paid the latter sum had his assessment reduced to ten, and so on. In realising this revised assessment he committed much oppression and even personally beat some of the ryots. This irregular and arbitrary way of fixing assessments naturally created considerable dissatisfaction among the ryots, and many petitions were sent by them to the Minister, who thereupon deputed Mr, Mahdi Ali to proceed to Aurungabad and inquire into the ryots complaints. Mr. Mahdi Ali travelled over the districts, made personal inquiries from the ryots, had some of the measurements and classifications tested by professional

surveyors, with the result that he found them both, especially the latter, very incorrect. He sent in a detailed report of his inquiry, whereupon the Government suspended Mr. Sheikh Daood, as that officer had carried out the survey and made the revolutionary changes in the assessment without the knowledge or sanction of Government. That year the revenue suffered a loss of upwards of one lakh of Rupees. Mr. Sheikh Daood was afterwards re-instated as first Talukdar, but was transferred to another district. He was, however, suspended for six months.

4. Mr. Gorst says that 'in the rural districts there is no administration of justice. The Talukdars and their subordinate officers, who collect the revenue, are themselves the Ministers of Justice, with civil and military jurisdiction, and have the charge of the police.' This is a condemnation not of the system prevailing in the Nizam's Dominions but of that in vogue in the British Districts. The District Collectors not only possess criminal powers but, throughout British India, they also have the police under their control. In some of the large provinces of British India, notably the Panjab, the Berars, Oudh and Assam, the District officers possess civil jurisdiction also. The late Sir Salar Jung was anxious to take civil cases from the control of the District officers and place them in charge of a special agency, but he died before he could put this reform into practice. That the administration of justice in some parts of the Nizam's Dominions is not as good as it is in certain favoured

British Districts cannot be denied, but in this connection account must be taken of the difficulties which Sir Salar Jung had to encounter. The late Nizam, Afzal Ud Dowlah, was completely in the hands of old-fashioned Moulvies and he would not allow any reforms that might interfere with their right to administer justice. On one occasion an intelligent lawyer from Bombay was engaged to codify the laws and put the administration of justice on a proper footing. The Nizam, however, would not listen to anything in favour of the introduction of reforms in that branch of administration and the legal gentleman had to return, his work not even begun. It was on account of these matters that Sir Salar Jung once placed his resignation in the hands of his master, and it was because of obstructions of this kind that Sir George Yule had, on several occasions, to address him in strong terms. On the death of the Nizam in 1869, Sir Salar Jung began the work of reform in the Judicial Department, and from that time until 1876 he continued to introduce new measures as opportunity occurred. Then came the second Co-Regent, forced upon Sir Salar Jung by Lord Lytton. The Co-Regent was strongly opposed to all reforms in the direction of cheaper and more effectual justice and the Minister was obliged to put a stop to his wise designs. On the death of the Co-Regent he again drew up a scheme of reform with the approval of Sir Steuart Bayley, but before he could put it into force he died. At the same time, while the administration of justice in British

Provinces is in the condition described by Mr. L. P. Delves Broughton, Administrator-General, in a series of letters to the *Statesman* (Calcutta) in January, 1885, it is not for Mr. Gorst, nor for any one else of his nationality, to speak slightingly of the attempts made in the State of Hyderabad to initiate and carry out judicial reform.

5. It is not true to say, as Mr. Gorst says in his article, that revenue 'has been on the decline for some years past.' In a memorandum on the administration, prepared by the present Minister and circulated among Indian newspapers and in other directions, a statement is given of the revenue for twelve years. There are no great fluctuations observable. Wherever there are differences those differences are due to the seasons. The year 1878-79, which ended three years before Sir Salar Jung's death, brought more revenue than any other year had done for the past twenty years.

6. Again, Mr. Gorst is altogether wrong in stating that the whole revenue is expended in the city of Hyderabad. The following are the items that are spent on special administration and on productive works. They are for 1881-82—

	Rs.
Law and Justice	7,25,730
Police	23,18,434
Education	1,85,577
Medical	1,93,562
Municipalities (which are paid from General Fund and for which no special tax is levied)	6,25,522
Public Works	17,49,390
Total	57,98,215

Out of the grant for Public Works Rs. 3,50,000 were devoted to the repair and maintenance of irrigation works in the country.

The foregoing refutations of Mr. Gorst's incorrect statements must suffice. From them, and from the particulars given in the preceding chapter, it will be clear that the charges brought against the administration of the Nizam's Kingdom by the late Minister are wholly without foundation. No doubt Mr. Gorst did not set forth the unveracious statements in his article with conscious and deliberate unveracity. He gives an explanation of his own action when he says, 'In our system of governing India we shut our eyes to disagreeable truths.' This is exactly what he has done. He, a lawyer, accepted *ex parte* statements from interested parties as proved facts and published them as such. The consequence has been the commission of gross injustice. So far from the Nizam's Dominions being ill-governed they are well-governed, and the general conduct of the nation's affairs is such as to make the great Mahommedan State of India a pattern not merely to other Indian States but to the much vaunted British Provinces as well.

APPENDIX.

I.

MR. GORST AND HIS CLIENT.

(From Hyderabad Politics, by Grattan Geary.)

Now let us see what are the facts relative to this admirable Minister of Mr. Gorst's choice. The Peshcar, Raja Narendra, was appointed senior administrator after the death of Sir Salar Jung, having for his colleague Mir Liak Ali, now better known by the title of Salar Jung, the eldest son of the deceased Minister. The Government of India made this arrangement at the suggestion of Sir Steuart Bayley—one of the most experienced and successful Residents ever sent to Hyderabad—in order to bridge over the interval of a year which had yet to elapse before the Nizam attained his majority, fixed by the law and custom of Native States at 18 years. It was expressly laid down that the Peshcar, who was an old and feeble man, but had enjoyed considerable experience in administration under Sir Salar Jung, should give the major portion of the actual work to his young colleague, and himself supply the guidance which official experience qualified him, it was supposed, to give. There was a Council of Regency, but the two administrators were alone to carry on the executive work. Within a few weeks of assuming office, the Peshcar completely ignored his colleague, and, in spite of the remonstrances of Mir Liak Ali, he kept the whole of the affairs of Government in his own hands. We have seen Mr. Gorst's description of his peculiar methods of conducting business. Let us add that he was addicted to opium-eating, a practice which was necessary to keep his failing vitality from sinking under the pressure of State affairs. He refused to work with the official hierarchy, composed mainly of educated natives trained in the British system, and lent by the Government of India to the State of Hyderabad to reform the administration. There was a certain kitmutgar, or butler, who became an important personage of State. He and another man wholly illiterate, and who had not so

long before filled some humble employment at ten shillings a month, were intermediaries between the general public and His Excellency the Peshcar. The ordinary work of administration came almost to a stand.

The reforms laboriously instituted by Sir Salar Jung with the approval of the Government of India, fared badly under the new *régime*. A certain Hunmunt Rao, who had formerly filled the office of Treasurer, committing therein large peculations, for which he was heavily fined in treble the amount, and banished the city for five years, was actually appointed Inspector-General of all the Departments and special Supervisor of Accounts to the Treasury. Hunmunt Rao naturally hated the Salar Jung family, seeing that the late Minister had detected his defalcations and caused him to be severely punished. When he found himself again in the Treasury, the accounts of which are so intricate that very few outsiders are competent to understand them, he was able, without much trouble, to make out a sort of counter-charge against the memory of the late Minister calculated to tarnish the name of Sir Salar and discredit his sons with the Government of India. It was said in Hyderabad that Hunmunt Rao offered to accomplish this measure of vengeance and of policy on the condition of being restored to the office of Treasurer. Young Salar Jung appealed to the Resident against so monstrous an appointment, and the Resident, Mr. Cordery, protested, but without any practical result.

The honest Treasurer had not been long in office when he passed an order, at the instance of the Peshcar, for the payment of a sum of Rs. 82,000 to Mr. Thomas Palmer, a Eurasian Barrister, who had become the Peshcar's unofficial adviser and bosom friend. Salar Jung and Bushir-ud-Dowla, one of the Members of the Council of Regency, inquired for what purpose so large a sum was taken from the Treasury. The Peshcar stated that it was required to make large purchases for the Nizam in Bombay. Salar Jung asked His Highness whether this were the fact. His Highness replied that the statement was absolutely false; he did not want to make any purchases whatever. It was ascertained that the money, instead of being sent to Bombay, was taken by Mr. T. Palmer to Calcutta. The Peshcar was pressed for a further explanation, and he gave one wide as the Poles from that already given. The money was needed, he stated, to pay for advice in connection with His

Highness's approaching accession. It has been asserted in a paper of general circulation in India, the *Pioneer*, that the money was really drawn as a fee for Mr. Gorst, whose advice was sought by the Peshcar, and that statement has never been contradicted. Either Mr. Gorst, or some one else, drew up a document which filled two pages and a half of a printed sheet of foolscap, that was subsequently handed by the Peshcar to the Viceroy as a statement of his proposals for the future government of Hyderabad. There was certainly nothing in the document in question which would seem to an unenthusiastic reader to be worth Rs. 82,000. It proposed that there should be no consultative Council, that a Dewan should have sole and undivided authority, and that to counteract the impulsive temper of youth, His Highness's Dewan should be a person of mature age. It was not natural that at his age he should cherish the ambitious projects which are natural to the young; but such as he was, his whole life was devoted to the State, and his services are at the disposal of His Highness, if they were required. Whether Mr. Gorst wrote this, I cannot say, lacking the confidence of those who declare that hardly any doubt can exist upon the point; but it is unquestionable that whoever wrote the two pages and a half of foolscap, of which we have just seen the purport, was according to His Excellency the Peshcar himself, paid eighty-two thousand rupees out of the Treasury of Hyderabad for the job. His Excellency is evidently quite satisfied that His Highness the Nizam got good value for the money. Mr. Palmer was applied to for information upon the point, but he cautiously referred the Governments of Hyderabad and of India to the Peshcar for any further information that might be required.

II.

MR. GORST'S CHARGES.

From Preface to Memoir and Correspondence of General J. S. Fraser by Colonel Hastings Fraser.)

With the views I have always entertained and expressed as to Hyderabad affairs during the long administration of the late Nawab Sir

Salar Jung, a period marked, as explained in the body of this work, by the establishment of reforms already planned and partially introduced by his uncle, Sooraj-ool-Moolk, under General Fraser's advice and influence, it may be conceived that I read with mingled regret and irritation an article in the *Fortnightly Review* for April 1884, by Mr. J. E. Gorst, M.P., the chief object of which seemed to be to decry the work of Sir Salar Jung's life by a combination of faint praise and undisguised abuse. Mr. Gorst says that Sir Salar Jung's "attempts to establish a sound system of administration failed completely," accuses the Nawab of "hoodwinking the British Government," and says that in this alone his "reformed administration was completely successful" (*Fortnightly*, p. 523). If this were true, it would say very little for the perspicacity or the honesty of the successive Residents at Hyderabad since 1854, who have *all* borne testimony to the progressive and beneficial character of Sir Salar Jung's administration,—testimony accepted and confirmed by the Marquis of Ripon at the State Banquet given in his honour at Hyderabad. (See Additional Appendix, page lxi.) Perhaps, after twenty-seven years of personal observation and experience, my opinion may be considered as valuable as that of Mr. Gorst, whose stay at Hyderabad was limited, I believe, to about three weeks, and whose views as to the condition and prospects of the Nizam's dominions are not in accord with my own observations. Mr. Gorst ventures to say that "the condition of the kingdom is wretched," and that "the people" are "unhappy" (p. 529). I have no hesitation in meeting those assertions with a direct and positive contradiction. The condition of the kingdom and its inhabitants is far better now than it was twenty years ago, and in general prosperity and contentedness the people will compare favourably with those of our own provinces.

The late Ameer-i-Kabeer, whom Mr. Gorst may recognise under his previous title of Wikar-ool-Oomra, father of the present Ameer-i-Kabeer, Khoorshed Jah, frankly acknowledged, in personal conversation with me, that the whole country had progressed in good order and in material prosperity under Salar Jung's rule; adding that the districts under his own charge came quite up to the general standard, for which result he gave much credit to his several Commissioners.

Mr. Gorst introduces the whole subject by saying that at some vague

date, "a few months ago," in some un-named "village in the Deccan," a case of torture for the extortion of revenue occurred, similar to those related in the Reports of the Madras Torture Commission many years ago (page 522). In the absence of some specification and authentication, Mr. Gorst, as a lawyer conversant with the law of evidence, and as a student of history, will pardon me if I decline to attach much importance to this story. I believe that all such malpractices have been as completely put down in the Deccan as in the Madras Presidency.

But Mr. Gorst has formed a very bad opinion of the inhabitants of the Deccan. According to him, the 350,000 citizens of Hyderabad, among whom I thought I knew a few hard-working and meritorious persons in every rank of life, are all occupied in "squandering in riotous living" the wealth produced by "more than 9,000,000 tillers of the soil,"—the sole "pleasure" of those same tillers of the soil being that of "getting drunk on toddy" (p. 522). After twenty-seven years' familiarity with the cities and villages of the Deccan, I do not recognize the picture.

III.

SIR SALAR JUNG'S REFORMS.

(From Memoir and Correspondence of General J. S. Fraser, by Colonel Hastings Fraser.)

Passing over the testimony of the Residents in the earlier stage of Sir Salar Jung's administration, our first appeal shall be made to Sir Richard Temple, who, when Resident at Hyderabad in 1867, wrote as follows, in a dispatch dated 16th August, 1867:—

'In the Deccan, of late years, the constitution, system, and principles of the Nizam's civil government are really excellent: this much is certain. That the result must be more or less beneficial to the country is hardly to be doubted. Whether full effect is given to the intentions of His Highness's Government throughout the Deccan, I cannot yet say; but independent testimony is constantly reaching me to the effect of great improvement being perceptible.'

In the annual *Return of Moral and Material Progress* for 1867-8 compiled at the India Office, it is said:

'The vigorous efforts made towards reform have now placed the financial credit of the Nizam's Government on a satisfactory footing; it

enjoys the confidence of the moneyed class, and it can now raise money at very moderate rates of interest, instead of the usurious charges of former days.'

With regard to the assessment of land revenue, it is said that 'pains have been taken more and more to render the annual settlements equitable and moderate': and that 'all classes, high and low, connected with land or with trade, continue to flourish.' The judicial institutions have undergone the process of being entirely remodelled; and in the annual *Return of Moral and Material Progress* for 1869, the following reference is made to the new class of Magistrates and Judges, who are gradually replacing throughout the country the hereditary and separate jurisdictions, which are still maintained in some great nobles' estates:—

'All these officers are well educated, though all have not done well; several had originally received a training in one or other of the British Provinces. Many discharged their duties with more or less of efficiency; and some have by their firmness and uprightness brought credit to their department.'

In his report as Resident for 1869-70, Mr. C. B. Saunders thus warmly testified to the great improvement that had taken place in the administration of the Nizam's dominions in the previous twenty years:—

'It is hardly too much to say that the Hyderabad with which I first became acquainted in 1860, was to the Hyderabad which was described, for example, in the despatches of my predecessor of 1820, Sir Charles (afterwards Lord) Metcalfe, as the England of the present day is to the England of the Stuarts,—a result essentially due, as Government is aware, to the beneficent administration and sound policy of the present Minister, Sir Salar Jung, and to the support afforded to him by my predecessors in office. Not only was the public treasury full, but the annual income of the State exceeded the annual expenditure by about eight lakhs of rupees, while the credit of Government stood proportionately high. Owing chiefly to the abolition of the baneful system of former times, by which the collection of the revenue was farmed out to contractors, disturbances in the interior of the country had become rare. The Hyderabad Contingent had not fired a shot, except on its own parade-grounds, since the suppression of the mutinies.

'In no respect does the recent administration of His Highness's country contrast more favourably with the state of things prevailing twenty years ago than in regard to revenue matters.

'The police has been put on a satisfactory footing; and life and property are only slightly more insecure in His Highness's territory than in many parts of the country subject to our administration.'

At present there is no reason to suppose that life and property are in the least more insecure in the Nizam's Dominions than in any other part of the Indian Empire. In every respect, and in every quarter,

improvement has been visibly progressive. In January, 1880, after an inspection of the public offices at Aurungabad, the Resident, Sir Richard Meade, wrote a letter to the Nawab Sir Salar Jung, in which, as will be seen from the following extracts, he highly commended the district administration:—

'Now that, I understand,' he said, 'we have finished all that your Excellency wished me to see in connection with the affairs here, I think I may assure you in this way of the very great gratification that has been afforded me by this opportunity of observing their condition and working.

'The work and records of the Survey Department appeared to me to be admirable, and to leave nothing to be desired; and the care that has been bestowed on everything connected with this Department was very striking.

'The Settlement operations are, of course, quite distinct from the Survey work, but I gathered that they are being conducted with equal care.'

In the beginning of 1882, the Resident, Sir Steuart Bayley, went carefully and closely into an elaborate plan for certain reforms in the organization of almost every department of State, communicated by the Minister for his information, and for the benefit of his advice, and the Resident gave to all the details of this plan his cordial approbation.

Authentic statistics, among which may be mentioned those collected by the Imperial Famine Commission, which visited the Nizam's capital in 1878, show a remarkable improvement in the condition of the agricultural population in the Hyderabad State since the accession to power of the late Sir Salar Jung. At the present day the condition of the cultivators of the soil in the Nizam's territories will compare very favourably with any provinces under British rule. They are not heavily taxed, the assessments being very generally much in the ryot's favour. They have never been compelled to contribute to an income-tax, a licence-tax, or any other of those new imposts and cesses with which inventive ingenuity has harassed the people and stimulated disaffection. No land is ever sold for arrears of revenue, or in satisfaction of a court decree; and thus no land in the Nizam's Dominions has passed into the hands of money-lenders and soucars, as has occurred to such a disastrous and alarming extent in other parts of British India, and with a view to check which unpopular and impolitic disturbance of social relations, Mr. Hope's Deccan Ryots' Bill was brought forward.

If the Berar Districts have prospered, as they undoubtedly have, under British management, the other Provinces of the Hyderabad State which have remained under the direct rule of the Nizam, have prospered in at least an equal degree. If tested by the spontaneous growth of land revenue, due simply to increased cultivation, by orderly conduct and absence of crime among the inhabitants, and by the general evidence of their well-being and contentment, the Provinces ruled by the Hyderabad Ministry have made quite as marked an advance as those under the Berar Commission. This advance is, to say the least, quite as remarkable in the Raichore and Dharaseo districts, restored to the Nizam's direct rule by the Treaty of 1860, as in any of the districts retained under the control of the British Resident.

IV.

THE DEBTS OF THE NIZAM'S KINGDOM.

(From the Finance Statement of Sir Salar Jung for 1877).

XXIV. DEBTS.—The details of Government debts up to the 31st Sharivar 1287 Fasli, excluding the Railway debts, are as follows:—

	Rs.		
Temporary Loans	32,392,35	12	3
Bank of Bengal Loans on security of Promissory Notes	18,55,000	0	0
Loans from the Sarf-i Khas revenue, from which no interest is to be paid ..	26,45,924	15	0
Total	77,40,160	11	3

These debts would not have stood so high, but for the circumstances that famine supervened in the years 1286 and 1287 Fasli, which resulted in a loss of revenue to Government, and extra expenditure on relief works and administration. Then there is another fact that must be taken into consideration. Within the past twenty-four years a considerable sum of money has been paid towards debts contracted in the years

preceding 1263 Fasli. The amounts which were found due to Talukdars on the adjustment of accounts had to be paid, and the state jewellery that had been pawned was redeemed. These items, as stated in paragraph 184 of the Financial Statement, amount to Rs. 2,11,18,570. Nearly two crores of rupees have been spent in constructing the State Railway, the interest on which alone would amount to an aggregate of about 75 lakhs, besides a loss of six or seven lakhs of rupees annually on the working of the line. Moreover, a sum of about 80 lakhs of rupees has been spent on public works, many of them more or less productive and essential to the welfare of the country. Mortgages on Jagirs, which have been latterly resumed, have been paid off. A sum of 42 lakhs of rupees has been invested in Government promissory notes. The outlay on these heads alone exceeds the amount of Rs. 5,20,00,000. Reforms and improvements of a very essential nature had to be carried out in every department at an enormous cost, the establishment of a Regular Police Force alone requiring not less than 20 lakhs of rupees per annum. The number of officers and office establishments have been increased in the Revenue and Judicial Departments and at Head-quarters. In years of scarcity moreover, in times past, Government has had to make famine allowances to its Civil and Military officers, amounting altogether to about 98 lakhs of rupees, part of which, namely, the allowance to the Military, is still in force. Sanitary reforms have cost 16 lakhs of rupees, and the famine has swallowed up another 13 lakhs. Out of the revenues of Sharupur six lakhs annually are transferred to the Sarf-i-Khas Treasury, in excess of former assignments, the total payments on which account amount to some 90 lakhs, up to date. Taking all these circumstances into consideration, it is not difficult to account for the indebtedness of the State. Nor does it appear that the existing debts are anything formidable, for, notwithstanding all these expenses, the amount of Rs. 32,39,235-12-3 due to the bankers may be regarded as the only sum that stands as an actual debt against the Government. To meet the Bank of Bengal Loans, we have Government promissory notes to a larger amount to show, while we have no interest to pay on the Sarf-i-Khas Loans, which are by no means large in amount, if we deduct therefrom the sums spent in Sarf-i-Khas public works. The proportion of the revenue of His Highness the Nizam's Dominions for 1288 Fasli, to the whole debt, is thus found to be nearly fifteen to four—in other words, the total debt is a little less than one-third of the

entire revenue. Should we, however, deduct from the total debt the Bank of Bengal Loans, to meet which we have got the Government promissory notes and the Sarf-i-Khas Loans, on which we have to pay no interest, the ratio of the whole debt to the annual revenue diminishes to one-ninth only; and it is hoped that if the seasons prove favourable for a couple of years, a considerable diminution will be effected in the amount of these debts. Indeed it may be confidently predicted that, should no untoward circumstances entailing extraordinary expenditure on the State take place, they will be completely wiped out.

V.

REFORMS IN THE HYDERABAD STATE.

(Bombay Gazette, January 8th.)

HYDERABAD, *January 7th*, 1885.

Yesterday a *Government Gazette Extraordinary* announcing the changes to be made in the general administrative work of the State was issued. It will be remembered that shortly before the death of Sir Salar Jung, that distinguished statesman had formulated a complete scheme of reform for the Government. He had already introduced one or two important changes, notably the formation of a Revenue Board, when his death occurred. His proposals had been submitted to Sir Steuart Bayley and the Government of India, and had met with the cordial approval of Lord Ripon's Government. When the late Minister visited Simla in 1882, Lord Ripon expressed a hope that these reforms would, when introduced, be productive of the good the Minister confidently anticipated. As already stated, Sir Salar Jung died before these reforms were introduced. During the interregnum which followed his death no attempts were made to follow up his plans, although from time to time the Government of India requested, through the Resident, that the Peshkar would not lose sight of the scheme of the late Minister, which was ready to hand. After the installation of His Highness last year, and the appointment of Sir Salar Jung's son as Minister, it was decided to take up the question of the reform of the Administration at the point where it had been left by the late Minister. A few minor

reforms were first introduced, and gradual preparations were made for the final and complete reorganization announced in yesterday's *Gazette Extraordinary*. It should be mentioned that the Minister's brother, Nawab Munir-ul-Mulk, accompanied by a staff of experienced officials of the State, was sent in August, last year, to Bangalore, Madras, Poona, Nagpore, Umraoti, and other places to acquire information which would be useful in the introduction of the contemplated reforms. The Nawab was thus enabled to gain a good deal of knowledge and experience which will prove most useful and valuable to his brother and the Government. After his brother's return the Minister himself went to Simla by invitation from Lord Ripon. He took with him a progress report drawn up by himself, showing what he had accomplished since his appointment as Minister and what he proposed to do. Lord Ripon was greatly pleased with the Minister's account of his work and told him so, both in conversation and in a letter which he addressed to him. The Viceroy approved generally of the proposed reforms, and gave him much good advice regarding the administration of the State generally. Briefly, the reforms are as follows:—The Minister takes personal charge of the Revenue, Judicial, and Public Works Departments, the three most important branches of the Administration. Moulvi Mahdi Ali becomes Political and Financial Secretary, and his duties will be the preparation of annual and quarterly administration reports, budgets, and financial statements, and other important work of a like description. Sirdar Diler Jung becomes Home Secretary, and has charge of the Railway, Police, Stamp Office, Post Office, Mint, Municipality, and Forests. The four Suddar Talukdars, or Commissioners of Divisions, become Subahs with enlarged powers. The Revenue Board is abolished, and most of its work transferred to the Revenue Secretary's office. The Miscellaneous Department is abolished as no longer necessary, and its work distributed amongst other offices. The Irregular Troops Secretariat is amalgamated with the office of the Military and Private Secretary, Major Gough, who will thus be at the head of the whole of the troops of both branches. The appointment of a European of Major Gough's experience and probity to such a high position has given the greatest satisfaction, and is looked upon as a sign that the Government of His Highness is desirous of having its military forces under experienced control in future, with a European at their head. The Munsub or Pension Office, is transferred to the Accountant General.

The Educational Department is given to Syed Hussain Belgrami, whose great ability and experience are a sufficient guarantee that it will be well looked after. He takes this work in addition to his present post of Secretary to His Highness the Nizam. Great changes are also made in the Public Works Department, Mr. Wilkinson, the present Secretary, becomes Consulting Engineer, and is succeeded by Mr. George Palmer. Rai Munnoolall becomes Superintending Engineer, and it is expected that the opportunity will be taken to reduce the expenditure of the Department, which is by far the most costly of its kind in India. The Minister has already announced his intention of supervising it personally in future. A number of minor changes will be introduced in the districts by and bye, but the foregoing are the most important, and are to take immediate effect. The scheme, which has received the cordial approval of the Resident, gives very general satisfaction to all classes of the Government servants, both European and natives. His Excellency the Minister is very keen about its success, and has worked hard to ensure that end.

PART III.

AN ENQUIRY AS TO THE POSSIBLE REMEDY.

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CHAPTER I.

In what direction are we to look for the realization of the hope expressed in the title of this brochure, 'India for the Indians,—and for England'? How are the supreme interests of the people of India to be secured, their poverty rendered less depressing and grinding, and their hopes and desires raised until they become generally what many are already, worthy or more than worthy, to stand face to face with the noblest Englishman who ever found his way to India? And, on the other hand, how are the interests of the British people to be preserved? These interests have grown to enormous proportions. With comparatively insignificant exceptions the Imperial debt of £150,000,000 is held by British investors. There are, also, (1) the Railway stock, totalling many millions; (2) the indigo, tea, coffee, and cinchona estates, representing a capital expenditure and investments at least as great as the

Empire's debt; and (3) the claims of those now employed in the Covenanted and Uncovenanted Services. These interests, combined or singly, are so powerful that the question of giving up India to the Indians and the British retire from the land once and for all, may be dismissed from the mind. There is no conceivable Power in the East which could occupy our place and give us fair compensation for the 'going concern' which we hold in our hands. It goes without saying that these 'interests,' representing perhaps five hundred millions sterling, would not be 'confiscated' without a struggle.

It is not necessary seriously to consider such a contingency as the British retirement, 'bag and baggage' from India. For good or for evil,—so far the good above and beyond one important consideration is hard to find,—the highest concerns of England and India are bound together. We cannot, if we would, give up our great Eastern Empire. Nor, in spite of the discontent which is widely prevalent among our Indian fellow-subjects, is it, in the opinion of this writer, at all likely that we shall ever be driven from the scene of our rule by force of arms.

The situation, therefore, which has to be faced, necessarily involves the maintenance of our connection with India. The writer cannot forbear stating that he, for one, regarding the weal of the two hundred and fifty millions rather than the increased wealth of the thirty-five millions, extremely regrets that this is the case. He would rather, in the interest of the principle of

nationalities and for the development of divers races, see India with as many nations as has Europe, each progressive in its own way and not kept in a particular orbit by the centripetal force of a mighty power, but without the provocation to conflict and the frequent conflicts which are marked characteristics of European State existence. To hope for such a consummation as that, however, is to cry for the moon, and to strive for it is to expend effort in an entirely fruitless direction. Such a doctrine of perfection is too high for us as a nation; we cannot, as a people, attain thereunto.

We are not, therefore, in a *cul de sac*, shut up to the conclusion that all things, as they exist in India in this year of grace, are ideally perfect, in precisely that happy condition which a Beneficent Providence would desire, or even as cultivated and thoughtful human beings, animated by a spirit of justice, would wish; nor need we suppose Indian administration to be an Ark of the Covenant, to touch even the fringe of which would lead to the fate of Uzzah the son of Abinadab falling upon the rash and unanointed individual. On the contrary, this one thing is absolutely certain that Indian administration cannot long remain in its present position. The waters are rising,—we, by our educational arrangements, have opened the flood-gates,—and it is for us to provide channels through which they may flow. Otherwise, we shall find them,—not sweep us from the country, but,—the occasion of terrible mischief and cruel suffering. What is more: the feeling in England, so far as it has, at present, any coherence, any understandable voice, is glad to know

the waters are rising, and will resent any damming with the view of keeping them back. English opinion, the opinion of the millions who now, through the ballot boxes, are omnipotent, once touched with a knowledge of the actual physical suffering in India, especially in British India, and excited (as they easily may become excited) with the knowledge of the manner in which every avenue to distinction in their own land is closed against the people of India and the best places occupied by Englishmen,—English opinion, once informed and touched with this potent twin-fact, will make short work of the existing *regime*, and will replace it with another and a better. Especially, when it becomes clear, as a little consideration will show that it may become clear, such immense relief can be given and justice done without breaking a single engagement or imperilling the investment of a single five-pound note. Many years of democratic rule in Britain will not be required to carry out such reforms as shall vastly ameliorate the condition and raise the status of the average Indian, as well as make provision for the hopes of the intelligent and wisely-ambitious Indian.

Lord Canning, three years after the Mutiny, in a couple of sentences, indicated the first step to be taken. In what is known as The Adoption Despatch, his Excellency said :—

'Should the day come when India shall be threatened by an external enemy, or when the interests of England elsewhere may require that her Eastern Empire shall incur more than ordinary risk, one of our best mainstays will be found in the Native States.'

Again,—

'Our supremacy will never be heartily accepted and respected so long as we leave ourselves open to the doubts which are now felt, and which our uncertain policy has justified, as to our ultimate intentions towards Native States.'

That is the first step,—To make secure beyond all doubt, the existing Indian States.

The second step is,—To create more and more Indian States, until the whole Empire shall become a congeries of such States.

In those ways alone lies safety. Lord Canning had good reason to speak well of the loyalty of Indian Princes and Indian Statesmen to the British Over-Lord. He was Governor-General when the Mutiny broke out and remained in office until peace was ensured and security reigned. Those Native Indian States which he highly eulogises were so many barriers of loyalty; they broke the force of the onrush of rebellion, and rendered comparatively easy the task of overthrow and subjection. With the exception of one or two minor States, too small to be taken into account, the Indian States throughout that trying period, stood firmly by British supremacy. The Nizam of Hyderabad, the Maharajahs Scindia and Holkar, and the late Maharajah of Jeypore, to take the leading Princes, remained staunchly loyal. It was not in Feudatory, but in British, India that the Mutiny broke out. Not Native-Indian, but British, misgovernment caused the outrush of violence. If a sense of gratitude were one of the attributes of

administration frequently displayed instead of capriciously (if ever) exhibited, those who are anxious for the stability of our rule in India would take care that the Nizam, Scindia and Holkar were fostered instead of, as, unfortunately (and discreditably) is the case, flouted. The truth of Lord Canning's remarks was demonstrated five years ago. On the outbreak of the war with Afghanistan the Indian Princes vied one with another in their offers of troops for service beyond the frontier. Ensured against annexation, preserved from Residential meddlesomeness and intrigue, and encouraged in the arts and practice of civilized governments with statesmanlike prescience, the Native-Indian States might soon be regarded as among the most trustworthy and resolute supporters of British supremacy. Unless a course of encouragement is followed so as to lead to this end it is quite certain that the sword which would otherwise be a sturdy weapon of offence will pierce the hand that holds it. There will be no Mutiny, but there will be continued unsettlement and disquiet.

CHAPTER II.

THE time has come to hark back to the wise words of Lord Canning. An anonymous contributor to *The Times*, whose letters on 'The Armies of the Native States of India,' recently appeared in the leading journal and attracted some attention, has published them in a collected form.* The republication is dedicated to the Earl of Dufferin, and we are told 'the student of history can hardly fail to recognise the probability of his having to imitate, in more than one particular, the policy of his great predecessor, Lord Dalhousie.'† Read in the light of the chapters which follow, only one inference can be drawn from the significant reference to Lord Dalhousie. Lord Dalhousie is chiefly remembered as the foe to independent or semi-independent Indian States. Annexation was his watch-word; annexation was his policy. In the passage quoted Lord Dufferin is clearly exhorted to end the disputes which worry the great men of the Calcutta Foreign Office by annexing the States: if by asking for justice

* Chapman and Hall, London.

† Lord Dufferin has already shown the manner in which he is disposed to treat this suggestion. Replying, on December 13, 1884, to an address from the Calcutta Municipality, he mentioned the names of preceding Governor-Generals whom he should strive to imitate. They were Cornwallis, Bentinck, Canning and Mayo. Dalhousie's name was conspicuous by its absence.

they provide a pretext so much the better for the annexationists; if the Princes and their Ministers are circumspect and loyal a pretext must be manufactured anyhow,—by fair means or by foul, the Feudatories must become Provinces and a series of palaces provided near Garden Reach for the Nizam, for Scindia, for Holkar, for the Begum of Bhopal; thereby the loneliness of the ex-King of Oudh will be mitigated. If there be no other reason for annexation, surely this kind consideration for a dethroned monarch is sufficient.

The collection of letters to which reference is now being made is one of the saddest conceivable instances of the maleficent influence which Indian bureaucracy can exert upon the generally fair mind of an Englishman. No lawyer's brief was ever more one-sided than are these communications. Truths are suppressed; suggestions are offered which are utterly untrue. Among the latter this remark may serve as a specimen. 'Nor are the shortcomings of these [*i.e.*, the Native Indian] administrations restricted to military expenditure. The *régime* is bad and it is costly. The Chief thinks only of hoarding up his treasure, and resents as an infraction of his right any request to expend it in the public cause.' Against no one is the parable taken up so viciously or urged with so much persistency as against the Nizam of Hyderabad and his Minister. The reader has had opportunity, in preceding pages, of judging how public-spirited and wise the Nizam's administration has been he can see for himself how utterly baseless is the assertion. From that assertion the partial and unfair

character of the whole work may be judged. The author surveys Native India, as he says, from the Himalayas to Adam's Bridge, and nowhere sees so much as a single redeeming feature. All is rotten; all is vile; even by accident good cannot come out of any Indian Nazareth. By the same reasoning everything done by the British and in British Districts is immaculate. When Sir Galahad discovered, after much search, the Holy Grail, it was not more mystic, wonderful, good, than, according to *The Times*' anonymous correspondent, is the English administration of India. So shockingly unfair is this work, which has been published while the writer of these pages is concluding his humble attempt to enlighten his countrymen on certain Indian matters, so incorrect (not to say false) are many of the statements put forward respecting much maligned races, that if he had not already undertaken the self-imposed task now before the reader he would have felt called upon, in the interest of common fairness, to attempt some such duty. There is too much reason to fear that these letters are a *ballon d'essai* put out to see which way the wind blows, and to ascertain whether it would be safe for Lord Dufferin to out-Dalhousie Lord Dalhousie and leave not a single spot on the map of India unmarked by the British red. Those who believe fairness and freedom should be the same for all men whatever the colour of their skin had need to be on the alert: there is mischief brewing.

The conclusion arrived at by *The Times*' favoured correspondent (favoured inasmuch as the largest news-

paper type and unlimited space were placed at his disposal by the most influential journal of the day) is that the armies of the Indian States must be abolished forthwith, and if the Princes object then they too must, be abolished. Certain figures regarding those armies are given. There can be little doubt the statements are exaggerated; in one or two instances they are clearly inexact. For example, on page 94, it is stated, 'A small army alone is maintained [in Mysore], and although the Maharajah has the right to keep up 2,000 cavalry and the same number of infantry, the force actually under arms does not much exceed one-fourth of that total.' There is a better authority on this point than the anonymous writer. Mr. Seshadri Iyer, the Minister of Mysore, was recently in counsel with the chief inhabitants of the State and laid before them the sad, half-ruined condition of the finances through British mis-government.* In his statement the Minister, discussing possible retrenchment, pointed out that the annual military expenditure was Rs. 7,38,009, that the soldiery consisted of three regiments of Silladar horse and three regiments of infantry. The total numerical strength is about 3,500 men, and the cost per man about Rs. 200 per annum.† For argument's-sake, however, the writer's assertions throughout his series of letters may be taken as correct.

* Our author alludes to English interference as beneficial, and adds, 'The Mysoreans are only taxed at the same rate as if they were the immediate subjects of the Queen.' His information about Mysore seems antediluvian, that is, before the Famine of 1876-77.

† *Madras Mail*, Oct. 28, 1884.

This done, the endeavour will be made to prove that, so far from these armies constituting a reason why the Indian States should be abolished, they, on the contrary, provide a way whereby the most pressing problem of easing the taxation of the people and providing higher and better prospects for those worthy of them may be secured. The summarised statement given is as follows :—

STATES.	MEN.	GUNS.
1. The Mahratta States	59,600	116
2. The Hindoo States	188,475	3,096
3. Cashmere	27,000	160
4. The Mahomedan States	74,760	865
Totals	349,835	4,237

Having placed these figures on record, we may leave them for a while, and somewhat fully consider a reconstructive policy.

In glancing ahead in India there are three things, which have already been insisted upon, to be borne in mind. They may be stated thus.—

First,—British supremacy cannot be shaken, and, in the interests of all, it is undesirable that it should be overthrown ;

Second, — That administration in Native-Indian States is carried on with greater benefit to the inhabitants than is government in the British Provinces; and that, in the employment of Indians in the various offices of the State, and in the promotion of local industries, the good of the respective peoples is greatly promoted;

Third, — These points having been proved, and

always bearing in mind that the one object in view is that of ensuring the greatest good of the greatest number, the duty is imperative to show how it can be accomplished.

Perhaps the writer cannot make the views he humbly and with diffidence ventures to press upon the attention of his countrymen, and,—if they are found worthy of acceptance to ask for support in attempting their realization, — more clear than by putting them in a series of statements, amplifying each statement as occasion may show to be necessary.

CHAPTER III.

OUR attitude towards the Indian Princes should be changed. They must, henceforth, be regarded in the light of associates, and invited to co-operate with the supreme authorities in the good and effectual government of the Empire. Allowing for necessary change brought about by the altered circumstances of the case, the example of Germany towards the various States of Central Europe and their relationship towards the Emperor William should be followed.

On the first of January, 1877, on the historic Plain of Delhi a COUNCIL OF THE EMPIRE was called into existence. It was, probably, modelled after the similitude of the British Privy Council. Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom and Empress of India, it was stated, 'being desirous of seeking from time to time in matters of importance the counsel and advice of the Princes and Chiefs of India, and of thus associating them with the Paramount Power in a manner honorable to themselves and advantageous to the general interests of the Empire,' nominated twenty Princes, Governors, Lieutenant-Governors, Members of the Viceroy's Council and others to be Councillors of the Empire. The Governors, Lieutenant-Governors, and Members

of the Viceroy's Council were *ex-officio* members only. In that Council may be found the germ of a regenerated India and an England satisfied that she is in reality acting in her Eastern realms worthily of her name and reputation and in accordance with her highest and best wishes.

The Council of the Empire has, so far as appears on the face of things, remained what it was on the day of its creation, a Paper Council and nothing more. Nobody has ever heard of its assemblings. Has anyone seen a notification to the effect that the successors to the Governors, Lieutenant-Governors, and Members of the Viceroy's Council in 1877 have been nominated to the honourable office of Imperial Councillor? The creation of the Council was the one good thing of the Delhi Assemblage. Let it be reconstituted, and let it receive a representative—either the reigning Prince or his Minister, the latter for choice — from each Indian State, and, among its members let there be all the officials mentioned in the original document. The Council should have a regular session, meeting for, say, a month or more in each year in some central locality, and to this body might be entrusted the consideration of and decisions concerning:—

(1) All military affairs, including the strength of the Imperial Forces, the location of troops, etc.;

(2) Foreign Affairs, for discussion, not for decision: decision should be left with the Viceroy's Cabinet, in which there should be a moiety of Indians;

(3) The Finances of the Empire;

(4) On a presentation of Reports from all the States and Provinces of the Empire (the Reports should be rigorously insisted upon from every State and Province, however small), consideration thereof, with open debate on merits and demerits in various modes of government.

The Queen-Empress has declared that it is her desire to associate the Princes and Chiefs of India with the Paramount Power 'in a manner honourable to themselves and advantageous to the general interests of the Empire.' In no way probably, certainly in no way yet described, could this worthy object be so well achieved as by making the Council of the Empire a reality, by enlisting the co-operation of the Princes and Chiefs in the Empire's Government, and thereby binding up all their interests with the interests of the Paramount Power. In a word they themselves would become depositories of that power and sharers in the exercise thereof. Half the sting to the people at large, would be taken out of decrees to which the Representatives of India themselves were parties.

The work undertaken by the Council should be of a very select character. The Councillors should deal only with the broad aspects of imperial questions. No detail affecting any particular State or Province should be submitted or considered save under certain contingencies for which special provision might be made. To this end another Reform, affecting principally, the

British Provinces, is urgently required. It should, if things could be arranged in logical sequence, be antecedent to the other, but may, not unfitly, come into being side by side with it. I refer to PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENTS for Bengal, Madras, Bombay, the North-Western Provinces, and the Punjab. The essential features of this suggestion may be thus set forth :—

(1) A Presidency or Provincial Assembly, in which the members of the Executive Council, H.E. the Governor excepted, should have seats *ex officio*; also the Advocate General or chief law adviser of the Administration. In this Assembly, in addition, should sit (*a*) the Collectors (chief administrators of districts larger than many English counties); (*b*) European, Eurasian and Indian nominated members; and (*c*) European, Eurasian, and Indian elected members. Qualification for a vote might be found in the jury lists, proved ownership of landed property, a holding not less than [five] acres, or payment of the profession tax. (An Assembly should, for the present, be so constituted as to leave the Government a majority on any matter which might arouse much discussion and occasion great interest, or in relation to a measure which the rulers felt the interests of the country demanded should be carried, even though the majority of the Assembly thought otherwise.)

(2) To such an Assembly *Financial Control* should be given to this extent, viz., with the exception of Fixed Establishments, which should be discussed only with the consent of the Governor-General in Council first asked for and obtained, every vote of money should be open to scrutiny and question; and (if permission had previously been given to Government Members to vote as they thought fit) on a majority being recorded against any particular vote, it could not be passed.

(3) Non-official members to have the right to put questions to Government on their general policy, or on any public matter whatsoever.

(4) Non-official members to have the right to introduce Bills not dealing with public funds.

(5) The Budget to be annually presented, and debated upon. No money to be spent until the same had been voted, Fixed Establishments excepted.

(6) The Assembly to meet at certain fixed periods of the year.

(7) The Governor-General in Council to have the power to veto any Bill or Money Vote, subject to appeal to the Secretary of State for India, or to the Home Government.

So far as finances and magnitude of interests are concerned, the respective Parliaments would not suffer in

dignity for want of affairs of sufficient importance to consider. This will appear from the following figures :—

REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE OF PROVINCES IN 1883.

Presidency or Province.	Population.	Revenue.	Expenditure.	Surplus.
		£	£	£
Bengal and Assam	71,572,882	18,577,272	8,372,796	10,204,476
North-Western Provinces and Oudh	44,107,869	8,873,058	3,962,536	4,910,522
Panjab	18,850,437	4,465,118	3,307,009	1,158,109
Central Provinces	9,838,791	1,479,180	997,922	481,258
British Burma	3,736,711	2,702,086	1,493,702	1,308,354
Madras	30,868,504	9,462,756	7,233,315	2,229,461
Bombay	16,489,274	10,644,657	9,929,731	714,929

During ten years—1872 to 1881—the various divisions of the Empire handed to the Supreme Government the sum of £108,741,649, as is shown in the annexed table :—

Presidency or Province:	Revenue.	Expenditure.	Difference. Deficit.	Average. Deficit.	Average. Surplus.
	£	£	£	£	£
India	61,715,351	163,362,350	101,646,999	10,164,699	..
			Surplus.		
Bengal (including Assam)	172,609,876	72,418,066	100,191,810	..	10,019,181
North-Western Provinces (including Oudh)	78,487,544	31,364,975	47,122,569	..	4,712,256
Punjab	37,834,667	23,377,568	14,457,099	..	1,445,709
Central Provinces ..	11,058,116	7,517,528	4,540,588	..	454,058
British Burmah ..	17,598,902	9,158,855	8,440,047	..	844,004
Madras	84,881,564	69,066,663	15,814,901	..	1,581,490
Bombay	103,177,947	82,356,313	20,821,634	..	2,082,163
	£567,363,967	£458,622,318	£108,741,649	£10,164,699	£21,138,861
England ..	5,653,556	118,243,805	112,590,249*		
Total ..	£573,017,523	£576,866,123	£3,848,600	* Deficit.	

The whole of the surplus, and twelve millions sterling beside, were expended, on official account, in England.

There is no reason why, being charged with the general oversight and administration of the whole Empire, the Supreme Government, through the Council of the Empire, should not have the control of the sums now annually paid into the Treasury at Calcutta, and several millions beside, the latter to come from the Native-Indian States under circumstances and for purposes to be immediately stated. Enough, it is contended, is shown here in the mere statement of the large sums which the respective Parliaments would, in the expenditure on administration and public works, have to control; in short, the whole expenditure on maintenance and recuperation would be under the control of those who provided the money. The question of deciding upon warfare would continue the concern, as it now is, of the supreme authorities, who, in the criticism and acts of the several Assemblies would find a wholesome and proper check on their actions. These Assemblies would have to find the money needed for an adventurous policy and would, accordingly, have something to say about the carrying out of that policy.

Discontent with the British as such, in the not unnatural and certainly not ignorant impatience of taxation felt by the Eastern as fully as by the Western, would in a very large degree vanish. The people themselves would be associated with us in what we did and would have a Yea or Nay to express to our proposals. Half their discontent would be disarmed.

Through the working of these Presidency Assemblies Indians of capacity would be so trained as to become fit

for any post in the Empire, and no office should be closed to any man whose fitness for it is apparent or has been proved. Beyond our national prejudice (and it must be confessed, insular conceit) there is no reason why, even now, an Indian Financier should not occupy the position of Finance Minister in the Viceroy's Council. Given Presidency and Provincial Parliaments, with control of expenditure, and the prejudice now existing would, of necessity, speedily vanish not only in the particular just mentioned, but in all others likewise.

Coincident with the changes described should come others which would exercise a direct and not altogether pleasing, influence on a particular section of the English people. It would not, in the event considered, be possible to keep sufficiently able Indians out of the posts of Collectors, Secretaries of Departments, and the like. Probably, if there were sufficient wisdom and adequate good sense in the present generation of Britons and Anglo-Indians to allow of such reforms as have been described being carried out, there would not be lacking strength of mind and will to anticipate and to discount the contingency to which reference is now being made and to provide for it in the following or some other feasible way, namely, to announce that, on and after a certain date, of the Indian appointments now open, by competitive examination to English youth, only one-fifth would be continued. Where now the Civil Service is recruited by one hundred persons only twenty should be accepted. Probably, for a generation or two, such an arrangement might stand fast:

even Indians themselves would admit that they would not suffer by a 'stiffening' of their ranks with a fair proportion of Englishmen. Not a little of the merit attending Sir Salar Jung's reforms in Hyderabad arose from the fact that he took English models and adapted them to Indian requirements; those models thus transmogrified, obtained a flexibility in working and adaptability to varied circumstances, to which, previously, they had been entire strangers.

The beneficial consequences of the adoption of the course recommended, or some such similar course, would be immediately apparent. First and foremost, home ability would be brought to bear upon the solution of home questions, and many costly blunders, which now occur through ignorance, would be avoided. Next, and of great economic importance, when the reform had worked into thoroughness, two consequences would follow,—(1) The duties required in the government of the State being performed by persons accustomed to the country, working in their own clime, salaries would be lowered, to the great relief of the taxpayer; and (2) two-thirds of the money paid for salaries and in emoluments generally would be spent in the country, and would be available for expenditure on higher-class education, among local tradesmen, and in a host of ways in the promotion of trade and industry. The 'turn-over' of money, and all the benefits circulation of money produces, would take place *in India* and be enjoyed *by Indians* (native or resident), instead of in Europe and for the benefit of European men of business. In this way, and

in this way alone, would what are termed 'English interests' suffer. Only a select and privileged class simply would be affected. These sectional interests, moreover, would, as will be shortly shown, be over-borne by the general greater benefit accruing, not less to the trade of England than to the general well-being of India.

The adoption of large and generous reforms of the character described, would not stop with the indirect yet very substantial benefits just detailed. Cease to regard the Indian Princes and Chiefs with suspicion, deal with them on the high and noble basis set forth in Lord Lytton's speech at the Delhi Assemblage, respect their sovereign rights when and where those rights do not conflict with the general rights of humanity, and the Viceroy would find the Princes co-operating with him in all that is for the general good of the Empire. If Indian Princes have been staunchly loyal in the face of such treatment as they have been compelled to endure in recent and distant years, but especially recently, from inappreciative and selfish administrators, what might not be expected from them if they were dealt with in a worthy and generous manner and associated, in a liberal and trusting spirit, with us in the high acts of supreme government? At present they are betwixt the Devil and the Deep Sea. The anonymous writer on the armies of the Indian States, to whom reference has been made, seems to rejoice at this condition of things. At least he quotes, in his Preface, a remark said to have been made by one of the Chiefs of the North-West when it was debated whether surrender

to Runjeet Singh or to the English was preferable. The Chief exclaimed, 'It is death for us in either event. If we are caught in the grip of Runjeet Singh we shall die with the sharp pangs of Asiatic cholera. If we come under the shadow of the British we shall pine away of slow consumption.' 'The prediction, although not realised at the time,' adds the Indian-hater, 'may prove true.' There is, however, no real reason why the British influence on Native Indian Princes should be of a withering character. The statement that it is so is the strongest possible indictment of our rule. The British people do not desire that it should be so, and, what is more, once they appreciate the situation, will not have it so. Yet, farther, they may one day demand an account from those who have degraded the British name by their unjust treatment of Feudatory Princes, and Chiefs, and Peoples.

CHAPTER IV.

A properly-constituted Council of the Empire, and an association of the Princes and Chiefs with us in the great task of ruling wisely and well the whole of India would put new life into their veins, and, what is more, provide a solution at one and the same time of the double danger of (1) the over-taxation of the people and (2) the continued existence of the Native State armies as independent forces.

Associate the Princes with the over-ruling Power in its task, treat them generously,—give the Nizam the Berars, hand over to Scindiah the fort at Gwalior, after having impoverished and partly denuded the State of Mysore of its population do not insist upon the increased tribute which the Maharajah cannot pay, without grinding the faces of his subjects, deal in like fashion with all the Princes: act thus, and the supreme government may then, with the concurrence of the respective rulers, take the armies of the Native States as a wing of the Imperial army and reduce its own forces. In the Council of the Empire military affairs would be dealt with, and the Princes and Chiefs, either in their own persons or in the persons of their representatives would have a share in the disposal of those

forces. Their soldiers would be enrolled members of an Imperial army. They themselves would become in reality Generals in the British forces, instead of, as in the cases of Scindiah and Holkar at the present moment, mocked with the shadow of that position. Ample compensation would, by the adoption of the various courses mentioned, be provided for the barren honour now possessed. The Princes, in such instance, would receive more than they gave. The British Raj, on the other hand, would lose nothing; it, also, would gain greatly. No longer would British Forces be required to watch and neutralize Native-Indian Forces. The one purpose of the combined army would be of a military character and its operations carried on only in opposition to a common enemy. "Wielding the whole armed power of the Empire the Viceroy, on occasion, could stamp out disaffection in any one locality with the concurrence and goodwill of the majority. All the irritation and attrition which now mark military relations between the Supreme Government and the respective States would come to an end. An end, too, would be put to the silly vapourings of critics who reckon rust-eaten and dismounted guns as though they had just come from the Armstrong Foundries. In place of useless weapons, serviceable guns would be served to every battery and to each regiment.

This realized, and it is in every whit practicable, it may be well to note the consequences financially; these likewise would be of a beneficial character. To show how this is certain to be the case a few more figures

must be suffered by the patient reader. The offensive, defensive, and protective forces of India, under the control of the supreme government, are as follow*:—

ARMY—EUROPEAN.

	Officers.	Non-comd. Officers & Privates.	Total.
Royal Artillery	601	11,576	12,177
Cavalry	252	4,095	4,347
Royal Engineers	330	—	330
Infantry	1,650	44,318	45,968
Invalid and Veterinary Establishment	40	106	146
Staff Corps	1,190	—	1,190
General List, Cavalry	74	—	74
" Infantry	187	—	187
Unattached Officers	9	—	
General Officers unemployed	81	—	81
Total	4,414	60,095	64,509

NATIVE.

Artillery	23	1,647	1,670
Body Guard	8	194	202
Cavalry	301	17,972	18,273
Sappers and Miners	241	3,019	3,260
Infantry	1,068	101,615	102,683
Total	1,641	124,447	126,088
Total of European and Native Army	6,055	184,542	190,597

POLICE.

	Total sanctioned strength.		Number of force armed with		
	Officers.	Men.	Firearms.	Swords.	Batons. only.
Bengal	3,561	21,395	4,259	1,326	18,585
Assam	522	3,600	2,856	121	1,156
N. W. Provinces and Oudh	4,643	20,137	7,178	11,731	6,395
Punjab	564	19,502	9,412	10,295	359
Central Provinces	1,331	7,262	3,143	554	4,896
British Burma	600	6,719	6,061	627	685
Ajmere	96	486	176	250	446
Berar	451	2,233	1,288	396	888
Mysore	499	4,379	615	155	4,417
Coorg	5	49	—	49	—
Madras	483	24,143	10,191	11,181	21,078
Bombay	3,221	16,126	8,921	6,617	3,867
Total	15,976	126,731	54,100	43,302	63,672

ARMY AND POLICE COMBINED.

	Officers.	Men.	Total.
Army	6,055	184,542	190,597
Police	15,976	126,731	142,707
Total	22,031	311,273	333,304

* The figures are those for 1881, as given in the Statistical Abstract.

The forces of the Native Indian States are (according to the authority already cited) as follows :—

Men.	Guns.
349,835	4,237

Combine together the Imperial Army and the Armies of the States and the result is,—

	No.
Imperial Army	190,597
Armies of the State	349,835
Total	540,432

Add to these the Police as a Force—(half of it is armed with guns and swords)—which makes for peace and good order, and the total number mounts to 683,189. These combined bodies constitute a fighting and order-keeping machine far beyond the requirements of the Empire. Once the Confederated Imperial Council is established the army *in India* would have little else but Police work of a higher order to do. Only the enemy beyond the gates would remain an object of dread and concern. That enemy, Russia, it is clear, without argument, would never so much as dream of attacking an India in which Princes and People, the Foreigner and the Native, were heartily united. Russia's only opportunity of attacking India with the faintest prospect of success lies in the discontent and disaffection which may exist within our borders. Discontent and disaffection now notoriously do exist in India,—not only (and not most seriously) in the Feudatory States, but much more seriously in

the British Provinces. All this peril would be removed by the adoption of a course embodying the chief features of the scheme set forth above. What is more, over and above the binding character which self-interest and the opportunities for distinction, for securing emoluments, and for the satisfaction of reasonable ambition would of necessity ensure, there would be the farther advantage of reduced taxation. The statement which follows will show where sensible and welcome relief for the Indian tax payer may be obtained :

	Rs.	£
Military Expenditure of Supreme Government in India and England in 1883		17,440,250
Do. do, in Native States, on the basis of cost of the Native Army in the Nizam's Dominions (not reckoning the Contingent), viz., Rs. 155 per annum per man	5,41,24,425	
Do. do., on the basis of the Force in Mysore, viz., Rs. 200 per man per annum	6,99,97,000	
Total	Rs. 12,40,91,425	
Take the mean of these two at Rs. 10 to the £ sterling		6,204,571 *
		£23,644,821

* The writer of the Letters to *The Times* says that of the seventeen millions of revenue raised in the Native-Indian States twelve are expended 'for enabling the chief or prince to make a display suitable to his Oriental fancy.' He gives no data whatever for this statement. If it were correct, each soldier would cost on an average nearly £40 each per annum. All who know anything of the Native Indian soldier's mode of life will see the absurdity of the estimate. I think my own estimate too high. But, be that as it may, the reader is in possession of the data on which it is based.

Such an expenditure, however, as twenty-three millions sterling per annum on military account in India is altogether unnecessary. In 1855, before the strategic railways were in existence, less than eleven millions sufficed for all purposes. It is stated, over and over again, by Anglo-Indian authorities, that a large portion of the imperial troops in India are maintained to watch and overawe the armies of the Feudatory Princes and Chieftains. That statement may or may not be correct. Certain it is, that, during the Mutiny, in the State which is the object of the most intense hatred of the Indophobes of to-day, the Hyderabad Contingent was able to leave its cantonments and render gallant service to the cause of the over-ruling Power. Further, when war was declared with Afghanistan and, if the alarmists were correct, the opportunity of the malcontent Princes gave promise of coming, if indeed, it had not already come, these same Princes offered to denude their States of the soldiery they had trained and send them to fight by the side of the Empress's own troops. This, surely, is a strange way of exhibiting the dangerous propensities which are declared to inspire and control the waking thoughts and the midnight dreams of each and all of the Feudatories of the Empire.

Assume, nevertheless, the theory is correct, and a portion of our forces is employed in watching and overawing the Feudatory Armies. The most determined enemy, in the British press,* of the policy advocated in

* *The St. James's Gazette.*

these pages, the most strenuous assertor of Dalhousie-like annexation, states that the following forces in India are engaged in watching the State Armies:—

British Troops.

Artillery	.. ..	33 batteries
Cavalry ..	.. ..	8 regiments
Infantry	.. ..	19 ,,

Indian Troops.

Artillery	.. ..	4 batteries
Cavalry	.. ..	23 regiments
Infantry	.. ..	57 ,,

Constitute the State armies, duly equipped and made efficient, a wing of the Imperial army, let all their aspirations be for the Empire, and, on the showing of opponents, it is clear that a very great reduction might be made in our Indian army,—quite as large as is claimed later on. Military expenditure may be lowered. Our greatest warlike triumphs in India were, as Professor Seeley has reminded the English public, gained when a large proportion of the Queen-Empress's forces were Indian and not English. Such a reform in Indian administration as has been advocated would bring about a recurrence to those times. What was possible, with safety, a hundred years ago and less in India is, undoubtedly, more than possible now. In those days, when our European troops were few and our Indian allies many, the continent was not, as it now is, almost homogenous. Some of the most warlike races in India were not, as they are now, enlisted under our banner, but they were most

powerful foes. If we were only high-minded and heroic enough to treat the Indian people as our friends and were not afraid to associate them with ourselves at the Council Board and in the field, instead of sixty thousand British troops in India, which is now the muster, we should not need more than twenty thousand. It may be remarked that this is a purely military question upon which a layman should not venture to express an opinion: that, in such a matter, the views of experts should be taken, and if those views were contrary to what is stated, were to the effect that, in the condition of things surmised, twenty thousand more and not forty thousand fewer British soldiers would be wanted in our Eastern Empire, the counsel ought to be unquestioningly accepted. Such a contention is contrary to the experience of modern government. The civil government everywhere—not a military clique with the eternal horse-leech cries of 'Give us more troops:' 'There is nothing like guns, unless it be the bayonet,'—dictate what force shall be maintained for a country's defence. In the humble opinion here expressed the unprofessional standpoint is adopted: the writer takes the whole range of history in India since we have been connected with that country, he regards the several incidents of extreme peril which we have encountered, and he expresses what doubtless would be the opinion of all unprejudiced and unprofessional persons who would examine the matter for themselves, in asserting that twenty thousand British troops would, in the Reformed and Uplifted India, be sufficient.

If this contention is, for argument's sake, allowed, it will be easily seen how great a relief of taxation would follow. The cost of a British soldier in India, taking effectives and non-effectives together, is, roundly, £200 per annum. The cost of an Indian soldier, officered by Britons and not too economically administered, is, roundly, £40 per annum. The last-named sum might readily be reduced 25 per cent. Following out this calculation, and taking it for granted that the internal protection of the various States would need to be provided for, that the Indian troops (from British Provinces and Indian States) should number more than twice the total of the Native Army at present we should have to face an annual expenditure thus set forth,—

No. of Troops.	Cost.
20,000 British Troops at £200 per soldier..	.. £4,000,000
250,000 Indian Troops * at £30 per soldier..	.. 7,500,000
Total	£11,500,000

For this sum the adequate protection of the entire Empire could be secured. That is to say, the military budget would be £11,500,000, instead of £23,000,000,—a saving of £11,500,000. This eleven-and-a-half millions, however, are to be saved not out of the British-India revenue of £70,000,000, but out of £70,000,000 plus £6,000,000 which, it is assumed, the Native-Indian armies cost their respective countries. Halve the last-

* That is our own 120,000 Indian troops, and the pick of the Native States' armies. Or, considering the relative numbers of population, we might furnish 200,000 and the States 50,000.

named sum and apportion to the States £3,000,000 of the joint expenditure. That reduces the item to £8,500,000 so far as British India is concerned, and gives nine millions sterling per annum for reduction of taxation. It is not clear, however, that the matter is not put too favourably for the Indian States; £4,000,000 or even more might, with justice, be appropriated as the share to be paid by the Feudatories. If *The Times'* correspondent is correct, and their armies cost £12,000,000 a year, a large sum, even if they paid four four millions between them, would be freed for other purposes of expenditure. It is not clear, however, that the armies of the Feudatory States cost a moiety of twelve millions. There would be this farther gain to economy, that such expenditure as is really necessary would be minimised by unity of administration, and the abolition of costly and cumbersome staffs. But, be the details what they may, all who will approach the solution of the great Indian problem with generous ideas towards the Indian Princes and people and unprepossessed by civil or military professional bias, will, it may be asserted, be prepared to agree that, in the suggestions put forward are to be found means whereby discontent and danger in India may be removed, and in their place diminished taxation, increased security, greater loyalty to the British Crown, and enormously increased prosperity ensue first to India then to England.

There need be no concern as to the loyalty or bravery of the Imperial Army of the future, even if the proportion of Indian troops in comparison with British troops

is greatly increased. Lord Northbrook, in the praiseworthy attempts he has made to enlighten his countrymen on Indian affairs since he returned from India, has reminded us that, during the Mutiny, in 1857, the native troops raised in the Punjab under Edwardes and Nicholson, supported by the courage and the wisdom which made the name of John Lawrence dear to his fellow-countrymen, gave, at a most critical moment, assistance and support without which the struggle before Delhi might have had a very different result. 'And in the memorable siege of the Residency of Lucknow, in which the thoughts of every Englishman were absorbed during many months of suspense, faithful native soldiers shared all the privations and all the dangers of the British garrison. When Sir Frederick Roberts held, not without difficulty, his position at Kabul, the most distinguished regiments of the British Army saw the Goorkhas, the Sikhs, and the Guides side by side with them in every feat of arms. In Sir Donald Stewart's action near Ghazni, and in Sir Frederick Robert's decisive victory at Candahar, the native troops highly distinguished themselves in the field, while their discipline under great hardships throughout two campaigns had left nothing to be desired. But of the feats of the native army in Afghanistan, none would in future be remembered by them with greater pride, and by us with more lively gratitude and affection, than the defence of the Residency at Kabul by seventy-five men of the Queen's Own Corps of Guides. Here, again, as at Lucknow, many of the native soldiers were of the same

race and religion as their assailants, yet not a man among them deserted the four Englishmen whose lives it was their duty to protect at the cost of their own. For a long day they sustained the unequal conflict; and at last, when Cavagnari and Kelly had fallen, when Jenkyns and the gallant young Hamilton had lost their lives in charges against the Afghan guns, the last desperate sally was led by a native officer, Jemadar Jewan Sing. The mention of the name of this gallant native officer reminded him of the many high-spirited native officers whom he had seen in India. Not a few among them were men of rank; and there were remarkable instances of their having distinguished themselves upon service in command of detached bodies of troops.'

The spirit thus described permeates all sections of society. A remarkable instance of this was shown at a great meeting held in Bombay in December, 1884. The Hon. Budroodeen Tyabjee, in the course of an eloquent speech, eulogizing Lord Ripon's character and rule, proceeded to say:—'I ask you, has India ever been so tranquil, has she ever been so happy, has she ever been so devoted to Her Majesty's throne as during Lord Ripon's viceroyalty? During his Excellency's reign we have almost forgotten that we are living under a foreign government. It was not the Queen of England who was ruling over us, but the Empress of India. It mattered not to us that our gracious sovereign happened to be a native of Great Britain, any more than it mattered to our ancestors that the great and wise Akbar, the magnificent Shah Jehan, or the powerful

Aurangzeb were descendants of Mogul conquerors from Central Asia. Composed as we ourselves are, of a thousand and one races, we are concerned not with the race, but with the policy of our rulers.' It is because sentiments so expressed represent the real feelings of our Indian fellow subjects that it is desirable above all things we should so re-organise our administration as to make it but slightly British and overpoweringly Indian. And, in so doing, we should consult the best interests of the millions of India.

CHAPTER V.

SUMMARISED, the reforms advocated for India on the strength of proved fitness in the Indian people for a very large measure of self-rule, are as follows:—

I.—A Council of the Empire, in which all Independent States, Presidencies, and Provinces shall be represented.

II.—Presidency and Provincial Parliaments, partly nominated, partly elected.

III.—Amalgamation of all the Armies of the Empire and of the Indian States.

Among the reasons, in addition to those already given, which may be set forth why it would be advantageous to the Indian people to have self-governing power granted them are these:—

(1) So great a gulf exists between the English rulers and the Indian ruled that, in spite of our admirable district administrative arrangements, we do not know what is going on among the people. It is stated in Part II., page 107, of the Report of the Famine Commissioners, that during the recent famine, Government officers, in certain districts in various Provinces, were *first* made aware of the severity of the distress by the revelations of the Death Registers, received, of course, only some months after the calamity which they

recorded had occurred. '*In many places where it* [famine distress] *was not thought to be severe the height of the death ratio has opened the eyes of Government Officers to the extent of the actual pressure.*' In spite of this *official* confession of failure, *The Times*, in one of its 'leaders' in its issue of February 5, 1885, says, 'We know, in general terms, that a handful of *our countrymen are conducting* WITH GREAT SUCCESS the government of a region two-thirds as large as Europe,' &c. The fact mentioned alone would be sufficient to make it advisable that the continuance of such a condition of things should be rendered impossible. Had Madras possessed, in the autumn of 1876, a Legislative Council, such as is sketched on preceding pages, the terrible scandal of the large portion of the time of the Governor and of the chief officials being occupied in preparing for, and in attending, the Delhi Assemblage could not have happened. While that pageantry was going on, the people of Southern India were dying of hunger by tens of thousands.

(2) The people are admirably fitted for the exercise of self-governing faculties. Says one who has known them well, 'I have worked on a Municipal Board and in numerous Committees with Indians of all races. I have found them able in debate, courteous, considerate, and moderate, whilst their usefulness and the special knowledge they bring to bear upon questions makes them invaluable.' Adminstration in India has become so fearfully complex and far-reaching that, with the best intentions in the world, we cannot continue to rule

satisfactorily upon the existing system. A few more years of the present state of things and a POOR-LAW FOR INDIA *may become necessary*, a Poor-Law not as in England for less than a million of people, but for ONE HUNDRED MILLIONS. Throughout their history Indians have not needed a Poor-Law,—castes and families have each cared for their poor; we are bringing a Poor-Law, with all its hideousness, on the country. It is time we took into our counsel men capable of avoiding the errors we make—not wilfully, but ignorantly.

(3) In those parts of the continent where Indian ideas have had freest play, or where Indian statesmen have had complete control, there is least poverty and greatest prosperity. Witness the Nizam's Dominions. See Travancore and Baroda, where the work Sir Madava Rao has done led Mr. Fawcett worthily to call him 'The Indian Turgot.' Given a fair field and no favour, scores of Salar Jungs and Madava Raos would be produced, as circumstances rendered them needful. The writer of these notes had an opportunity when in Bombay a few years ago, of ascertaining from an Indian gentleman, who, by the way, was no friend of Sir Madava Rao, but the reverse, the most perfect testimony as to the thoroughness of the work done in Baroda by Sir Madava, work which *could not* have been done by the ablest and most philanthropic of Englishmen. Legislative Councils such as are urged would provide an excellent training ground for men of this stamp, but what is of greater importance, would

furnish means for obtaining a knowledge of the country which cannot now, in the fewness of newspapers and other means, be secured.

(4) As an instance of the breadth of Indian views, note the following passages from a memorandum by the Minister to His Highness Holkar, proposing a simplification and reduction of duties:—

The system under which Sayer or Customs' duties are levied in these territories is not much in advance of the old Maratha one. It is far from having reference to scientific principles of taxation, and cannot but impede the growth of trade.

2. The system then imperatively calls for reform.

3. It has to be replaced by one better defined, more simple, more uniform, and far more equitable.

4. The subject is engaging my earnest attention, and, though beset with grave difficulties, I hope it may be successfully grappled with under proper encouragement and assistance.

5. I may briefly mention some of the leading principles I aim at carrying out:

(*a*) Food grains to be generally free;

(*b*) Necessaries to be taxed less than luxuries;

(*c*) A few classes of goods only to be liable to taxation;

(*d*) Places of levy to be as few as possible;

(*e*) Rates of levy to be uniform and intelligible;

(*f*) Transit duty to be abolished, only reserving to us the equitable right to levy a toll, fair and moderate, for the use of roads made at our expense and protected by our police.

6. To the extent these principles are approached trade will benefit, and the benefit will not be confined to these territories; it will extend to neighbouring territories also.

7. It is clear, however, that the reform I contemplate cannot be carried out without considerable loss of revenue; and as improved and improving administration has already entailed much additional expenditure on His Highness's treasury, and this expenditure must still increase, I am not in a position to ask His Highness to sacrifice much

revenue in the Sayer Department for the sake of the reforms I have in view.

8. Anxious, however, as I am to carry out these reforms, and thereby to bring about the development of trade (especially in reference to the railway approaching completion), I am in need of some external help. I think I may venture to suggest how the British Government may, if it feels disposed, grant us some help.

Then follow a number of practical suggestions which, for no good or sufficient reason, the Indian Government declined to accept, but instead thereof proceeded to acts of injustice and unfairness which could hardly be believed of a British administration. Had anything like open Councils existed in India, the wrongs alluded to in the foregoing pages, and hundreds of other wrongs, could not have been perpetrated.

(5) Such reform as is now urged would be in accord with the principles which have been practiced in India since the Queen assumed the government of the Empire in 1858. First, there were nominated non-official representatives on Local Funds Boards, then Municipalities with nominated members, then the elective principle was applied to Municipalities with most excellent results. One of the candidates, who fought his ward in true election fashion, addressing the electors at various meetings, was a grandson of Tipoo Sahib, who was elected, and who is serving on the Madras Municipality, whilst he is also a member of the Legislative Council of that Presidency. Lord Ripon recently took occasion to pay a compliment on the manner in which the work of the Indian Municipalities,

even when considered in comparison with English Municipal Corporations, is carried on.

(6) Provincial Legislatures should be broadened in their membership and should possess large powers and privileges. For nearly fifty years similar powers to those now advocated have been exercised in the Legislative Council of Ceylon, with remarkably good results. The results have only failed to be greater in that Island because all the non-official members of that Council have been nominated, and because only a very few have had seats in the Chamber.

(7) To be effective the Councils, must be, at least, *partially elective.* It is not claimed for the proposals put forward that they meet all the requirements of the situation, or are ideally perfect, but they, at least, form a basis for discussion and consideration. Too much emphasis cannot be laid upon the need which exists for enlisting the interest of the people in the work of government that is carried on for their benefit.

(8) If it be urged as an objection to action that there is no very serious agitation in India for reform, that the people, though they may clamour loudly, are not likely to go farther than words, and that therefore remedial changes ought not to be undertaken, then the answer is easy. If one thing more than another is to be deprecated in an Empire like India, it is popular agitation. This is especially true from the point of view of the few who rule. It should be our policy in India to *anticipate* wants, and to check the agitator-spirit by granting the reforms which are seen to be needed. If

agitation is required, the Indian people can stir themselves to action, as witness the agrarian riots in Bengal a few years ago, where a 'No-Rent' manifesto was not merely issued, but, to some extent, acted upon. Or, again, see the Santhals, who, when refused attention to their grievances, did not long consider whether they should or should not resist. From 'the thought to the thing,' was with them—it may be with others if we neglect our duty—but a leap. The unexampled display of national sentiment which accompanied and will render historical Lord Ripon's departure from India is an illustration of the fact, long known to some, that there are forces developing in India which it were well for us to direct while the chance of doing so is ours. It is unwise to the utmost extent of unwisdom to wait for mass meetings and excited discussions in India before granting reform.

(9) Full and adequate precautions can be taken, so as to prevent the Executive being out-voted, and Government rendered impossible. The time may come when it will be possible to remove further barriers; as to that time no account need now be taken. With a suspensory veto in the hands of the Governor or Governor-General, and with the power, held by the Secretary of State for India, of rejection of any measure, and the possibility of appeal to, and discussion in, the House of Commons, the most timorous need see no fear as to the stability of English rule in India being affected by a reform which, before all other things, is calculated to procure the knowledge of opinions and sentiments of a

vast population, which knowledge, as much as accurate statistics, is essential to good government.

(10) Although outwardly there is peace and content and a fair appearance of things, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the present system of despotism has failed. (*a*) The Imperial debt has become fearfully large; (*b*) taxation is most onerous, (*c*) the price of food-stuffs has alarmingly increased, (*d*) existence is daily becoming a more terrible struggle with all classes, (*e*) discontent with British supremacy is not unknown in the Native States. These untoward events have occurred under the *regime* of benevolent despotism. The few hundred English officers, who are seldom or never rooted in one spot, able to thoroughly know one part of the country, but who are always being changed from one place to another,—(Sir Richard Temple is an instance of this: in his Indian career he has been almost as peripatetic as the Wandering Jew),—even if endowed with supernatural power could not understand the people they rule, and the needs of the country in which they are, without a single exception, sojourners and strangers. If we could separate ourselves from our own connection with India, and see things unprejudicedly and with other eyes, English voices would be lifted up unceasingly against the injustice involved in the present course of action.

(11) *India needs to be ruled* IN INDIA, *not from England, nor, exclusively, according to the English ideas of Englishmen in India.* Far better than bringing Indian Princes or gentlemen to sit in the English Parliament is it to

provide on Indian soil institutions which shall afford a scope for those aspirations which we, by our mode of rule, have called forth, *and must satisfy*.

(12) For the present, at least, agitation in England is necessary. It is difficult to arouse and to sustain in this country an interest in India, shocking though the condition of things may be in our Eastern Empire. At this moment, however, by a fortuitous concourse of circumstances, a very great work may be done by Liberal Associations at the expenditure of comparatively little effort. If Liberals generally and the Liberal Associations will, at this juncture, rise to the height of the situation in which they are placed, and bring the tremendous power they possess to bear upon the House of Commons, a boon will be obtained for India, the importance and value of which, through all time, cannot be estimated. It is impossible to believe that Englishmen will permit a golden opportunity like the present to pass unheeded.

Against such reforms as have been advocated who could protest?

Not the Princes or the Peoples of India: the dignity and power of the former would be increased, while prosperity and all that serves to make life worth living, in opportunities for usefulness and distinction in a nation, would be enjoyed by the people to an extent now hardly conceivable;

Not the Queen, the Parliament, or the People of England: the monarch would acquire greater importance; the Legislature would find a guarantee, in the respective Parliaments and Council which would be

constituted, for that close attention to Indian affairs which it desires to give, but, owing to the multiplicity of matters under its daily consideration, cannot afford; the last-named, in everything that tended to the advantage of their fellow-subjects in India, would find an ample reward: they would not, however, need to trust to that alone;

Not the Cotton Manufacturers of Lancashire whose trade with India has increased 1100 per cent. during the past forty years: Free Trade would continue in our Eastern Empire, the people would be increasingly prosperous and able to purchase more clothing as well as other things than they now can, (manufactories in India are not likely to beat the English factories);

Not the great army of investors in Indian Stock, whether it be of Debt or of Railways, whether the capital is sunk in mercantile houses on the Coast or in Tea and Coffee and Cinchona Plantations in the interior, for their dividends and interests would be carefully secured.

There is, nevertheless, one Class which would object, but that is a small one, and as the process of reform would be gradual, vested interests being saved, there would be little or no personal suffering. This Class need not be too carefully considered; the interests of two hundred and fifty millions far out-weigh the prospects of the children of a few thousands of Anglo-Indian families.

In a word, and making allowances for the imperfections and mistakes which attend upon all things

human, these Reforms, recognising as they do the high capacity and proved loyalty to the British Supremacy of Native-Indians, make for gain every way and for loss in no respect save in a single and selfish one.

APPENDIX.

THE ARMIES OF THE NATIVE STATES.

(*From Preface to Memoir and Correspondence of General J. S. Fraser, by Colonel Hastings Fraser*).

While the greater part of this book has been in type, four long articles, averaging four columns, have appeared in the *Times* (August 20, 26, September 2 and 10), headed "*The Native States of India*, from a Correspondent." These articles, placed in a position of such advantageous prominence, and reviving, as they do, all the contemptuous aspersions against Indian Princes and their rule, which were the prelude to Lord Dalhousie's annexations, are calculated to excite alarm and ill-feelIng in every Native Court throughout India, among our protected Allies, as well as among our tributaries and feudatories. A few words of correction and warning may not, therefore, be out of place here.

The articles abound with blunders and misunderstandings as to matters of fact, that are somewhat remarkable in a writer who has evidently ransacked Blue Books for his information. For example, one of the articles (No. II, "*The Mohammedan States*, August 26) is chiefly given up to "the most populous as well as the largest of all the Native States," Hyderabad, or the Nizam's dominions, and especially to what is said to be its "too lavish military expenditure." He very much overrates in numbers, and especially in the number of guns, the troops in the immediate service of the Nizam. Instead of that Prince having 725 guns in "his Army," he and the principal Chieftains holding lands under him on military tenure, have not altogether more than 30 guns equipped, a few horsed, and others with bullocks, capable of making their appearance on parade. The large number of guns mentioned in the article can only have been arrived at by counting up all the old guns, mounted and dismounted, for the most part mere old metal, lying about in dismantled

forts all over the country,—not the guns of "an Army," and not even capable of being so converted.

It is only by this enumeration of old honey-combed cannons without carriages or means of transport, that the ridiculous returns can have been made of "Hindoo armies with which the Central India Agency has to deal," of "not fewer than 3,180 Cavalry, 34,000 Infantry, and 434 guns, in addition"—it is added—"to the forces of Gwalior, Indore, and Bhopal."

PART IV.

THE OUTLOOK.

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THE English people have not been suckled and brought up on the Evangelical creed of Christendom in vain. The central feature of the Evangelical creed is embodied in the sentence: 'Without shedding of blood there is no remission.' It matters not in what direction the eye is turned this doctrine finds full exemplification. Is reform needed in the land laws of Ireland? Then, 'without shedding of blood' by the assassin, reform cannot be accomplished: the greatest statesman of his age is not able to carry his reforms through a Liberal House of Commons without this (unsought and undesired) assistance. It has become a part of the common speech that a reform may not be hoped for in our railways until a Bishop or a Director has been slain. Even respecting so moderate and wise a change as the Franchise Bill of 1884, Lord Randolph Churchill declared he should not believe in the earnestness of the people for further reform unless the bad doings, the arsons, the attacks upon property, the assaults upon individuals, which marked the pre-Reform era fifty years ago, were repeated. 'Without shedding of blood there is no remission' runs like a

scarlet thread through every department of our national existence: it marks every work we undertake and mars much that otherwise might be wholly beneficial.

In India we are exaggerating this national and Christian characteristic. Even with 'shedding of blood' there is not remission. Not wholly for want of will does this lamentable state of things exist; efforts are made but they run on old lines wherein the benefit proves to be for the foreigner and not for the native. Not, again, out of ill-will or desperate malice, but because foregone conclusions are acted upon. An Insurance Fund against Famine of one-and-a-half million a year is added to the taxation of the country. First, it is pounced upon to pay a portion of the expenses of a needless war in Afghanistan. Then, it is determined to expend the sum year by year upon railways and other means of communication: as though iron roads were, in a poverty-stricken and steadily-drained country, panaceas of famine, and as though the most disastrous famine of the century had not, within our immediate recollection, occurred in Provinces fairly well supplied with railways. We take the people's money to preserve them from famine, and all of it, except the mere cost of labour, is expended in England for supervision, for iron or steel rails, for engines and coaches; even the English investor finds an outlet secured for his surplus cash—in a guaranteed loan in many cases: where the loan is not guaranteed the reason is because there is a moral certainty of the projected line paying a dividend


better than is received from English Consols. This is taking one shilling from the Indian people, and spending the larger portion, say eightpence, for the profit of the English manufacturer and investor. Under such a system, and, in spite of the multiplication of railways, famines will increase in the land, the last state of the unfortunate people will be worse than the first, and the tale of blood exacted more and more fearful.

The pages of this little book were commenced in a hopeful spirit: in the spirit which finds expression in the dedication. It is concluded in a spirit of hopelessness. For, while the writer was arranging the facts found very largely in the publications issuing from the India Office, and noted how the significance of the statements published were overlooked or wholly ignored by those whose duty it is to read them aright and to act on the conclusions wherever those conclusions may lead; and when, further, he remembered the many good men and true who had taken up Indian subjects from John Dickinson to Henry Fawcett and the non-result which seems to have followed their earnest and devoted efforts, his heart sank within him. 'Of all the questions I undertake,' said the late Mr. Fawcett a few years ago, 'there is none respecting which I feel more helpless as about the duty I try to perform for India.' Greater men than he who has just passed away, mourned by many millions who never saw him, may well feel despairing when such a Chief let the banner fall in his hands and almost drop from his grasp.

But farther, a glance at the aspect of affairs in India

calculated to deepen the gloom and intensify the despair. A mild reform, a mere effort with the little finger, was attempted by the Marquis of Ripon: it was met, on the part of Anglo-Indians, with an agitation the virulence and violence of which, even now that the echoes have died away, cause a shudder of shame as one recalls the narrowness of mind and the cruel illiberality of the agitators. The Ilbert Bill, the removal of the gag from the Native-Indian Press, and the Local Government Reforms of Lord Ripon being past history, what is there on the horizon of Indian politics to inspire hope? There is nothing, absolutely nothing. Nay, there is one exception: it is the anticipation inspired by the arrival of the Earl of Dufferin in Calcutta. That man, however, who, after considering the influences to which the Viceroy will become subjected, can find satisfaction in such an anticipation has a sanguine disposition almost beyond conception. In no single one of the Presidencies or Provinces is there aught, at this moment, to afford confidence to those who wish the future to be more full of benefit to the Indians than the past has been. Mr. Grant Duff went to Madras with a great reputation; he has frittered it away in trivial tasks, in compositions portentous Minutes the paragraphs whereof may be numbered by hundreds, and which seem shovelled together in a pell mell fashion, in which all sense of proportion is lost,—a wayside weed receiving as much attention as a matter involving the well-being of a multitude. Worse than this he delivered the destinies of the town and district of Salem into the hands

"There is one simple test which we may apply to
questions: let us never forget that *it is our duty to govern*
FOR OUR OWN PROFIT AND ADVANTAGE, BUT FOR THE
OF THE NATIVES OF INDIA." — LORD NORTH
Viceroy of India."


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INDIA FOR THE INDIANS

—AND FOR ENGLAND.

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